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ABSTRACT 
Christopher George Faricy: The Politics of Public versus Private Social Welfare  
(under the direction of Virginia Gray) 
 
The United States has a divided social system in that both the public and private 
sectors provide citizens with benefits and services. The effects of political party control on 
public social policy are widely known. An area of study less understood is how partisanship 
influences private social benefits. I develop and test a theoretical argument that political 
parties' choice between indirect and direct social expenditures is primarily motivated by a 
desire to alter the balance between public and private power in society. The two major 
political parties have divergent philosophies on the role of government in society due to their 
significant differences in core democratic values and electoral coalitions. First, I properly 
conceptualize social policy as a choice between direct and indirect spending, using a new 
data set of federal tax expenditures. Next, I find no statistically significant difference 
between the Democratic and Republican parties in annual changes to total social 
expenditures. Additionally, my results show that Republican influence in the legislature 
results in a higher ratio of indirect to direct social spending, more private-sector spending, 
and increases to income inequality. These results have implications for determining the 
providers and beneficiaries of social benefits, the balance of power in society, and economic 
inequality.  
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CHAPTER I 
THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SOCIAL WELFARE 
My dissertation attempts to recast our understanding of the relationship between 
political parties and social policy through offering a new theoretical argument that builds on 
research from political institutions, public policy, and comparative politics. Common wisdom 
argues that the Democratic Party advocates for the creation and expansion of social programs 
while the Republican Party supports cuts to social benefits and spending. This traditional 
narrative misrepresents the reality of government activity in modern politics. The important 
difference between the two major political parties is not in the total amount of resources 
allocated to social policy but in the modality of social financing mechanisms. The United 
States has a divided social state in that both the public and private sectors provide citizens 
with social benefits and services. Public policy finances both these sectors and a deeper 
understanding of partisan politics is achieved by operationalizing social policy as a choice of 
policy tools. I develop and test a theoretical argument that political parties' choice between 
tax incentives, also known as indirect spending, and direct expenditures in funding social 
programs is primarily motivated by core democratic values and electoral goals. This 
dissertation demonstrates that partisan policy choices over social policy alter the balance of 
power between the public and private sectors in ways that influence economic inequality in 
America.  
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Politics is the authoritative allocation of values (Easton 1965). In the United States, 
the interplay of liberty and equality determines political culture and conflict. Although U.S. 
citizens recognize both values as being distinctly “American,” domestic political conflict is 
organized along the dividing line between equality and liberty. There is a clear relationship 
between these two core values and the political ideological spectrum. The belief that 
government should construct policy to encourage societal equality is a cornerstone of liberal 
ideology. According to progressive theorists, the root cause of economic and social 
inequality is the maldistribution of resources that occurs as a result of growing capitalist and 
unregulated capitalist economies. Liberal ideologues promote the use of government to 
correct for market failures or abnormalities that disrupt the equality necessary for a 
functioning republican democracy. Conversely, conservatives view the potential abuse of 
government power and the growth of the state as the major threat to individual liberty. 
Therefore, conservative advocates promote government activity that shrinks the influence of 
the public sector and grows the private sector.  
In this dissertation, I examine the role of political parties in both the legislative and 
executive branches in bringing about different ratios of indirect to direct social spending and 
the resulting implications these changes have on private markets and economic inequality. 
The government allocates financial resources to social programs using multiple methods such 
as appropriations, grants, loans, and tax expenditures. In this project, I present a new 
conceptualization of social policy as a choice between direct and indirect social expenditures. 
This representation of social policy more accurately reflects the reality of the policy process 
and therefore can better capture the true differences between the two political parties over 
how best to provide economic security. The use of indirect and direct social spending allows 
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for two new measurements of social policy: an aggregated measure that includes both 
expenditure types and a ratio measure, demonstrating how the two spending types move 
together. I expect that the new aggregated measure of social spending, when regressed on 
party control, to challenge existing theories of political party control and changing levels of 
social expenditures. In addition, I expect the Republican Party to support the use of indirect 
spending that subsidizes businesses in social provision and redistributes income to wealthier 
citizens. Next, I present a theoretical argument on the divergent partisan motivations for 
social spending. The Democratic Party values producing more societal equality and uses 
public policy to shift monetary resources to the public sector as a means to assuage market 
inequities and direct public monies to their constituencies. Conversely, Republicans are 
primarily motivated in maximizing individual freedom from the perceived encroachment of 
government and, therefore, use public policy to move economic resources to the private 
market and their constituencies. Subsequently, I offer a second unique data set on pure 
private-sector social spending. I predict that Republican Party control of government results 
in more indirect social spending (and less direct social spending), thereby stimulating 
business spending on social benefits and services. Finally, I theorize and test the relationship 
among political party control of government, the social expenditure ratio (indirect versus 
direct), and income inequality. I expect that Republican Party control increases the ratio of 
indirect to direct social spending, resulting in changes to the direction of income 
redistribution and greater income inequality. Understanding these relationships is critical to 
properly representing the size, scope, and scale of political party influences on the American 
social welfare state. 
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American politics is a battle over the proper balance between democracy and 
capitalism. The concept of individual liberty is the most important feature of theoretical 
capitalism. Capitalism presupposes the freedom of labor, the freedom of competition, and the 
free exchange between buyers and sellers. Democracy rests on the postulate that all 
individuals are essentially equal since no one person possesses greater inherent worth than 
another person. The equality of common humanity is the undergirding of democratic 
standards such as popular sovereignty, the universality of human rights, and the guarantee of 
minority rights. Within the American political system, however, economic individualism and 
egalitarianism do not easily coexist. The two major political parties represent contrasting 
philosophies over the role of government in the economy. The Democratic Party has both 
ideological and electoral incentives to use public policy to check the growth of capitalist 
markets while promoting the “American” ideals of equality and fairness. Republicans view 
capitalism as the fairest and freest system for organizing human behavior and use public 
policy to assist businesses and reduce the scope of the public sector. As a result, political 
party control of government results in changes to public policy that shifts power, resources, 
and jurisdiction between the public and private sectors.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
A THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Since the New Deal, the fundamental dividing line between the Democratic and 
Republican political parties has been over the size of the federal government. Extant research 
reveals a consistent relationship across time between Democratic Party control of 
government and higher levels of domestic spending (Cooper and Bombardier 1968; Mayhew 
1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Many of these same studies demonstrate that increased 
Republican influence correlates with less government spending. While these relationships are 
undoubtedly true, most empirical research does not take into account many of the fiscal tools 
used to finance public policy such as tax expenditures, grants, and loans. These policy tools 
have all grown more popular in recent decades and constitute an increasing percentage of 
public financing efforts. The unnecessary exclusion of these financing instruments both 
restricts our ability to build robust theory and empirically misrepresents the full effect of 
political institutions on public policy. The focus on the size of government, represented by 
changes to spending through the appropriations process, misses much of the important 
political action at the federal level. In this dissertation, I argue that transformations to social 
policy occur not only in adjustments to the annual level of appropriations spending but also 
in the modality of expenditures used to finance social benefits and services. The policy 
choice that political parties' encounter in choosing between tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures involves more than the deliberate selection of a mechanism to finance public 
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policy.  The choice between indirect and direct spending is essentially about altering the 
balance between public and private power in society. 
Why would political parties in government use public policy, in general, and 
government spending, in particular, to move resources from one sector of society to another? 
A political party's decision to finance the public or private sector is primarily a function of 
their members' policy and election goals. The Democratic Party values societal equality and 
therefore uses public policy to allocate monetary resources to the public sector as a means to 
assuage economic inequities and progressively redistribute income to their constituents. 
Republican Party members are interested in maximizing individual economic freedom from 
the perceived advancement of government power and therefore use policy to shift public 
funds to the private market. This theoretical argument challenges the idea that only the 
Democratic Party actively supports social policy through increases to government spending. 
In recognizing America's bifurcated social system, the analysis of party conflict can move 
away from debates over the size of government to the study of political parties' perceptions 
of social benefits as either a right of citizenship provided by the state or a commodity sold in 
market. The difference between direct and indirect spending not only tilts the balance of 
power between the public and private sectors but also has tremendous implications for who 
provides social benefits, who receives social benefits, and the direction of national income 
distribution.  
This chapter is organized into the following sections: literature review, political and 
policy contexts, the theoretical problem, and a theory of political parties and social policy. In 
the literature review, I situate this project among research on political institutions, 
comparative politics, and public policy. Second, I present modern political and policy 
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environments for this study from 1967 – 2007, which are salient to understanding the causal 
mechanisms behind party influences on the changing social welfare state. Next, I lay out the 
theoretical problem in existing studies’ failure to properly conceptualize the dual nature of 
public policy. Finally, I present a two-pronged theoretical argument of political parties and 
social policy that argues political parties’ policy and electoral goals are primary in 
determining changing levels of social expenditures in the United States.  
Previous literature on political parties and social spending 
Political institutions influence public policy outcomes. Specifically, political party 
control of government has been found to affect policy, whether measured as important 
legislation, regulations, or government spending (Cooper and Bombardier 1968; Ripley 
1969; Sundquist 1973; Clausen 1973; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). As applied to 
social policy, the Democratic (or leftist) Party continually expands social welfare through 
increases to government spending while the Republican (or rightist) Party contracts social 
programs through spending cuts. This resilient relationship has been found across time 
(Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002), across levels of government (Fellowes and Rowe 
2004), and across countries (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993, 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001).  
The relationship between political parties and changes to the social welfare state is 
central to the study of comparative politics. Esping-Andersen (1990) in The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism argues that three entities provide social welfare: the state, the market, and 
the family and that understanding the role of public policy in social provision has to account 
for political parties influence on all three units. Esping-Anderson presents three typologies 
for social policy in advanced capitalist countries based upon worker decommodification:  
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liberal, conservative and social democratic. The United States is qualified as a liberal state, 
given the dominance of the private market in social policy and the unique ratio of public to 
private social welfare spending as compared to other Western industrialized nations. The vast 
majority of comparative research on social welfare policy focuses strictly on public programs 
and spending. Cross-national comparisons of social welfare that include only public spending 
demonstrate that U.S. expenditures are lower than those of all other European countries 
(Weir et al. 1988). Yet, to ignore tax subsidies for the private sector social spending 
disregards over one-third of total social spending in the United States (JCT 2008). Recent 
studies from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show 
that if tax incentives for private social welfare benefits and public sector spending are 
accounted for in total expenditure measurements, American social spending as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rises to the international average (Adema et al. 2005). In 
table 2.1., thirteen OECD countries are compared across three different types of social 
spending categories in 2003: direct, indirect, and total expenditures. In ordering the 
countries’ social policy effort using the traditional metric of direct public spending as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the United States ranks last of the thirteen 
nations. However, America’s social welfare effort ranks first in the category of indirect social 
spending or tax subsidies. The final column displays total social spending, a combination of 
the direct and indirect. The United States rises to ninth, just below Norway, in the total social 
spending rankings, demonstrating the importance of including all expenditure methods when 
calculating comparative social welfare efforts.  
    Public policy studies evaluate the role of government in the creation and 
maintenance of America’s divided social system. Jacob Hacker’s The Divided Welfare State 
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(2002) demonstrates how public policy influenced the trajectory of private social benefits and 
in turn how the private social system colored policy decisions about public social programs. 
Hacker argues that what is unique about the American system, from a comparative 
perspective, is not the low percentage of social spending but the extent to which the private 
market is responsible for the provision of social benefits and services. He proposes a theory 
of policy path dependence and feedback that demonstrates why the private side is so heavily 
represented in the health care insurance industry but less so in the provision of old-age 
pensions. Other scholars argue that the growth of the private sector is the most significant 
change in modern social policy and is driven in large part by the increased political 
popularity of the policy tool of tax expenditures, or indirect spending (Howard 1997). 
Typically, research on political parties and spending does not recognize the historical use of 
subsidies and tax expenditures, which represent a significant portion of government efforts to 
address social needs in the United States (Howard 1997, 2007). Tax expenditures for social 
policy are not part of the appropriations process and therefore not captured by most studies of 
political parties and spending. Tax expenditures are segments of the tax code that provide for 
deductions, special exclusions, and credits for privileged individuals, organizations and 
activities. Christopher Howard argues that "most finance experts consider tax expenditures to 
be conceptually equivalent to direct spending" (1997, p.3). Therefore, a more accurate 
depiction of the relationship between parties and social policy should consider indirect 
spending side by side with direct social expenditures.  
This dissertation offers a new theoretical argument on the motivations of the two 
major political parties in selecting specific modalities of public policy. The two major 
political parties each increase annual public spending in ways that align with their distinct 
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election and policy goals. This line of argument is similar to the idea of interest-group 
liberalism offered by Theodore Lowi (1969). Lowi argued that the American style of 
pluralism was liberal in that it offered a positive view of the power and ability of government 
to shape societal outcomes and the public good was determined by the majority party’s 
special interest coalition. I agree with Lowi that both political party elites, despite the limited 
government rhetoric from the Republican Party, have activist views of the federal 
government and use government power to distribute benefits and services to their 
constituents. In addition, Lowi was correct in implying that conservative and liberal 
ideologies should not be thought of as a disagreement over the size of government. I depart 
from Lowi in the specific motivations behind why political parties support different forms of 
social policy. First, I argue that political parties allocate benefits and services mainly to 
electoral constituencies, not necessarily special interests. Now, this is an imperfect division 
given that many electorally important social-economic groups have organized interests 
representing their concerns in social policy debates. In addition, I argue that political parties 
have incentive to select policy instruments that align with the party’s ideological leanings. 
Elected officials are interested in adhering to their party’s dominant ideology for both 
personal and political reasons. Often times, private citizens who decide to run for office are 
ideological outliers and are willing to undertake the sacrifices that come with public life for a 
chance to produce policy outcomes that align with their ideology. Finally, strict ideologically 
policy positions have a political payoff given that ideologically extreme voters are more 
likely to vote, donate money, and volunteer for campaigns.   
The full theoretical model of how political party control relates to social policy and 
economic inequality is in presented in figure 2.1. Specifically, the Republican Party 
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motivated by the core value of economic individualism and election goals use public policy 
to shift public resources and federal jurisdiction to the private-sector thereby taking away 
resources and jurisdiction from the public sector. Not only do businesses and wealthy 
individuals hold a privileged position in the private-market, their activities are subsidized by 
Republic social spending patterns and policy. These social policy changes represent a 
tradeoff, in that government revenue is distributed towards the wealthy by subtracting funds 
and diminishing the scope of programs aimed at assisting the working classes. This shift in 
social policy results in redirection of national income towards the wealthy both through 
direct policy changes and the indirect effects policy has on the interaction of the public and 
private markets. In conclusion, Republican control of government correlates with an increase 
in indirect social spending at the expense of direct spending resulting in an overall growth of 
income inequality.  
The Political and Policy Contexts of the Study 
The political and policy contexts of this study are salient to understanding the 
postulates and theoretical argument of the dissertation. Specifically, the rise of political party 
polarization and the end of the Great Society era are important elements for both the theory 
and research design of this study. The time period of this study runs from 1967 – 2007 due to 
the restricted availability of the data for indirect spending. Therefore, the theoretical 
argument and scope of this project is situated in the recent forty year period and not designed 
to be ahistorical. Over this period, the most important political trend was the polarization of 
the two major political parties at both the elite and mass levels. Political polarization is the 
increased intraparty preference homogenization as evidenced by the ideological position of 
each party’s members moving closer together in space and time (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; 
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McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997). For example, roll call votes in Congress are more 
frequently divided between liberals and conservatives in the last forty years than at any other 
time since 1947 (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Political 
polarization in Congress has resulted in more ideologically extreme members replacing 
previous legislators who were more moderate and therefore willing to cross the aisle and 
work with the other party. As polarization increased, political parties acted more as unitary 
actors in the policy process resulting in the emerging trend of “conditional party 
government” (Aldrich and Rohde 1999). Aldrich and Rohde argue that as members’ policy 
preferences homogenize, they have greater incentive to provide party leadership with the 
power and resources to force ideological discipline, resulting in final policy being decided at 
the majority’s mean – not the chamber’s mean.  
During the period of party polarization, political parties gained more institutional 
power in government. The majority party served as an important organizing mechanism in 
Congress, as party and caucus leaders became more willing to use their powers in the 
composition of committees and legislation. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Cox and 
McCubbins (1993) demonstrate majority party influence on committee assignments, 
committee transfers, aggregate expenditure levels, and roll-call voting. The dual trends of 
conditional party government and increased institutional power gave the majority political 
party greater power in distributive politics. In this study, I assume that the Democratic Party 
and its leadership have sincere preferences for liberal policy. Conversely, the Republican 
Party and leadership have sincere preferences for more conservative public policy outcomes. 
The second postulate that stems from these trends is that a political party in the majority has 
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the institutional power to act as a unitary actor in the execution of trading off one type of 
spending for another.  
In addition to elite-level polarization, the mass electorate polarized politically as well 
as along economic and racial lines. As the political parties polarized, their messages and 
contrasting preferences for public policy became more clearly communicated to the voting 
public. As a result, party identification became more important to voters as people realized 
there were significant differences between the two parties on policy preferences across issues 
areas (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hetherington 2001: Layman and Carsey 2002). In 
addition, mass partisanship has become increasingly correlated with income over the past 
century. As the two political parties polarized over economic issues, the electorate has 
followed their lead. The wealthiest Americans increasingly identify with the Republican 
Party while working-class citizens are more reliably aligned with the Democratic Party. For 
example, the top income quartile was only marginally more likely to identify with the 
Republican Party in 1956, but in 2000, those in the top quartile were more than two and half 
times as likely to identify with the Republican Party as the lowest quartile (McCarty, Poole, 
and Rosenthal 2007). Political parties have separated not only along class lines but racial 
lines as well. The Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s sparked an exodus of white Southern 
voters from the Democratic to the Republican Party. As of the 1960s, the Democratic Party 
became more likely than the Republican Party to support aid to racial minorities, and 
therefore racial policy developed as an important characteristic dividing the two parties 
(Carmines and Stimson 1989). The high correlation of race and income class has only served 
to reinforce the electoral and policy differences between the two major parties. The 
Democratic Party increasingly represents working class and minority voters while wealthier 
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whites identify with the Republican Party. The bifurcation of the electorate has made it easier 
for political parties in government to target their constituencies through changes to social 
policy.  
The Social Policy Context: The End of the “Big Bangs” and the Rise of the Shadow State 
Both the public and private provision of social benefits and services drastically 
changed from 1967 – 2007.  A basic responsibility of any government and the core of 
domestic policy is the provision of social benefits and services to citizens. Social policy is 
commonly defined as any government effort to provide economic security to citizens through 
protection against income loss and guaranteeing a minimum standard of living. This 
definition allows and even invites us to examine all the ways through which government 
activity determines policy outcomes. I incorporate two basic facts that are missing from most 
analyses of the relationship between political parties and social policy: first, social policy is 
divided between the public and private sectors and second, public policy decisions finance 
and regulate the private social system in the United States.  
The public social system was created largely during the two “big bang” periods of 
social policy: the New Deal and Great Society eras. These periods of policy punctuation 
occurred when the Democratic Party controlled the executive branch and enjoyed large 
majorities in Congress. This study starts after the Great Society, the second of the big bangs, 
and is generally referred to in public policy as an era of social policy retrenchment. During 
this period of retrenchment, supporters of public social programs were forced to justify the 
existence and current level of social benefits rather than focus on social policy expansion. On 
the public side, means-tested programs aimed at assisting the poorest citizens were scaled 
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back or devolved to the state level (Fellowes and Rowe 2004). In addition, many federal 
social programs experienced policy drift. Policy drift occurs when social services and 
benefits remain stagnant while inflation and changing labor markets erode the extent and 
generosity of social insurance (Hacker 2004). There were only a smattering of new social 
programs created during this time such as the Supplemental Security Income Program, Pell 
grants, Adoption Assistance and Foster Care, Child Care Block Grant, the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program and Medicare Part D. Medicare Part D subsidizes prescription 
drugs by allowing citizens to obtain benefits through two private plans: Prescription Drug 
Plan (PDP) or Medicare Advantage (MA). Conversely, popular non-means tested programs, 
such as Social Security and Medicare, added some supplementary programs, increased in 
generosity or had their payments tied to inflation. Recently, scholars have recognized the 
different path trajectories of means versus non-means public social programs and relabeled 
this period as selective retrenchment (Mettler 2007). Medicare and Medicaid spending 
increased dramatically mainly due to cost increases in the health care industry. In conclusion, 
the public social system experienced mixed results with programs for the poor and 
unemployed usually being scaled back while benefits for senior citizens and the disabled 
were maintained or expanded.  
The private social system in America grew in large part due to changes in public 
policy. The use of alternative policy tools to fund private, mainly employer-based social 
benefits and services is often referred to as the “hidden,” “shadow,” or “subterranean” social 
system. Just in the last forty years, the proportion of total American social spending in 
constant dollars that came from the private sector increased by more than 25%, even though 
the United States already spent the most on private social welfare in the industrialized world 
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(SSA)1. Some of the most important tax expenditure programs for social welfare originated 
in the period of this study. Two of the largest tax expenditure programs were expanded under 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which created new tax 
incentives for employer-based retirement and health care insurance. Under ERISA, employer 
plans must allow worker pensions after a determined minimum number of years of service, 
and it also created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure companies’ 
benefits plans. ERISA created new government tax subsidies, which provided companies 
incentive to shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans. Surprisingly, 
ERISA had even more of an impact on employer health insurance than it did on employer 
pensions. Although the act did not require employers to provide health insurance, it heavily 
regulated employers who volunteer to establish an employee plan along with creating the 
accompanying tax deductions and exclusions. There have been a number of amendments to 
ERISA’s health insurance component including the establishment of the Consolidated 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) in 1985, which is insurance for the unemployed, and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996 that prohibits 
various forms of discrimination. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the largest and most 
expensive federal program to ameliorate poverty in America, was passed in 1975. The EITC 
was expanded in eligibility and generosity in 1990, 1993, and 2001. Finally, a number of tax 
credits for higher education were passed in the late 1990s along with the Child Tax Credit. In 
this period without significant Democratic majorities, important indirect social programs 
were passed and expanded. The previous growth in direct social spending during the Great 
Society era created political incentive to scale back public programs in the 1980s and 1990s, 
while it created positive incentives for the extension of private social welfare. Republican 
                                                 
1
 Social Security Administration  
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leadership interested in dismantling the public social welfare state followed a two-pronged 
strategy of not only decreasing, devolving, or drifting public benefits but creating an 
alternative social policy infrastructure through increases to tax subsidies for the private 
sector.  
The Problem: The Divided American Social Welfare State 
     The United States has a divided social system, one public and the other private. In 
ignoring private-sector social benefits and the government subsidies that finance them, 
scholars have unnecessarily excluded a significant amount of government activity from their 
research and the means through which most American citizens receive social benefits and 
services. This dissertation, working from scholarship in public policy and comparative 
politics, treats social spending as having two elements – a direct and indirect path and a 
social system with both a public and private side. In 2008, there were 44,831,390 
beneficiaries of Medicare and 50,898,396 citizens that received assistance in the form of 
Social Security on the public side of the divided welfare state.2  During the same year, over 
158 million citizens received health insurance through their employer or their partner's 
employer-sponsored health care plans and over 101 million people were enrolled in pension 
plans through their employer.3 Jacob Hacker (2002) in The Divided Welfare State traces the 
historical development of public and private pensions and health care. Hacker argues that the 
differing characteristics of public versus private social welfare benefits presented alternative 
policy approaches and costs to political parties. In his analysis, the current mix of social 
benefits and services is a function of the particular dual path development for each policy. 
                                                 
2
 These data are presented by the Social Security Administration in their annual report for 2009. 
3
 The data on private health care coverage are from the Kaiser Family Foundation's report on Employer 
Health Benefits for 2008 and the pension data are available from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics database 
(BLS). 
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Hacker demonstrates that the decision to finance public versus private social benefits has 
consequences for social policy administration, beneficiaries of social policy, and the political 
incentives for groups to lobby for changes to public policy.  
     Public policy tools can be used to finance either the public or private social 
systems. The last forty years has witnessed a tremendous growth in the diversity of policy 
tools, which are simply defined as ``a method through which government seeks policy 
objectives'' (Salamon, 2002, pg.29). Numerous and varied government tools are used to 
finance private social benefits including: tax expenditures, grants, regulations, loan 
guarantees, government corporations, and loans (Hacker 2002; Howard 1997; Kettl 1997; 
Salamon 2002). I focus on tax expenditures, or indirect spending, since this has become an 
increasingly common method used by the federal government to finance social programs. 
Direct and indirect spending are the two largest categories of public expenditures for social 
policy that together summed to over $1.5 trillion dollars in 2006. In order to place this 
number in context, total U.S. budget expenditures in 2006 are listed at $2.6 trillion dollars 
(Jones, True and Baumgartner 2007).  
The Policy Effects of Indirect and Direct Spending in Social Policy Analysis 
Tax expenditures represent a method of counting in real dollar terms the cost to the 
U.S. Treasury of tax exclusions, deductions, and credits. Economists argue that tax breaks 
should be considered ``expenditures'' since these instruments target money to specific 
populations or activities and have the same effect as direct spending on beneficiaries, the 
market, and the budget (Howard 1997; Burman, Geissler, and Toder 2008). Tax expenditures 
for social welfare have grown as a percentage of all tax expenditures and now represent close 
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to 60% of total tax expenditures in the United States. Tax expenditures are the primary means 
of indirect public spending used to subsidize employer and private social benefits. 
Christopher Howard (1997) presents an analysis of how tax expenditures for social policy 
differ from public social programs in that most tax breaks for social benefits were initially 
passed without much organized debate and spread out over decades as opposed to originating 
in the ``big bang'' periods as public social programs did.  
       The majority of tax expenditures -all but refundable tax credits- have regressive 
effects on income redistribution. Since the income tax has a progressive structure, tax 
expenditures formulated as deductions or exclusions generally reduce the progressivity of the 
tax system. Tax expenditures regressively redistribute income by reducing average tax rates 
more for higher marginal rate taxpayers than for lower marginal rate taxpayers. For example, 
if a worker in the 40% bracket is allowed to exclude $10,000 from personal income, that 
worker receives a tax expenditure of $4,000. If a similar worker in the 20% bracket is 
allowed to exclude the same $10,000, the tax break is only $2,000.  
     Table 2.2. presents the redistribution of national income by income class from 
selected tax expenditures for social welfare. The relationship between income class and tax 
subsidies is clear. For the child care tax credit and student loan interest deduction, there is a 
positive relationship between class and benefits with increases to income correlating with 
more generous tax payments. The lone exception to the regressive nature of social tax 
expenditure programs is the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). A refundable tax 
credit, as opposed to a nonrefundable, allows a taxpayer to reduce her income below zero and 
thereby qualify for a tax refund. Only those taxpayers who itemize their personal deductions 
receive benefits from tax expenditures. As of the mid-1990s, only one in three taxpayers even 
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itemized their taxes beyond the standard deduction. Since home ownership along with its 
accompanying deductions for interest and property taxes is almost essential for an individual 
to itemize, it is fair to say that the majority of tax expenditures for social benefits are 
government subsidies for wealthy homeowners. According to data from the I.R.S., taxpayers 
in higher income brackets are much more likely to itemize their deductions than those in 
lower brackets. In addition, the use of deductions, exclusions, and exemptions excludes 
nontaxpayers, the poorest Americans, from tax benefits for social purposes. The implications 
are that when social spending shifts from direct to indirect methods, the income redistribution 
effects associated with social policy become much more regressive. 
     In contrast to the private social welfare state, the public social system is funded 
through direct spending measures and progressively distributes financial benefits. Public 
social programs are often organized into two broad categories: means and nonmeans tested. 
Means-tested programs are aimed at reducing poverty through assisting working class 
citizens with aid, assistance, and training. These programs by design are progressive since 
they draw on the general tax base and redistribute income and benefits exclusively down the 
income ladder to poorer citizens in the form of cash or services. Nonmeans tested social 
programs are universal and therefore not designed to be explicitly progressive but have 
progressive financial effects nonetheless. Research shows that the income redistribution of 
Social Security and Medicare disproportionately benefit citizens down the income ladder 
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2005).  
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A Partisan Theory of Social Policy 
A political party's decision to finance the public or private sector is primarily a 
function of its values and election goals. The Democratic Party values societal equality and 
uses public policy to allocate monetary resources to the public as a means to assuage 
economic inequities and progressively redistribute income to its constituents. On the other 
hand, Republican Party members are interested in maximizing economic freedom from the 
perceived advancement of government power and use policy to regressively shift public 
funds to the private market and conservative constituencies. In the following sections, I 
explore the values and electoral motivations for the two major parties’ positions on modern 
social policy in America.  
Core Values, Ideology, and Social Spending 
     Core values determine citizens’ ideological disposition in American politics by 
constraining individual attitudes and preferences for public policy. Social psychological 
literature shows the importance of core democratic values in structuring people's attitudes 
and opinions about preferences for policy outcomes across issue areas (Converse 1964; 
Lipset 1979; Feldman 1984; Maio and Olson 1998; Peffley, Kniggie, and Hurwitz 2001; 
Keele and Wolak 2006). Ideology and core values are closely related. Self-identified liberals 
consistently rank egalitarianism as their highest personal value while conservatives select 
individual freedom as their most important core value (Feldman 1988; Jacoby 2006). When 
survey respondents are asked to decide between preserving a free-market economy and 
enacting measures that promote greater social and economic equality, conservatives 
emphasize capitalistic values while liberals emphasize democratic values. Jacoby (2006) 
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finds that ``people who believe that liberty is more important than equality are also more 
likely to favor reductions in government spending. Conversely, those who value an 
egalitarian society apparently recognize the relevance of governmental spending and services 
for achieving this objective” (718).  Feldman (1988) argues that “support for equalitarianism 
leads to support for a broad range of government social service spending and aid to 
minorities, while economic individualism is associated with preferences for a more limited 
federal government and limits on welfare spending” (p.123). In addition, this same study also 
demonstrates that party identification had a very limited impact on individual’s issue 
preferences once controlling for core beliefs.  
Research demonstrates that there are two prominent core beliefs that are directly 
applicable to the formation of American political culture: support for economic individualism 
and belief in equality of opportunity (Lipset 1979; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Feldman 
1984).  Economic individualism is based on the idea that people should advance through 
their own hard work in the marketplace. Equality of opportunity is the belief that formal 
equality is a right regardless of a citizen’s socioeconomic status. These divergent partisan 
value hierarchies create hard and fast party preferences for one sector over another and by 
extension specific types of spending tools. The result is that Democrats use social policy to 
move economic resources and legal jurisdiction to the public sector, and conversely, 
Republicans use policy to allocate resources and jurisdiction to private markets. Each 
political party, once in the majority, has a choice between two types of social spending: 
direct expenditures administered by government bureaucracies that promote equal 
opportunity and indirect expenditures administered by the private-sector which advances 
economic individualism. Therefore, Democratic majorities will increase direct social 
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spending at the expense of indirect spending and the Republican Party will support increases 
for indirect social spending and not direct expenditures.4 
One reason for political conflict is that these dueling values cannot be easily 
dismissed by elite ideologues. Conservatives cannot ignore equality and democracy as core 
values in the U.S. while liberals cannot dismiss the values of economic individualism and 
limited government. McClosky and Zaller (1984) argue that “ideological conflict as exists in 
America is confined within a broad framework and of almost universal public support for the 
basic values of capitalism and democracy” (p.276). Recognized liberal and conservative 
opinion leaders use identifiable rhetoric and support different public policies, thereby 
effectively creating a set of ideological conventions for organizing conflict between the two 
prominent values of political culture. Core American values are communicated over time by 
politicians and maintained through stable political institutions (McClosky and Zaller 1984). 
Additionally, the mass electorate learns of core values from the set of widely held beliefs and 
norms about the relationship between citizens and their government represented in the 
political ethos. Members of the mass electorate who pay close attention to politics become 
aware of these organizing conventions and internalize the partisan value that is most central 
to their own predispositions. Political sophisticates place more emphasis on core values in 
constructing their opinions and demonstrate an ability to rank order values into attitudinal 
hierarchies (Jacoby 2006). 
Distributive Politics, Political Parties, and Social Policy  
                                                 
4
 There is some evidence that conservatives have a larger gap between their first value of individual 
freedom and equal opportunity while liberals have more conflict between their preferred value of equal 
opportunity and individual freedom (Feldman and Zaller 1992). 
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     Political parties use distributive politics to the electoral advantage of their 
members. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) argue that “it is in their spending priorities that 
parties tell the electorate most clearly what policies they favor and what groups they 
represent.”  Distributive politics is an institutional commitment by political parties to aid 
incumbents in delivering tangible and traceable benefits to their constituencies or 
congressional districts.  Political party members have become increasingly convinced that 
legislative pork, skillfully targeted, produces votes from their constituencies (Alvarez and 
Saving 1997; Levitt and Snyder 1997). Research demonstrates that political parties are 
especially adept at targeting fiscal benefits to specific voting groups through the 
appropriations process. The appropriations process allows political party members in the 
majority to narrowly direct public projects, funds, or services back to their district or loyal 
party supporters.  
     A political party in the legislative majority uses its institutional position to 
disproportionately benefit its members, often at the expense of the minority party. Numerous 
studies demonstrate that districts of majority party members have been disproportionately 
favored in the distribution of defense dollars (Carsey and Rundquist 1999), transportation 
funding (Lee 2000), and federal grants (Levitt and Snyder 1995). Legislators value being in 
the majority party since they can form intraparty minimum winning coalitions (MWC) and 
thereby maximize their personal electoral and legislative benefits (Riker 1962). The clear 
benefit of majority status is the power of institutional discrimination that allows for the 
targeting of legislative pork to supporters and enhancing the ruling political party’s electoral 
prospects. The majority party protects itself against charges of wasteful spending from the 
minority party by including some minority members in the distribution of benefits.  
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     In addition to targeting pork back to their home districts, political parties use the 
appropriations process to target benefits towards loyal voting groups. Levitt and Synder 
(1995) conclude that parties in the United States target types of voters and not individual 
member districts. Specifically, Levitt, and Snyder (1995) find “that Democratic control of 
both the House and Senate over most of the post-war period has allowed Democrats to 
fashion a portfolio of spending programs that disproportionately benefit their constituents. It 
appears that parties in the United States can, given enough time, target types of voters, but 
they cannot easily target individual districts” (p.961). In this same study, political parties 
were most effective in directing spending types that are allocated using formulas and 
program funding that was created under the majority party’s control. In this study, I argue 
that the bifurcation of voting groups by ideology and class allows both political parties to 
design social legislation that redirects resources towards their supporters and away from the 
opposing parties’ constituents.  
Political parties use “off-budget” policy tools to distribute government benefits to 
loyal party supporters. In contrast to direct spending, indirect spending passes through a 
smaller number of legislative committees and is not subject to an annual review. The private 
social system is subsidized by alternative public policy tools and distributes financial benefits 
to wealthier citizens. Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Stanley Surrey invented the concept 
of tax expenditures in 1967. Secretary Surrey wanted members of Congress and White House 
administrators to compare in real dollars the money spent in one category, such as health 
care, through the appropriations process and the tax code. Therefore, majority parties can and 
do use the tax code to direct resources in the same way they use the appropriations process. 
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      The public and private social systems serve different populations. The two 
political parties select different social spending types due to the divergent policy effects of 
direct versus indirect expenditures. Indirect spending directs most financial gains towards 
two important Republican voting blocs: wealthier citizens and businesses. A recent study 
finds that the Republican Party uses alternative spending tools to distribute government 
goods and services to their constituencies. Bickers and Stein (1996, 2000) demonstrate in 
periods of Republican control of government, there are increases in contingent liabilities 
which include direct loans, guaranteed loans, and federal insurance programs. These types of 
spending programs underwrite risks for individuals and groups by guaranteeing that the 
federal treasury repays any loss. Contingent liabilities benefit core Republican constituencies 
including small businesses, farmers, and entrepreneurial businesses. Indirect spending 
initiatives are worth more per unit to taxpayers in higher tax rate brackets. Higher-income 
citizens identify more with the Republican Party, especially in recent decades. Not only do 
wealthier citizens benefit from increases to indirect spending but so do financial firms, 
private health insurance companies, and general business interests. Indirect spending 
subsidizes private social benefits which in turn help the bottom line of financial firms that 
offer 401ks and 403bs as well as private health insurance companies that work with 
corporations in offering employer-sponsored health care through the private market.  
      Indirect social spending methods that finance private social benefits and services 
disproportionately benefit groups that identify with the Republican Party. The distribution of 
private social benefits is biased towards people who are white, work full-time for large 
companies, and earn high wages. According to a recent study from the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), in 2005 the percentage of 25- to 64-year-old workers in the private 
27 
 
sector who participated in an employer-sponsored retirement plan was 45%.  Black, 
Hispanic, and other non-white workers were less likely to have participated in an employer-
sponsored retirement plan than white workers. In 2005, 57% of white workers participated in 
an employer-sponsored retirement plan, compared to 46.5% of black workers, 29% of 
Hispanic workers, and 48.8% of other non-white workers. The percentage of part-year or 
part-time workers in the private sector whose employer sponsored a retirement plan was 
39.9% compared to 69.5% of full time workers in 2005. Only 25.3% of workers at firms with 
fewer than 25 employees participated in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, compared to 
45.2% of workers at firms with 25 to 99 employees and 65.4% of workers at firms with 100 
or more employees. There is also a great deal of variance by income class; only 27.5% of 
workers whose earnings were in the lowest quartile (under $25,000) participated in a 
retirement plan at work compared to 70.3% of workers whose earnings were in the top 
quartile (above $60,000). When social spending moves from direct to indirect, government 
subsidization shifts from more vulnerable to more privileged constituencies who are likely to 
identify with the Republican Party. 
     The beneficiaries of federal government social programs are the elderly, the 
disabled, the unemployed, and the poor. In addition to these target groups, federal social 
programs disproportionately serve racial minorities, ethnic minorities and single female-
headed households.  The major public social programs in the United States were created 
under periods of unified Democratic control of government. Therefore, the constituencies 
that benefit from public programs expect the Democratic Party to protect and expand social 
benefits and services. The first set of federal social programs centered on Social Security and 
created a generation of loyal “New Deal” Democrats that benefited from public works 
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programs and have continually identified with the party for decades. Voting groups that 
benefit the most from public social programs such as the elderly, Blacks, Latinos, women, 
and the working class consistently identify more with the Democratic Party and are more 
likely to trust the Democrats in dealing with the issues of Social Security, Medicare, and 
general welfare services. Additionally, high-income liberals who value their political identity 
and are primarily concerned with government support of underrepresented populations and 
the creation of a more egalitarian society often identify with the Democrats. The Democratic 
Party gains an electoral advantage through increases to public social spending since the 
financial and social benefits accrue disproportionately to voting groups that identify with the 
party.  
Conclusion 
   American politics is a constant push and pull between principles of pure capitalism 
and pure democracy, and nowhere is this more evident than in partisan debates surrounding 
social policy. In fact, the tensions between the two systems organize and animate political 
conflict in the United States.  Capitalism is primarily concerned with maximizing economic 
individualism and private profit while democracy aims at fostering equality and public 
goods. Capitalism holds that the private market is not only the most efficient but the fairest 
method for distributing goods and services, including social goods and services. Democracies 
support the rights of democratic majorities to override economic market mechanisms to 
assuage economic and social distress resulting from the uneven distribution of resources by 
capitalist economies.  
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The important difference between the two major political parties is not in the total 
amount of financial resources allocated to social policy but in the modality of social 
financing mechanisms. This dissertation addresses political party motivations and strategies 
in financing public versus private social welfare benefits, as well as the resulting policy 
effects. Political parties can alter the delicate balance of power in society by favoring one 
over the other in ways that reflect the party’s ideological and electoral interests. I include 
empirical work focusing on the role of political party control in determining the direction of 
the social welfare expenditure ratio, the effectiveness of tax incentives in stimulating private-
sector social expenditures, and how changes to direct versus indirect social spending 
influences economic inequality. 
 
An Addendum: Public Opinion and the Divided Social System in America 
      The American public is attentive and dynamically responsive to actions of the 
federal government and the federal government responds to movements of the mass 
electorate (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). This work generally speaks well for 
conceptions of democratic representation and democratic accountability in the United States. 
Contrary to this prevailing view of the American political system as open and dynamic is the 
idea that policymaking is restricted to a small group of political actors in “policy 
monopolies,” “subgovernments,” or “iron triangles” (Lowi 1955; Schattschneider 1961). 
According to these theories, there are specific types of policy areas, such as tax expenditures 
for private social programs, which are so narrow in scope as to diminish the saliency of 
public opinion and invite the influence of special interests. Therefore, dependent upon the 
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policy arena, the American political system is either open and responsive to public opinion or 
closed and vulnerable to the demands of special interests. These two different conceptions of 
the policy process perhaps best describe the state of research with respect to American social 
policy. The public is generally attentive and responsive to changes in direct federal social 
appropriations—the amount that the federal government spends in particular social domains 
(Wlezien 1995, 2000). Conversely, indirect social spending is thought to be “hidden” from 
public view (Hacker 2002, 2004; Howard 2007) and much less subject to public influence. 
Models of indirect social policy imply that these types of policies have causes and 
consequences so obscure that they diminish the saliency of public opinion and invite the 
influence of special interests. In this section, I present the beginnings of a theory of public 
opinion and the divided social system. I theorize that voters have preferences over the role, 
and not the size, of government in society. These preferences are normally distributed in 
society and provide negative feedback when policy moves too far in one direction or the 
other. Therefore, changes to mass public opinion produce divergent patterns of social 
spending and distribution of benefits. I expect a public that is attuned not only to the role of 
government in the social policy arena, but also the redistributive effects of different types of 
social policy. 
A micro theory of voters and preferences for social policy 
     The dominant view of mass responsiveness is that the public behaves as a political 
“thermostat” (Wlezien 1995), adjusting its preferences for the size and scope of the federal 
government in response to changes in public policy. In this model, the public is a collection 
of individuals distributed along a dimension of preference for “more” or “less” social policy. 
For example, if policy starts at the social policy median, which divides the public’s 
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preferences in half, then as direct social spending rises or falls opinion will move in the 
opposite direction. Wlezien (1995) argues that voters don’t have specific preferences for an 
exact amount of social policy in mind but rather reveal relative preferences for “more” or 
“less” policy. There are two necessary conditions for this model. One is that the policy area 
must be large enough so changes can be observed or experienced by the mass public. Second, 
it must be important enough to warrant attention from political elites, the media, and the 
public.  
            In applying the thermostatic model to a broader conceptualization social 
policy, presented in this project, it becomes difficult to argue that citizens’ central 
preferences are about more or less policy. First, the way social policy is framed by political 
and media elites convey information about disputes concerning the role of government in 
society. The two major political parties disagree as to whether social services such as health 
insurance and pensions are a right of citizenship, as believed by most liberals, or a consumer 
good, as believed by most conservatives. This fundamental disagreement has nothing to do 
with the magnitude of social benefits but rather which sector of society should have the 
jurisdiction to provide and regulate social services. Second, core democratic values structure 
individual’s positions across social policy issues. Citizens who value more equality in society 
will translate this view into the government taking a more active role in funding and 
providing basic social services. In contrast, individuals that value more economic freedom 
will support a role in government that assists the private market. These differences are the 
underpinnings of the liberal-conservative ideology spectrum in American politics. Therefore, 
I would tweak the thermostatic model by arguing that the mass public is a collection of 
individuals that have relative preferences for the role of government in society. These 
32 
 
preferences are normally distributed and provide negative feedback as the social expenditure 
ratio moves in one direction. For example, as indirect social spending is traded off for direct 
social spending, moving policy in a conservative direction, the mass public will respond by 
calling for a more direct role of government in society through increases to direct spending.  
      It has been argued that survey questions tap into a voter’s perceived desires for 
more or less government or more or less policy (Wlezien 1995). In fact, there are many 
survey questions from both the GSS and NES that could be interpreted as tapping people’s 
preferences for the role of government offering either a more public or market-based solution 
to the problem of economic security. For instance, take the following two examples from the 
GSS and NES respectively: 
Here are several things that the government in Washington might do to deal with the 
problems of poverty and unemployment. I would like you to tell me if you favor or oppose 
them.  - Would you say that you strongly favor it, favor it, neither favor nor oppose it, oppose 
it, or strongly oppose it? 
A. Giving businesses and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high 
unemployment areas.  
B. Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods especially for pre-
school and early education programs.  
C. Provide special college scholarships for children from economically disadvantaged 
backgrounds who maintain good grades.  
 
 
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all 
medical and hospital expenses for everyone...others feel that all medical expenses should be 
paid by individuals, and through private insurance plans like Blue Cross or company paid 
plans. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
(7 point scale) 
1= Government Insurance Plan 
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7= Private Insurance Plan 
 
 The first question from the GSS presents two direct government options and one in 
which the government works through the private market. The second question from NES 
does not present an option of government subsidization of the private market but might pick 
up an individual’s preference for whether she views health care as a right of citizenship and 
therefore under the jurisdiction of the government or as a good that can be provided by the 
market. In conclusion, questions that have traditionally been interpreted as tapping into 
preferences for the size of the government might be reinterpreted or rewritten to better 
evaluate the ideological differences between public support for more public intervention 
versus private subsidization.  
How changes to social policy influence mass opinion 
     The clandestine nature of the policy process for tax expenditures has resulted in 
the idea that changes to indirect spending should not influence public opinion. The use of 
indirect spending to finance social programs has been referred to as “hidden,” “a shadow 
state,” and “subterranean” (Howard 1997; Gottschalk 2000; Hacker 2004). The limited 
number of congressional committees involved in policy process of indirect spending, along 
with the lack of annual review, provides institutional barriers and disincentive for the mass 
electorate to learn, understand, and react to spending changes. Indirect spending provisions 
are created or expanded in revenue or tax reform bills and not through the annual 
appropriations process. In addition, the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
committees have exclusive jurisdiction over indirect spending bills and serve as both 
approving and “appropriating” committees. Since indirect expenditures do not pass through 
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the appropriations process, the provisions are not subject to any annual review process. In 
contrast, direct spending measures must pass through standing committees with jurisdiction 
over a specialized policy area as well as the Budget and Appropriations committees that fix 
discretionary spending levels for each budget category.  Indirect spending programs for 
private social benefits are administered by the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.). 5 The 
reduced scope of conflict for indirect spending measures privileges the role of special 
interests groups and could diminish the importance of public opinion (Schattschneider 1960).  
The public, at least in the aggregate, is attentive and responsive to both the policy 
actions of the federal government and the consequences of those actions. This thermostatic 
model provides a straightforward conception, rooted in classic systems theories of politics 
(e.g., Easton 1965), of how the public reacts to changes in the policy environment. In 
essence, this is a model of negative feedback to policymakers, as the public adjusts its 
relative preferences for public policy opposite the dominant ideological direction of 
policymaking activity. For example, when public policy moves in a conservative direction, 
citizens notice these changes and respond by demanding comparably more liberal policy. 
Advocates for this model posit that if levels of federal social spending increase, public 
demand for additional spending decreases (and vice-versa). This type of responsiveness 
bodes well for representative democracy, as it implies a public that is broadly attentive to the 
actions of federal policymakers, and that provides strong incentives for elected officials to 
consider the wishes of citizens when crafting policy (Erikson et al 2002).  
                                                 
5
 The I.R.S. rarely investigates the individual deductions that citizens claim for social purposes and do 
not monitor or evaluate employer or private social spending (Toder, Wasow, and Ettlinger 2002).   
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E.E. Schattschneider (1935) rightly observed that “new policies create a new 
politics”. Public policies, once enacted, reshape the political environment, especially for the 
mass public. Pierson (1993) theorizes that there are two “policy feedback” types that apply to 
the policy-mass public relationship: resource effects that determine how policies shape the 
distribution of incentives, and interpretive effects which influence how policy conveys 
information about the political environment to citizens. First, social policy provides resources 
to citizens in two ways: through social and financial benefits. The two types of social 
spending, direct and indirect, allocate social benefits to different populations and redistribute 
national income in opposing directions. Second, direct and indirect social spending are 
communicated by elites and therefore interpreted by the electorate as divergent ideological 
policy prescriptions to the problem of economic insecurity. 
The two modalities of social policy tools, direct and indirect, have distributive effects 
that should produce distinct patterns of public response. An increase in direct social spending 
targets vulnerable populations such as the elderly, the working poor, and the unemployed by 
distributing social and financial benefits down the income ladder. It also increases the role of 
the federal government in directly providing benefits and social services. Indirect spending 
accrues social insurance to wealthier, professional workers in the private market through the 
upward distribution of social and financial benefits.  It does so by enhancing the position of 
private and market-based actors in the provision of benefits by the use of targeted tax 
expenditure programs. The public, in other words, generally treats direct federal 
appropriations in social welfare domains as “liberal” public policy since it redistributes 
wealth downward. Conversely, indirect social expenditures allocate public resource to 
businesses and private organizations while redistributing wealth upward and therefore should 
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be perceived as “conservative” policy. Following the thermostatic logic, citizens should thus 
respond to increases in direct social spending by increasing their demand for “conservative” 
public policy solutions and respond to increases in indirect spending by increasing their 
demand for public policy liberalism.  
Political and media elites publicize changes in policy in ways that allow citizens to 
learn and understand the current ideological direction of public policy. Party leaders have 
substantial incentives to communicate policy changes in digestible and meaningful frames 
(Sniderman and Theriault 2004). In this project, I theorize and find evidence for differences 
in political parties’ preferences for direct versus indirect social spending. For example, if an 
election produces new majorities for the Republican Party, the resulting policy action will be 
to increase indirect social spending at the expense of direct spending. The majority party, 
often using the bully pulpit of the presidency, will communicate through all available sources 
the benefits of recently passed legislation, using typical partisan language (Lakoff 2002). In 
my example, the media will cover the general rise in tax breaks and, due to the tradition of 
‘balanced’ presentation, will communicate the policy as both needed tax relief desired by 
Republicans and Democratic criticism of tax breaks for the rich. The net effect will be that a 
sufficient swath of the electorate will read, hear, and learn about the change to public policy 
and update their preferences accordingly.  
I expect that public opinion influences subgovernments because while the policy 
process of tax expenditures may be hidden, policy effects are not. I agree with past scholars 
that the process of tax expenditures is subterranean and highly influenced by special interests, 
yet the effects of tax expenditures are felt by the public. First, tax expenditures for social 
programs represent a substantial part of federal expenditures, totaling close to $700 billion in 
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2008. Next, changes to tax expenditures are communicated to citizens by the media as stories 
about the general direction of tax breaks by employers, tax specialists, unions, and 
accountants concerning employer-provided social programs, and through friends and family 
who itemize their returns. Finally, most of these tax expenditure programs are highly 
regressive and redistribute enormous sums of money to the wealthiest Americans. Increases 
in tax expenditure programs are often accompanied by cuts or stagnant direct spending 
trends, so the upward movement of financial resources would be noticeable to some portion 
of the population. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
TAX EXPENDITURES: THE OTHER SIDE OF SOCIAL SPENDING 
         In a radio address on October 18th, 2008, Senator John McCain, the Republican 
candidate for President, opened a new line of attack against his Democratic opponent Senator 
Barack Obama. Senator McCain charged that, “Barack Obama's tax plan would convert the 
IRS into a giant welfare agency, redistributing massive amounts of wealth at the direction of 
politicians in Washington. I suppose when you've voted against lowering taxes 94 times, as 
Senator Obama has done, a new definition of the term "tax credit" comes in handy. At least 
in Europe, the Socialist leaders who so admire my opponent are up front about their 
objectives. They use real numbers and honest language. And we should demand equal candor 
from Senator Obama. Raising taxes on some in order to give checks to others is not a tax cut, 
it's just another government giveaway” (McCain 2008).  Tax breaks, formally known as tax 
expenditures, have been used to fund social welfare benefits and services through the tax 
code since the passage of the progressive income tax in 1913 (Howard 1997).  According to 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, tax expenditures amounted to $945 billion worth of 
government spending in 2007, or 10% of Gross Domestic Product (60% of total tax spending 
went towards social programs). In 1967, the Joint Committee on Taxation (hereafter the JCT) 
first identified 50 items as tax expenditures; forty years later using similar methodology in 
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2007, the JCT listed 170 tax expenditures.6  The growth of tax expenditures has 
fundamentally changed the government’s role in financing, providing, and administering 
social benefits and services in the United States of America.  
The goals of this chapter are to present an introduction to the tax expenditure concept 
and to analyze the growth of tax expenditures during the modern era. Tax expenditures are 
used by governments primarily to subsidize private-market activities but also can be utilized 
to provide tax-free public benefits and services. Once a policy area is designated to receive 
funding, political actors can choose between direct spending and tax expenditures otherwise 
known as indirect spending. The political choice of tax expenditures to fund policy objectives 
results in a less visible policy path, more regressive income distributional effects, and an 
altering of the balance of power in society towards the private sector and away from the 
public sector. This chapter is organized into the following sections: the concept of tax 
expenditures, the methodology of tax expenditures, the policy process of tax expenditures, 
the policy effects of tax expenditures, the growth of tax expenditures during the modern era, 
and tax expenditures for social welfare policy. 
Tax Expenditures 
     In 1967, the tax expenditure concept was created by Stanley Surrey, then Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury, as a means to elucidate the political use of tax breaks for means 
that were usually accomplished through direct spending programs. Secretary Surrey argued 
that members of Congress were using tax policy not as means to raise and collect revenue but 
as a ``vast subsidy apparatus'' to reward favored constituencies or subsidize narrow policy 
                                                 
6
 The different individual tax programs for social welfare in 1967 and 2007 are listed in tables 3.1. and 
3.2. 
40 
 
areas (Surrey 1973, p. 6). The primary purpose of the American tax system is to collect 
revenue for the operation of government in a manner that is fair to all taxpayers. The federal 
individual and corporate income taxes supply over 60 percent of total government revenues. 
Incomes taxes are the main sources of progressivity in the nation’s tax system. This system is 
progressive in that it obtains a larger share of national income from wealthier families as 
compared to working-class families. The federal income tax system counters the regressive 
effects of other large revenue sources such as payroll taxes, federal excise taxes, and state 
and local sales tax. Tax expenditures alter the horizontal and vertical equity of the basic tax 
system by allowing exemptions, deductions, and credits to specialized groups or activities.  
     Historically, the U.S. income tax system has been used to promote social and 
economic goals. Since the initial adoption of the income tax, numerous provisions have been 
labeled as “tax loopholes” or “tax breaks.”  These terms were used to identify a tax evasion 
not foreseen by Congress but discovered by tax lawyers. There is a second category of long-
standing tax provisions that encourage homeownership, subsidize the provision of private-
group health insurance, encourage retirement savings, and subsidize charitable organizations. 
It is recognized that most of these provisions were adopted deliberately by Congress as “tax 
preferences” and were not unintended escape routes for income tax evasion. The tax 
expenditure concept takes the next step, recognizing that these “tax preferences” are really 
government spending programs and, consequently, public assistance administered through 
the tax code. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (CBA) officially 
codified and defined tax expenditures as "those revenue losses attributable to provisions of 
the Federal tax laws which allow a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
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liability.”  The tax expenditure method of social policy financing is the government’s 
primary means to subsidize private-sector social benefits and services.  
     There are three main types of tax expenditures: exclusions, deductions, and credits 
(less frequent are preferential tax rates and deferrals of tax liability). The difference between 
exclusions, deductions, and credits relates to where each provision factors into the calculation 
of income and tax liability. Exclusions are those items excluded from gross income, which 
means they never enter into the "top line" calculation of the taxpayer's tax base.  Deductions 
are those items that may be subtracted from gross income in computing taxable income.  
Credits are allowed against the tax rates imposed by the tax code, thereby reducing an 
individual’s tax liability.  Refundable credits provide a payment to the individual even if all 
of her tax liability is eliminated.  For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) acts as 
a wage subsidy for taxpayers at or near the poverty line. The EITC is based on a percentage 
of a worker's earnings and is usually large enough to compensate for the taxes owed and 
entitle the worker to a refund (Howard 1997). 
The Methodology of Tax Expenditures 
      The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation annually estimates tax 
expenditures in terms of revenues lost to the U.S. Treasury for each special tax provision 
included in the U.S. tax code. A provision has traditionally been listed as a tax expenditure if 
it departs from the normal income tax structure and if it results in more than a de minimis 
revenue loss ($50 million).  Under the JCT methodology, the normal tax structure for an 
individual includes the following: one personal exemption for each taxpayer and one for each 
dependent, the standard deduction, the existing tax schedule, and deductions for investment 
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and employee business expenses.  Most tax benefits to individual taxpayers can be classified 
as exceptions to "normal income tax law" and therefore qualify as tax expenditures. Each 
annual tax estimate is a function of subtracting two predicted streams of revenues: predicted 
revenues under current law from predicted revenue under new and expanded tax provisions. 
According to the JCT, these estimates have been excellent predictors of actual changes in 
government tax receipts as calculated by the I.R.S. returns.  
     The initial step in tax expenditure analysis is to distinguish between the structural 
component, the normal baseline, and its tax expenditure component. The structural 
component has the following aspects: provisions that establish the tax base, the definition of 
income, the tax period, the taxable units, the rate structure, application of taxes to 
international transactions, and administrative procedures. The remaining provisions 
constitute tax expenditures for specially designated activities or groups. Congress recognized 
this distinction with the Budget Act of 1974 that identified tax expenditures as “special 
provisions” that constitute a “deviation from the normal tax structure.” The crucial task for 
economists developing an income tax system is to define income for the purpose of tax 
calculations. The normal tax baseline in based on the Schanz-Haig-Simons (S-H-S) definition 
of income. The S-H-S concept defines net income as an increase in net economic wealth 
between two points of time plus consumption during that period. The S-H-S method does not 
specify which accounting techniques should be used in formulating consumption, so the 
Treasury uses standard business accounting techniques in establishing the baseline. 
Essentially, by declaring a provision a tax expenditure, the treasury is stating that the 
provision is not a function of the normal tax structure.  
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     Economists claim that caution should be used in the summation of individual tax 
provisions since there is a possible interaction effect. The revenue estimate for a tax 
expenditure is based on the assumption that it alone is repealed and that all other provisions 
remain constant. As the JCT analysis states, “In general, elimination of several itemized 
deductions would increase revenue by less than the sum of revenue gains measured by 
eliminating each item separately because more tax payers would use the standard deduction. 
Conversely, elimination of multiple items that are exclusions from the adjusted gross income 
would increase revenue by more than the sum of individual gains because taxpayers would 
be pushed into a higher tax bracket” (JCT 2008). 
      This interaction effect should not preclude the use of the sum of individual tax 
expenditure items as the total tax expenditures amount. First, the interaction effect would 
only occur if a tax expenditure for social welfare was eliminated prior to the estimates being 
reported by the JCT. I was careful in using the tax expenditure estimates from the exact fiscal 
year reported and not the two, three, or four year estimates. For example, the tax 
expenditures listed for the year fiscal 1994 comes from the JCT report ``Estimates of Federal 
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1994-1998'' published at the end of the fiscal year 1993. 
Therefore, if no individual tax provision is eliminated in the short time period between the 
end of the fiscal year and the publication of the estimates, the hypothesized interaction effect 
will not occur. Additionally, the JCT calculates the possible interaction effect of including 
new tax provisions in their estimates. Next, the same interaction effect occurs in totaling 
estimated direct outlays. A repeal of one of the public welfare programs may not reduce total 
outlays by the amount associated with the program. The results occur if benefits under the 
repealed welfare program must be counted in determining an individual’s eligibility under 
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another welfare program. In essence, repeal of one welfare program could make more people 
eligible for another, and total government outlays would increase for the program continued. 
No one asserts that budget outlays cannot be added to produce a total outlay figure, even 
though the interaction effect described above exists. Nor should this interaction effect 
prevent tax expenditure items from being totaled.  
Collecting and Cleaning the Data 
       These data were collected by contacting the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), 
a nonpartisan committee of the United States Congress created under the auspices of the 
Revenue Act of 1926. I requested from the JCT all the documentation of tax expenditures 
they had over the last fifty years. The first public report was issued in 1972 and a report has 
been published annually every year since, with the exceptions of 1974 and 2000. The 1972 
and 1973 reports were prepared as special requests prior to the Budget Act of 1974, which 
requires the publication of all tax expenditure estimates. The mandate for annual publication 
according to the Budget Act began with the 1975 report. There is only one break in the 
estimates from 1967-2008 when no report was prepared in 1974 and therefore no data is 
available for 1973. While no report was filed in 2000, there is no break for the estimates of 
tax expenditures. The tax expenditures categorical values are represented in billions of 
dollars for each year. From 1967-1985 tax expenditures were calculated in millions; I have 
converted these figures into billions so that one unit of measurement can be used across the 
total time period. For the analyses presented in the following chapters, the values are 
calculated as constant 2007 dollars.  
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      Tax expenditures are organized into budgetary categories that match direct 
outlays. There are 18 categories or functions of tax expenditures, and they are the following: 
National Defense; International Affairs; General Science, Space and Technology; Energy, 
Natural Resources and Environment; Agriculture; Commerce and Housing; Transportation, 
Community and Regional Development; Education, Training, Employment and Social 
Services; Health; Medicare; Income Security; Social Security and Railroad Retirement; 
Veterans' Benefits and Services; General Purpose Fiscal Assistance; and Interest. I chose to 
organize the data into the following four categories as to represent social welfare: health 
care, which includes the two budget categories of Health (includes Medicaid) and Medicare; 
income security, which includes the budgetary category of Income Security, the subcategory 
Employment from the Training, Employment and Social Services, Social Security and 
Railroad Retirement, and Veterans' Benefits and Services; welfare, which includes the 
subcategory of Social Services in the Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services 
category along with the EITC program that is listed under the budgetary category Income 
Security; and education, represented by the subcategory Education from the category 
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services. In each category for each provision, 
the revenue lost is bifurcated into two categories, Corporations and Individuals. I used only 
the Individuals section of the tax expenditure listings.7 
The Policy Process of Tax Expenditures 
     The use of tax expenditures for social welfare policy has been referred to as 
“hidden,” “shadow,” or “subterranean” politics (Howard 1997; Hacker 2002; Gottschalk 
                                                 
7
 For each tax expenditure program there are two categories: individual and corporation. I use only the 
individual category for a number of reasons. First, the vast majority of indirect social spending occurs in this 
category, over 90%. Next, the category of corporation represents “corporate welfare” and is not the concept I’m 
measuring and testing in this project.  
46 
 
2000). These descriptions all relate to the clandestine legislative processes from which tax 
expenditures are passed and expanded that differ drastically from the appropriations process 
of direct spending programs. Any financial aid or incentive program may be written as a tax 
expenditure or direct spending program. Tax expenditures are not subject to the same rules 
and procedures as direct spending in the budgetary process. The budget process has three 
main goals: to establish spending priorities, to set the upper bound for federal spending, and 
to evaluate, coordinate, and control spending for particular programs. The congressional 
budget process divides the spending and revenue functions. Tax expenditures face less 
scrutiny primarily because they fall on the revenue side of the budget process. Revenue items 
such as tax expenditures are not reviewed as part of the annual budget process. They are 
discussed and reported in a separate appendix to the annual budget process, making them less 
visible. On the spending side, the Budget and Appropriations Committees determine the 
discretionary spending levels for each budget category. On the revenue side, the tax writing 
committees are simply given a revenue floor; above the revenue floor, the tax writing 
committees can trade off tax rate changes with tax expenditures. Indirect and direct spending 
measures have an inverse relationship in the budget process. Increases in tax expenditures 
reduce the amounts of available resources for direct outlays. Conversely, reductions in tax 
expenditures increase revenues available for direct outlays or general tax cuts. In Congress, 
the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees have exclusive jurisdiction in 
both approving and “appropriating” tax expenditures. Indirect spending provisions are 
created or expanded in revenue or tax reform bills. In contrast, direct spending measures 
must pass through standing committees with jurisdiction over a specialized policy area, as 
well as the Budget and Appropriations committees that fix discretionary spending levels for 
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each budget category. In summary, indirect spending measures follow an alternative policy 
path, facing fewer veto threats in their creation and expansion and not being subject to any 
review process. 
     There have been numerous legislative acts that have attempted to operationally 
equalize indirect spending to direct spending measures in the budget process. The enactment 
of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 requires the annual reporting of 
tax expenditures by the Treasury Department and Congress. The CBA of 1974 established a 
Senate and House Budget Committee whose essential function is to develop an overall 
congressional approach for the annual budget process. This act also required the newly 
created Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to submit annual projections of tax expenditures 
for the five succeeding fiscal years. The budget committees use the basic CBO list in 
preparing their respective reports on direct and indirect expenditure estimates that are given 
to all the relevant congressional committees. The intent of publishing an annual tax 
expenditure list was to make it easier for legislators to consider indirect versus direct 
spending programs under the same policy area. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) 
mandated that direct spending and tax expenditures be treated as equivalent for the purpose 
of setting spending limits under the new pay-as-you-go requirement (PAYGO) for mandatory 
spending. Since the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990, discretionary spending 
programs have been subject to an overall ceiling. The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) creates two lists of tax expenditures: one using the standard methodology of revenue 
lost, and the second measuring tax expenditures as direct outlay equivalents.8 The 
                                                 
8
 The OMB has reported tax expenditures as direct outlay equivalents since 1981. This estimate is not 
used here and in most empirical studies of tax expenditures given the shorter time series, and the methodology 
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Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires yearly examinations of tax 
expenditures by the White House, yet according to one recent study this has been largely 
ignored by recent administrations (Hungeford 2008).  
The Administration of Tax Expenditures  
       On the bureaucratic side, the Internal Revenue Service within the Department of 
Treasury administers tax expenditures. The administration of indirect spending differs from 
direct expenditures in the visibility of administrative costs and the determination of eligibility 
and benefits. The costs of administering direct social spending programs appear explicitly as 
part of the program agencies’ budget. On the other hand, the administrative costs to the I.R.S. 
are not readily identifiable because there is no separate categorization of costs based upon 
normal tax provisions versus tax expenditures. Economists argue that tax expenditures add 
complexity to the tax structure and raise the costs for the I.R.S. in enforcement and taxpayer 
service (Surrey and McDaniel 1985). The Department of Treasury administers close to 70 tax 
expenditure social programs with no admitted expertise or vested interest in any of the social 
welfare policies. Therefore, unlike public social welfare programs, such as Social Security, 
which enjoy strong support from their bureaucratic administrators, tax expenditures exist in 
spite of little bureaucratic enthusiasm from the I.R.S. (Campbell 2003; Hungerford 2008).  
     The eligibility for tax incentives depends on characteristics of taxpayers or their 
behavior. Since tax breaks are self-reported, taxpayers must have both sufficient knowledge 
to determine which tax provisions they qualify for as well as having adequate economic 
incentive to itemize their returns. On the contrary, direct spending programs often base 
                                                                                                                                                       
for calculating these estimates has changed over time with shifts in political party control of the executive 
branch.  
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eligibility for public benefits on general criteria or the discretion of an administrator. Direct 
spending programs’ rules are usually enforced more stringently than those involving tax 
incentives. For most public social welfare programs, beneficiaries have to file claims and 
sometimes appear in person before an administrator to receive a cash benefit. Conversely, 
any taxpayer can claim tax expenditures on their returns. The I.R.S. reviews eligibility only 
after the fact, either in an audit or through calculations on individual returns that are then 
compared and confirmed with third parties. Additionally, the self-reporting feature of tax 
returns does not carry the stigma of receiving public benefits and deters fewer people, 
whether they are eligible or not, from claiming tax benefits. Tax expenditures function as a 
form of entitlement spending in that everyone who qualifies receives benefits and are not 
subject to annual reviews. In contrast, funding for direct discretionary spending is set 
annually, requiring Congress to make a decision every year to continue or not continue 
funding. 
The Policy Effects of Tax Expenditures 
   Tax expenditures redistribute national income in a different direction than 
traditional social welfare programs. The majority of tax expenditures, all but tax refundable 
credits, have regressive effects on national income redistribution. According to economists at 
the JCT, since the income tax has a progressive structure, tax expenditures formulated as 
deductions and exclusions generally reduce the progressivity of the tax system by reducing 
average tax rates more for higher marginal rate taxpayers than for lower marginal rate 
taxpayers. For example, if a worker in the 40 percent bracket is allowed to exclude $10,000 
from her income, she receives a tax expenditure of $4,000. If a similar worker in the 10 
percent bracket is allowed to exclude the same $10,000 from her income, her tax break is 
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only $1,000 dollars. If instead of a tax expenditure each worker received a direct government 
payment of $10,000 and the receipt was taxable, the lower bracket worker benefits more with 
$9,000 available to her after tax, whereas the other worker is left with just $6,000. Therefore, 
social welfare benefits directed through tax deductions, exclusions, and nonrefundable tax 
credits reduce the progressivity of the income tax structure. Conversely, tax expenditures 
constituted as refundable tax credits generally increase the progressivity of the tax system 
(JCT 2008). Additionally, it is important to consider if and how these tax cuts are financed 
with changes in direct federal spending. If an increased deduction for employer-sponsored 
health care is paid for by a decrease in Medicaid payments, this exchange is certain to cause a 
rise in economic inequality.   
     The vast majority of tax expenditure programs disproportionately benefit upper-
income groups. Only those who itemize their personal deductions receive benefits from most 
tax expenditures. As of the mid-1990s, approximately one in three taxpayers itemized their 
taxes beyond the standard deduction. According to data from the I.R.S., taxpayers in higher 
income brackets are much more likely to itemize their deductions than those citizens in lower 
brackets. In 2005 at the federal level, 93.3% of taxpayers making a yearly income of 
$200,000 and above itemized their returns. In the same year, 89.5% of taxpayers making 
$100,000-$199,999 itemized their taxes as compared to 76.2% of taxpayers in the income 
bracket of $75,000-$99,999.9 In the lowest two income groups, 58.3% of taxpayers earning 
an income of $50,000-$74,999 itemized their returns while only 17.9% of citizens making 
under $50,000 itemized in 2005. Additionally, the use of deductions, exclusions, and 
exemptions excludes nontaxpayers, the poorest Americans, from tax benefits for social 
                                                 
9
 In 2007, if a taxpayer’s income was over $156,400,  the total itemized deduction amount is reduced.  
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purposes. Since home ownership along with its accompanying deductions for interest and 
property taxes is almost essential for an individual to itemize, it is fair to say that the majority 
of tax expenditures for social benefits are government welfare for wealthy homeowners. 
      Not only are tax expenditures the primary culprit in creating tax inequity, they 
also distribute money in a way that most Americans would deem unfair for social programs 
that usually are targeted towards society’s most vulnerable populations. For example, the 
medical expense deduction is in essence a regressive, national health care program run 
through the tax system. In the program, there is a deductible, similar to private insurance, in 
that only medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income qualify for the 
tax deduction. Additionally, there is a coinsurance element requiring taxpayers to pay a 
portion of their medical expenses above the deductible level. The regressive nature of this 
program lies in the coinsurance element, since it is a function of a citizen’s marginal income 
tax rate. If an individual in the 10 percent bracket incurs $100 of medical expenses above the 
deductible level, under the coinsurance element he or she must pay $90 of those medical 
expenses and the government pays $10. A taxpayer who makes $60,000 a year in a 
hypothetical 25% bracket and incurs the same $100 of medical expense above the deductible 
level will pay $75, and the government will pay $25. Finally, the wealthiest individuals 
making more than $300,000 adjusted gross income and up will pay $50 of each $100 of 
medical expenses over the deductible level. Taxpayers that are at or below poverty level and 
those who do not itemize their personal deductions receive none of this government aid.  
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The Growth of Tax Expenditures During the Modern Era 
     In 1967 there were 50 tax expenditure programs at a total cost of $36.5 billion. In 
2008 there were 170 tax expenditure programs and the total cost was close to one trillion 
dollars. Tax expenditures have grown at a much faster pace than direct spending, whether 
measured by relative percentages or as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 
some social budget categories, tax expenditures have assumed far greater importance than 
direct spending provisions in financing benefits and services. A combination of partisan and 
institutional features is responsible for the increase in indirect spending. First, tax 
expenditures face fewer veto points along the policy process than financing for public 
programs. All else equal, it is easier for a legislator to fund a desired program or please a 
favored constituency using tax expenditures versus direct spending. Next, the vast majority 
of tax expenditures are not subject to any review process. The lack of review results in tax 
expenditures functioning as a type of mandatory spending that grows every year, regardless 
of political party control or public mood. Finally, during this period there was an increase in 
public conservatism that resulted in more Republican influence and a rise in tax breaks.10 
Politicians from both parties, responding to the changes in mood, used tax expenditures to 
promote policy objectives and increase spending in a manner that rhetorically came across to 
voters as an effort to reduce the size of government.  
     As Figure 3.1 shows, tax expenditures as measured as per capita grew at a quick 
pace from 1972-2007. Indirect spending increased exponentially until 1987 and then 
proceeded to steadily increase again during the 1990's. The steep drop in tax expenditures in 
1987 was a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This act was a product of Republican 
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 As measured by Stimson’s (1999) public mood measurement of mass opinion.  
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President Ronald Reagan receiving tax cuts for marginal income and corporate rates from the 
Democratically-controlled Congress in exchange for eliminating a number of tax breaks for 
businesses. Interestingly, most of the existing tax breaks for social welfare were not 
eliminated by this legislation, and indirect social spending continued to grow unabated. Tax 
expenditures for social welfare have grown over the last thirty years as a percentage of all tax 
expenditures and now represent over 50% of total tax expenditures in the United States.  
Conservative Think Tanks, Tax Expenditures, and the Construction of a Private Social 
System 
The rise of conservative think tanks assisted the Republican Party in creating a policy 
environment favorable for the construction of a private alternative social system. The 1960s 
and 1970s saw a series of new organizations to regulate businesses including the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSA) in 1972, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1975. 
These regulatory agencies were created at the end of a period of policy liberalism, which 
included the creation of Medicare and the strengthening of Social Security. One way that 
conservative and business leaders responded to a long era of political liberalism was to 
construct a universe of think tanks for the outlet and marketing of ideas that promote 
capitalist markets. Andrew Rich (2004) defines think tanks as “independent, non-interest 
based, nonprofit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to 
obtain support and to influence the policymaking process”(p.211).11 In the following 
sections, I examine the rise of conservative think tanks and their promotion of pro-market 
policy. 
                                                 
11
 This definition does not preclude ideological think tanks.  
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Conservative think tanks have grown in power and wealth since 1970. According to 
recent study, 80.7 % of the think tanks in existence by 1996 were formed after 1970. This 
same study categories the existing think tanks by ideological leanings and finds that 31% of 
think tanks are conservative, 19% are liberal and 56% are centrist or unidentifiable (Rich 
2004). The 1970s were a period of growth for conservative think tanks including the 
founding of the Heritage Foundation in 1973 and the Cato Institute in 1977. Although, there 
were liberal think tanks such as the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and the Economic 
Policy Institute, their budgets were and are much smaller than the conservative organizations. 
For example, conservative think tanks accrued $156.4 million of resources compared to just 
$47.8 million for liberal groups in the fiscal year 1996. Smith (2007) argues that the 
economic insecurity and instability of the 1970s allowed conservative think tanks to make 
arguments around the economic consequences of policy instead of civil rights and civil 
liberties. Numerous studies argue that conservative think tanks main effort was to publicly 
laud and promote the benefits of unfettered capitalism while at the same time pointing out the 
flaws, danger, and inefficiencies of the government (Ricci 1993; Smith 2000, 2007). The 
American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute moved to reframe 
arguments to emphasize the potential economic harm from consumer and environmental 
protection (Ricci 1993). In addition, conservative researchers argued that the freedom of the 
market was tied with the freedom of the individual; citizens could not be free in a society 
where the market was restrained by the government. The movement to an economic 
framework for policy problems was coupled with private alternatives to public programs.  
The Republican Party worked in cooperation with think tanks to promote 
conservative tax policy. Conservative leaders, beginning in the 1970s, believed that the 
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success of the Democrats was largely due to their advantage in the marketplace of ideas. On 
multiple policy fronts, conservative think tanks advance the specific view that the private 
market is the main system for social adjudication and wealth production. Conservative think 
tanks were most successful in promoting an alternative to the dominant Keynesian economic 
ideology through marketing the idea of “supply-side economics.” Supply-side economics 
theorists argued that decreased taxes for the wealthy, or those who owned capital, would spur 
investment into new labor, machinery, and supplies. The adherents of supply-side economics 
further argued that new tax cuts would pay for themselves and not increase the budget deficit 
since new investment and expanded growth would compensate for the revenue lost through 
the initial tax cuts. These organizations along with policy groups have pushed for the 
privatization of Social Security and Medicare.  
An integral aspect of the privatization movement is building a private-sector 
alternative health care and pension structure. Tax expenditures are an important part of this 
privatization strategy. For example, the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) put 
forth many ideas for privatizing Medicare, including developing the Medical Savings 
Account concept that passed as part of HIPAA in 1996 (Callahan 1999). The Medical 
Savings Account was replaced by the broader, more inclusive Health Savings Accounts 
passed by President Bush and a Republican Congress in 2003. The NCPA was also 
responsible for promoting a law that would automatically enroll all employees into their 
company’s 401(k) plans. The Heritage Foundation has been integral in the Republican effort 
to scale back Social Security. Teles (2007) argues that the Republican Party, with assistance 
from Heritage, designed a disentrenchment plan for Social Security, which required that 
conservatives weaken the public’s belief in the guarantee of future Social Security benefits 
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and increase their reliance and familiarity with private alternatives. After the Republicans 
were defeated in reducing Social Security in 1982, Stuart Butler at the Heritage Foundation 
began promoting the idea of using 401ks and IRAs to construct an alternative to Social 
Security (Rich 2004). As Teles (2007) argues, “instead of describing an abstract idea, 
widespread of use of IRAs would allow conservatives to point to something a wide range of 
individuals were already using and encourage them to compare their returns from Social 
Security and their IRA” (pg.170).  Social Security and Medicare have proven to be too 
popular for frontal assaults from the Republican Party. Consequently, conservative think 
tanks and Republican leaders supported a long-term strategy of building a private alternative 
to the public social system.  
Tax Expenditures and Social Welfare 
     The composition of tax expenditures has changed over the last thirty years. Tax 
expenditures can be classified as one of two types – business and social tax expenditures. 
Business tax expenditures are those that are intended to promote investment generally or to 
help certain industries that Congress considers important for economic development and 
growth. These include items such as the exclusion of extraterritorial income, accelerated 
depreciation for investments in machinery and equipment, and tax incentives for energy 
production such as oil and gas. Social tax expenditures subsidize the consumption of health 
care, welfare, education and income security. Using these categories, social tax expenditures 
have grown steadily at the expense of business tax expenditures over the last thirty years.  
     As figure 3.2. demonstrates, spending for social welfare as a percentage of all tax 
expenditures has grown rapidly. Social welfare is measured as tax provisions that subsidize 
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health care, income security, welfare, and education. There is a stark upward trend in the 
percentage of tax expenditures directed towards social policy from 31.2 percent in 1973 to 
51.8 percent in 2007. The fastest growth of social welfare tax provisions as a percentage of 
total tax expenditures occurred in a five-year period from 1986 to 1990, in large part due to 
the massive decrease in tax expenditures for business purposes as part of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. Not only were tax expenditures for social welfare spared the knife of the 1986 
reform, new provisions were added. For example, in the health care category, tax breaks for 
hospital insurance and supplementary medical insurance were added in 1986. There was 
another noticeable increase in tax expenditures of ten percent in the period from 2002 to 
2007. This change was driven by new tax expenditures for Medicare, expansions of existing 
tax expenditures for individual retirement plans, and increases in the EITC. At the end of the 
series in 2007, tax expenditures for social purposes constituted over half of all tax 
expenditures. This number increases to 60 percent if tax expenditures for interest are 
excluded from the calculation. In the following sections, social welfare is broken down into 
the four subcategories of health care, income security, welfare, and education. The following 
descriptive analyses select four time periods in ten year intervals to demonstrate the growth 
of tax expenditures in each policy area over the last forty years. The trends are clear – tax 
expenditures have steadily accounted for more of the government’s effort to fund all four 
areas of social policy.  
Health Care 
The health care system in the U.S. is bifurcated into a public system that provides 
services to the elderly and poor and private-market insurance that covers everyone else. In 
figure 3.3., indirect and direct spending for health care are placed together for the years 1975, 
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1985, 1995, and 2005. In 1975 tax expenditures represented just one percent of total 
spending for health care. There were only four tax provisions for health care in 1975: 
deductibility of medical expenses, disability insurance benefits, the exclusion of employer 
contributions to medical insurance, and disability to the blind. The percentage of health care 
spending constituted by tax expenditures grew to seven percent in 1985 and to 13 percent in 
1995. By 2005, there were 17 individual tax provisions for health care totaling $156.4 billion 
in lost revenue. From 1985 to 2005, tax expenditures nearly tripled as a percentage of all 
health spending, to 19.7 percent.  In 2005, around two-thirds of total indirect spending was 
made up of tax provisions for just employer-provided health insurance.  
     The growth of indirect spending for health care can be credited to the inclusion 
and expansion of the tax incentives for employer and individual health insurance. Employee 
compensation in the form of payments for health insurance premiums and other medical 
expenses is deducted as a business expense by employers and not included in an employee’s 
gross income. There are three broad categories of tax expenditure programs in the area of 
health care: insurance purchase subsidies, benefits for taxpayers who have incurred major 
health-related expenses, and general health benefits. In the category of insurance, there are 
tax breaks for the exclusion of employer contributions to accident and health plans, self-
employed health insurance premium deductions, and the exclusion of benefits under cafeteria 
plans. In 1985, cafeteria plans were added that allow employees to choose from a selection of 
fringe benefits, including some that are not subject to tax. Cafeteria plans are more likely to 
benefit wealthier employees in higher marginal tax brackets, as taxpayers are more likely to 
choose fringe benefits that receive tax preference. Self-employed people can deduct 30 
percent of their total health insurance costs every year. In the second category, personal out-
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of-pocket outlays for medical expenses exceeding 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income are 
deductible, along with prescription drug exemptions and dental expense deductions. Finally, 
the general category includes the medical savings account deduction, long term care credit, 
disability access expenditure credit, and the blind exemption credit.  
Income Security  
       The income security category constitutes programs that are designed to protect 
workers against the risks of the economic market and mainly pertains to old-age pensions. 
The percentage of indirect to direct income security spending is presented in figure 3.4 
Paradoxically, income security represents the social welfare category with the highest 
number of individual tax provisions yet the lowest percentage of indirect spending. In 1975, 
there were 24 individual tax provisions for programs such as retirement savings, workers’ 
compensation, and unemployment insurance. The number of income security provisions 
grew to only 27 by 2005 and totaled around 175.7 billion dollars. Income security tax 
expenditures grew at the slowest pace of all the social welfare categories. As of 2005, tax 
expenditures accounted for only 13.2 percent of total income security spending. The long-
term stability and popularity of Social Security is the primary cause for the relative slow 
growth of tax expenditures for income security as a percentage of total spending. Although 
the number and generosity of tax incentives for private retirement plans grew during this 
period, they did not keep pace with social security payments. This category represents a clear 
example of a dominant public social program that crowded out the growth of alternatives and 
has relegated private pensions to a complementary status. The net exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings for employer plans, individual retirement accounts, and the Keogh 
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plans represent the three largest tax expenditure programs for income security and together 
total two-thirds of all expenditures in this category.  
      The income security tax programs can be organized into two categories: subsidies 
for investment in retirement plans and other employee related expenses. In the first category 
of retirement investment are tax incentives for individual retirement accounts, the exclusion 
of employee contributions to pension plans, and self-employed pension plans. Employee 
contributions to pension plans and other kinds of personal retirement savings are excluded 
from an individual’s adjusted gross incomes. Pension contributions or benefits must be based 
on an equal percentage of salary for all eligible workers (up to the max of $30,000 a year). 
Full-time workers must be given a full right to accrued benefits after five years on the job. 
All taxpayers without employer-provided retirement plans are eligible for IRA deductions. 
Workers can deduct annual contributions to an IRA of $5,000 per year for individuals and 
$10,000 per year for family. In 1981, eligibility for tax-deductible IRAs was granted even to 
workers with pensions, but that expanded IRA tax break was scaled back in 1986. In 1997, 
Roth IRAs were expanded, becoming available for more workers with pensions. Self-
employed taxpayers can make deductible contributions to their own retirement (Keogh) plans 
equal up to 25 percent of their annual income.  
      In the category of other employee-related expenses are provisions such as the 
exclusion of meals and lodging furnished by an employer, the exclusion of employer-
provided education assistance, the exclusion of employee business and miscellaneous 
expense deductions, the exclusion of miscellaneous fringe benefits, the exclusion of 
transportation- related fringe benefits, and the moving expense deduction. There are other 
employer fringe benefits that enjoy the status of tax expenditure. Many employers cover part 
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or all the cost of premiums for employees’ life insurance benefits, accident and disability 
benefits, death benefits, and supplementary unemployment benefits. Again, the amounts are 
deductible by employers as business expenses and are excluded from employees’ gross 
income. The three largest programs in this second category are the exclusion of 
miscellaneous fringe benefits, premiums on group life insurance, and premiums on accident 
and individual life insurance that together add up to around 10 percent of total income 
security spending.  
Welfare 
     In figure 3.5., the change in welfare expenditures is far and away the most 
dramatic shift in social spending during this period. In 1975, there were just seven tax 
expenditures for welfare that totaled 5 percent of all welfare spending. The individual welfare 
provisions were a deductible for child care facilities, credit for employing AFDC/WIN 
workers, deductible for charitable contributions, deductible for child and dependent care 
expenses, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the exclusion of public assistance. The rise 
of indirect welfare spending from 1975 to 1985 was driven by the eligibility and benefit 
expansion of the EITC and the erosion of direct welfare spending. In this same period, only 
one new tax break for welfare was added and the majority of spending was done through just 
two individual tax breaks: the EITC and the deductible for charitable contributions. By 2005, 
there were 12 tax provisions for welfare, with the most significant addition being the tax 
credit for dependent children under the age of seventeen passed during the Clinton 
administration. The total amount spent on welfare through tax expenditures was $119.3 
billion in 2005, which represented 79.8 percent of all federal welfare spending. This 
tremendous growth in indirect spending has as much to do with the popularity of EITC and 
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the child tax credit as it does with the reform and devolution of direct federal welfare 
programs.  
     The tremendous increase in indirect welfare spending was driven by three tax 
expenditure programs: EITC, the child credit, and the deduction for charitable contributions. 
The EITC is designed to supplement the wages of low income workers, primarily working 
families with children. It is available whether or not a family owes income taxes. That is, 
eligible workers can get a tax refund even if the credit exceeds what they otherwise owe in 
taxes. The child credit tax provision was adopted in 1997 and provides $500 for each child 
under age seventeen. Working families with children get a tax credit for the percentage of 
their child care expenses. Foster parents are not taxed on the payments they receive for their 
services. Finally, contributions to charitable, religious, and certain other nonprofit 
organizations are allowed as itemized deductions for individuals, up to 50 percent of adjusted 
gross income. The tax provision for charitable contributions has complex effects given that 
most of the direct monetary benefits go to the wealthiest Americans, yet it has been proven to 
increase the amount of donations to organizations that primarily service the poor and 
disabled (Lipsky and Smith 1989).  
Education 
The federal government has taken on a larger role in post-secondary education largely 
through the creation of new tax expenditure programs. In figure 3.6., education spending 
displays a similar pattern to health care and income security. In 1975, four tax expenditures 
for education totaled less than one percent of education spending. By 1995, the number of 
provisions had doubled to eight and totaled $4.9 billion dollars. In a ten year period from 
63 
 
1985 to 1995, the percentage of indirect education spending more than doubled to 19.1 
percent of total expenditures. In 2005, the number of new tax breaks for education 
quadrupled from four to 16 at a total cost of $19.4 billion dollars. This increase was aided by 
new tax credits for post-secondary education passed under a Republican Congress and during 
President Clinton’s second term. For example, the HOPE tax credit, lifetime learning credit 
and deduction for student loan interest are relatively new tax preferences for postsecondary 
education. The Educational Individual Retirement Accounts (EIRA) allows a contribution of 
$500 per year per child to save for educational expenses. Finally, taxpayers can claim 
personal exemptions for dependent children 19 or over who receive parental support 
payments of $1,000 a year or more, are full-time students, and do not claim a personal 
deduction. The three largest tax expenditure programs for education are charitable deductions 
for educational institutions, tax credits for post-secondary education, and deductions for 
higher education expenses. These provisions constitute over half the total amount spent in 
this category.  
      In summary, indirect spending has risen as a percentage of total spending in each 
of the four categories. In the cases of education and health care, tax expenditures now 
represent one out of every five dollars allocated to these policy areas by the federal 
government. In the category of welfare, indirect spending has replaced direct spending as the 
dominant policy tool used to direct funds to the nation’s poor. This has been driven by the 
popularity of the EITC program and the narrowed scope of public welfare under the 
transition from AFDC to TANF. The category where tax expenditures have grown the least is 
in the area of income security. Although the number and generosity of tax incentives for 
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private retirement accounts have grown, they have not outpaced the increased client base and 
payment increases of Social Security
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITCS OF SOCIAL POLICY: PARTISANSHIP AND SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURES 
The Democratic and Republican parties’ stark differences over the role of 
government in the provision of social benefits have defined political conflict since the New 
Deal. This chapter empirically tests the partisan theory of social welfare and changes to 
direct and indirect social expenditures in the United States from 1967-2006. The goal of 
these tests is to determine how changes in political party control at the federal level influence 
the government’s efforts to directly fund public social programs or subsidize private benefits.  
The influence of political party control on direct spending for public social programs is well 
known.  An area of study less understood is how partisanship and public policy affect 
private-sector social welfare. For the first time in empirical political science, this chapter puts 
together measures of both direct public financing and government subsidies to the private 
market in analyzing how partisanship shapes both total social spending and the ratio of 
indirect to direct social expenditures. In addition, I examine the influence of partisan trends, 
such as divided government and party polarization, on the direction of social welfare 
expenditures.  
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The Divided Social Welfare State 
There are two social welfare systems in the United States: one public and the other 
private (Hacker 2002). The public social welfare state created mainly during the New Deal 
and Great Society periods is composed of programs such as Social Security, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).12 The private side of 
the social welfare state constitutes mainly employer-provided social benefits and private 
social services. Although the decision to offer employer social welfare is determined by 
businesses through the private market, these benefits are heavily subsidized by the federal 
government. The politics of the private social system in the United States has largely been 
ignored by social scientists with a few notable exceptions (Howard 1997; Hacker 2002). In 
the fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government allocated more than $600 billion to private-sector 
social welfare in the form of tax subsidies. Out of this total, more than $300 billion worth of 
tax breaks went for employer-sponsored health care and pensions alone (Congress 2008). In 
ignoring private-sector social benefits, scholars unnecessarily exclude a significant amount of 
government activity from their research and the means through which most American 
citizens receive social benefits and services. In this chapter, I build on a small but growing 
body of literature that studies the government's role in both public and private social welfare 
provision by presenting an empirical examination of the partisan influences on indirect 
versus direct social spending. 
Social policy, properly defined, includes all government efforts to provide social 
benefits both through direct provision and indirect methods of private subsidization. Indirect 
                                                 
12
 In this project the terms ``social welfare,'' ``welfare state,'' and ``social policy'' will be used 
interchangeably. This is common usage in public policy and comparative politics. This differs from studies of 
American politics that only use the term welfare to represent means-tested  programs targeted at the poor. 
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and direct social spending follow different policy paths, subsidize different social providers, 
are allocated to different beneficiaries, and have different policy effects. Understanding these 
differences is critical to properly representing the size, scope, and scale of partisan influences 
on social welfare policy in America. To date, empirical studies of partisanship and social 
policy have not systematically analyzed nor tested the influence of political parties on the 
various forms of public financing used to fund total social benefits, both public and private. 
This chapter applies a new partisan theory of social policy to address the following questions: 
first, if both major forms of government financing for social programs, direct and indirect, 
are included in measuring total social expenditures, do traditional theories of partisanship 
still explain yearly changes to social spending? Second, considering the important policy 
consequences that result from using indirect versus direct spending,  how does Democratic 
and Republican party control differ in influencing the ratio of indirect to direct social 
spending? Finally, how does the presence of divided government or party polarization 
explain changes to social welfare expenditures, in addition to political party control?  
My findings indicate that Democratic party control does not clearly correspond with 
higher annual increases to total social welfare expenditures. However, partisanship does 
change the ratio of indirect to direct social expenditures. Republican influence, especially in 
the legislature, corresponds to increases in the social welfare expenditure ratio. Furthermore, 
divided government correlates with the social welfare expenditure ratio in the opposite 
direction than predicted while party polarization demonstrates no effect on spending. These 
results are important in understanding the political and institutional influences on changes to 
the public and private social systems in the United States. 
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Measuring and Testing the Partisan Theory of Social Policy  
My theoretical argument suggests a certain relationship between political parties and 
social expenditures. Contrary to common wisdom and previous research, I do not posit that 
the two major political parties substantively differ on changes to the total social expenditures. 
Where the two political parties do differ is on the question of which sector, public or private, 
should be responsible for the provision and administration of social benefits and services. 
These divergent philosophies can be captured through changes to the ratio of indirect to 
direct social expenditures. The partisan theory of social policy argues that each party designs 
social policy to reflect their electoral strategies and values. Consequently, the Republican 
Party implements financing tools that do not require public administration and subsidizes the 
private sector and their supporters, while Democrats promote direct spending that is 
channeled through public agencies and to their constituencies. I expect that under periods of 
Republican Party control more indirect social spending will be substituted for direct 
expenditures.  
Direct and indirect spending are the two largest categories of public expenditures for 
social programs that together summed to over 1.5 trillion dollars in 2006.13 There are two 
dependent variables used to represent social policy. The first is a measure of total social 
spending that combines indirect spending data with appropriations data on direct government 
expenditures. The other dependent variable is the ratio of indirect to direct social spending 
represented by the annual change in tax expenditures for social welfare in constant 2006 
                                                 
13
 In table 4.1., I report the descriptive statistics for the social expenditure ratio and all other categories 
of social spending. 
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dollars over the annual change in direct appropriations for social welfare in constant 2006 
dollars.14 
I have constructed a new data set of all social tax expenditures which represents 
indirect spending from 1967-2006 by compiling estimates from the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. The JCT estimates tax expenditures in terms of revenues lost to the U.S. Treasury 
for each special tax provision included in the U.S. tax code. A provision has traditionally 
been listed as a tax expenditure if it departs from the normal income tax structure and it 
results in more than a de minimis revenue loss ($50 million).  Under the JCT methodology, 
the normal tax structure for an individual includes the following: one personal exemption for 
each taxpayer and one for each dependent, the standard deduction, the existing tax schedule, 
and deductions for investment and employee business expenses. 15  Most tax benefits to 
individual taxpayers can be classified as exceptions to the normal income tax law. Each tax 
estimate is a function of subtracting predicted revenues under the current law from predicted 
revenue under new and expanded tax provisions. According to the JCT, these estimates have 
been excellent predictions of actual changes in government tax receipts as calculated by the 
I.R.S. returns. In fact, according to a recent study by Burman et al. (2008), summarization of 
tax expenditure estimates have proven to produce similar aggregated estimates as models that 
take into account the interaction effects of all tax expenditures under the alternative 
                                                 
14
 I ran two other models that produced similar results: one with the ratio of indirect to direct social 
spending represented by the percentage annual change in tax expenditures for social welfare over the annual 
percentage change, and the second with tax expenditures as a percentage of total social spending. The difference 
between this last model and the one reported is just scale with one range between zero and infinity and the other 
between zero and one. 
15
 The first JCT public report was issued in 1972 and has been published annually every year since 
with the exceptions of 1974 and 2000. There is one break in the estimates with no data for 1973, which is 
treated as missing data.  
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minimum tax structure.16 The tax expenditures are organized by the JCT into the same 
budget categories as appropriations spending. The following budget categories from both 
indirect and direct spending data were selected to represent annual social welfare 
expenditures: Health; Medicare; Income Security; Education, Training, Employment, and 
Social Services; Social Security; and Veterans Benefits and Services. 
In measuring direct spending, I use appropriations spending data for social welfare 
from the Policy Agendas Project. Jones, True, and Baumgartner (2007) have developed an 
appropriations data set back to the fiscal year 1947. The use of outlays versus appropriations 
makes a difference in capturing political influences, especially in the policy areas of defense 
and welfare. Wlezien and Soroka (2003) argue that scholars studying government spending 
should use appropriations spending since appropriations bills mandate the amount of budget 
authority to an agency or issue area, as compared to direct outlays that often lag behind the 
appropriations decision.17 In figure 4.1, I display changes to the social expenditure ratio from 
1972-2007. The ratio of indirect to direct social spending represented by tax expenditures for 
social programs in constant 2007 dollars over direct appropriations for social programs in 
constant 2007 dollars from 1972-2007. During this period, tax expenditures represented over 
25% of direct spending during two Republican administrations from 1982-1987 and again 
from 2002-2007.  
My political variables are Republican control of the executive branch and the 
percentage of Republicans in Congress. Republican membership in the U.S. Congress is 
measured as a percentage between zero and one, with a higher percentage corresponding to 
                                                 
16
 These authors find that using the alternative minimum tax to estimate and aggregate tax expenditures 
actually leads to lower values than adding up tax expenditures without the alternative minimum tax.  
17
 In table 4.2 I present the sub-categories that are organized into the measures of  indirect and social 
spending.  
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more Republican members. In addition, some of the models use dummy variables to measure 
Republican control of the two houses: the House of Representatives and the Senate. I use 
these measurements since my theory predicts higher Republican membership results in more 
indirect versus direct spending. I expect that for every unit increase in Republican Party 
influence, in both the executive and legislative branches, there will be an ensuing increase in 
the ratio of indirect to direct social spending. In addition to the political variables, economic 
controls are included that represent standard ideas about tax expenditures. The first economic 
variable is the annual percentage change in unemployment, since most indirect spending 
provisions are tied to employer fringe benefits. A rise in unemployment causes tax 
expenditures estimates to decrease as fewer employees claim employer tax credits. Also, an 
increase in unemployment will trigger an increase in public unemployment benefits so that 
the net effect will be a decrease in the indirect to direct social spending ratio.18 Next, inflation 
affects tax expenditure by pushing people into higher tax brackets that in turn provides 
incentives for taxpayers to seek out more tax breaks, including those for social purposes. Any 
unit increase in the annual percentage change for inflation should increase that year's 
estimates for tax expenditures for social welfare. 
First, I evaluated partisan changes to total social spending using a two-sample 
difference of means tests between Republican and Democratic Party control across the 
executive and legislative branches. If traditional theories of partisanship and social spending 
are correct, Democratic Party control will be associated with higher annual social welfare 
expenditures. The partisan theory of social policy predicts that there should be no discernable 
                                                 
18
 These numbers could be complicated by two facts: one is that employer benefits might extend for a 
period past the original date of unemployment and second, the public unemployment insurance program is a 
joint federal-state venture. 
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difference to annual total social spending between the two major political parties. In these 
tests, I use dummied variables for Republican control of the Presidency, the House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Senate. In addition to the difference of means tests, I ran an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to account for possible interaction effects of the three federal 
units and consider the influence of divided government control on spending totals. 
In the second set of tests, I use an Error Correction Model (ECM) for both theoretical 
and statistical reasons. I posit that the relationship between political party control and 
spending will have both short-run and long-run effects. Political parties form policy 
strategies that benefit their position in the short and long runs. The expectation is that 
Republican Party control will lead to higher ratios of indirect to direct social welfare 
expenditures. This is the type of relationship that is appropriate for ECMs when a dependent 
variable is expected to respond to short-run changes in the predictors and have a long-run 
equilibrium relationship with these same variables. When there is a change in political party 
control, there is an immediate impact in spending changes that will be represented in the 
budget and tax bills for that year, but since many of the spending increases involve 
entitlements or spread spending changes over a number of years, the full effects will not be 
felt at once. An ECM model has the capability to test for both short-term and long-term 
effects. On the statistical side, ECMs are appropriate when using non-stationary data.19 A 
                                                 
19
 I ran Augmented Dicky Fuller tests (ADF) with a constant, a time trend, and one lag for three 
measures: annual public social spending, annual social tax expenditures, and a social spending ratio. For the 
annual public social spending measure, the t-statistic was 0.826 and the p-value 1.00. The t-statistic for the 
annual social tax expenditure measure was -0.988 with a p-value of 0.945. Finally, the social spending ratio has 
a t-statistic of -1.99 and a p-value of 0.603. I also ran regular Dicky Fuller tests (ADF) with a constant, a time 
trend, and one lag for three measures: annual public social spending, annual social tax expenditures and a social 
spending ratio. For the annual public social spending measure, the t-statistic was .638 and the p-value .988. The 
t-statistic for the annual social tax expenditure measure was -0.988 with a p-value of 0.945. Finally, the social 
spending ratio has a t-statistic of -2.047 and a p-value of 0.266. Not one of these measures reported a negative 
value less than -3.50, so the null hypothesis of a unit root can not be rejected. These results confirm the initial 
findings of the three augmented Dicky Fuller tests. 
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number of the variables tested here contain a unit root and therefore can produce spurious 
results if not analyzed properly. The typical method for addressing non-stationary time-series 
is to model change in the variables. However, analyzing change in the variables, rather than 
levels of change, only captures the short-run effects. If an independent variable has a long-
run impact on the model, this effect is not captured. I use a single-equation error correction 
model since it is more efficient than a two-stage model. 
The single-equation error correction model is as follows: 
∆      	
	  	 ∆
   
	    
 I have two parameter estimates for each independent variable   	 for the 
differenced variable; its change from time t  to time point t + 1, and for   for the lagged 
level of the variable. In a simple bivariate example, the 	  parameter provides an estimate of 
the initial change in the dependent variable produced in the short-run shock to the 
independent variable. For example, if inflation increases and the level of tax expenditures 
responds, the short term coefficient,  	, provides an estimate of this change. This is referred 
to as the ``short term'' effect, meaning that the effect occurs fully at a specific time point, but 
it does not imply that the effect is temporary. The long term effect is provided by the error 
correction part of the model, which is the interaction of   and 	. The long-run impact is 
the portion of the correlation between X and Y that does not occur at one particular point in 
time but is distributed temporally such that a portion of the impact is felt in each time period. 
The size of the long-run impact is a function of the parameter  but also of 	, which is 
called the error correction rate. In an example of this effect, if the impact of inflation on tax 
expenditures as a percentage of total spending is connected via an error correction 
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mechanism, then a shock to inflation disturbs the long-run equilibrium between inflation and 
tax expenditure spending, and this divergence from the equilibrium will eventually be 
corrected over time. In addition to being an important part of the impact of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable, the error correction rate also tells us how quickly a 
disturbance from the long-run equilibrium is eliminated. In this ECM, estimates of 	 will be 
between zero and negative one, and the closer this parameter is to negative one, the more 
quickly the errors are corrected. The proper way to interpret this coefficient is the proportion 
of the disequilibrium that will be corrected at each time period, starting at t + 1. From the 
error correction rate, we can make inferences about how quickly the total long-run impact is 
felt. In summary, the degree of a short-run effect of X on Y is produced by the estimate of   
	. The size of the long-run impact is determined by the interaction of   and 	. 
The Influence of Partisanship and Economic Factors on Social Spending, 1967-2006 
In table 4.3., I present results from the difference of means tests of partisan control 
and total spending. These test results reveal an uncertain relationship between political party 
control of government and changes to total social spending. This is true across all three 
institutions of the federal government. Therefore, the clear correlation between Democratic 
Party control of government and increased social spending must be called into doubt. 
Republican presidents slightly outspend Democratic ones, on average annual basis, .051 to 
.045. Democratic Party control in Congress results in marginally higher spending totals, yet 
again these differences are not statistically significant. Although not reported in table form, I 
additionally ran an ANOVA with partisanship as a scaled variable. The scaled variable 
ranges from three equating to total Republican control, two and one as divided control, and 
zero to total Democratic control. Again, there was no statistical difference with the partial 
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sum of squares coefficient at .000 and the p-value at .968 with a standard f-value of .05.20 
Regardless of political party control, social spending increased, on average, five percent a 
year during this period of study. These results provide strong evidence that past findings of 
Democratic control resulting in higher levels of social spending only account for changes in 
appropriations for public programs. The similar spending totals, year after year, are driven by 
the entitlement nature of both indirect and direct social welfare spending.  The largest 
categories of direct spending are for non-means tested programs, and indirect spending 
provisions accrue benefits to whomever qualifies – resulting in consistent, annual changes to 
total domestic spending. Although partisan control does not predict changes in total 
spending, it may still serve as a useful indicator in forecasting the direction of the social 
expenditure ratio.  
The second tests stem directly from the partisan theory of social policy. This 
theoretical argument predicts that under higher levels of Republican membership, the ratio of 
indirect to direct social spending will rise. In table 4.4, I present two models: one, measuring 
Republican legislative membership as a percentage, and the second testing for political party 
control with dummied variables representing Republican Party control for both chambers of 
the legislature. It is clear from the results in table 4.4 model 1 that more Republican influence 
in the legislative branch increases the ratio of indirect to direct spending in both the short and 
long terms, with a slight additive effect from presidential control. The coefficient for the 
percentage of Republicans in Congress demonstrates that a positive one-unit shift in 
percentage of Republicans produces an increase in the ratio of indirect to direct social 
                                                 
20
 I ran this another way interacting the dummy variables so that the full model had the three original 
dummies and three more representing the presidency times the house, the presidency times the senate, and the 
house times the senate with the same results. Finally, I ran an ANOVA model that looked at only the 
differences in social spending the year after a switch in party control. Again, the same results were produced - 
no statistically significant difference between the political parties in total social expenditures. 
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spending of 0.145. Over the long-run, this initial increase in the indirect to direct ratio is 
augmented, mainly due to the entitlement nature of tax expenditures, by an even larger 
magnitude of 0.199. I find that the presence of a Republican president increases the spending 
ratio more towards indirect spending in the short-run with a coefficient of 0.020, but the 
long-run impact is negative and not statistically significant. In total and as predicted, the 
Republican Party trades off public funds towards private-sector social programs and away 
from the public sector.21 
There is a possibility that changes to the social welfare expenditure ratio are 
determined by economic conditions. An increase in unemployment should decrease the 
amount of tax expenditures for social welfare, since these individual provisions rely on 
employment. In periods of creeping inflation, more people would seek and claim tax breaks 
for social purposes as a means to lower their overall tax burden. The results here indicate that 
unemployment has no short-term effect but influences social spending ratio in the long-term 
with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.014. The long-term effects are due to the 
lagged nature of tax incentives to address unemployment, such as tax breaks for job and work 
training that affect job rolls years after implementation. In addition, new tax expenditures, 
once passed, expand slowly only after being properly interpreted and applied under existing 
worker contracts on an industry-by-industry basis.22  
                                                 
21
 I ran two other models: one that represented Republican control by dummying up the Presidency, the 
House of Representatives and Senate. The other model used the three previous dummies and created three more 
variables by interacting the Presidency and the House, the Presidency and the Senate and the House and Senate. 
In both of these models the results mirrored those of the reported ECM - Republican control of the executive 
matters and control of the legislature matters more. In the first model with just the three dummied variables, 
Republican control of the Senate reported a higher coefficient than the House. 
22
 In order to put these results into perspective, the biggest jump in the social expenditure ratio was 
between 1982 and 1983. In that year direct spending increased by .06% while indirect spending increased by an 
astonishing .43%. Conversely, when the ratio fell between 1993 and 1994 – direct spending increased by .05% 
while indirect spending increased a slight .02%.  
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In  model 2 in table 4.4., I examine differences across the two chambers of Congress - 
the House of Representatives and Senate. Republican control of both the House and Senate is 
coded as one and Democratic control is labeled zero. Although there is no theoretical reason 
to posit that Republicans in the House differ from Republicans in the Senate in their basic 
ideological preferences towards social policy, the different legislative rules and procedures in 
the two bodies could produce differences in spending. Specifically, the sixty-vote norm in the 
Senate needed to pass cloture and most legislation diminishes the efficacy of simple political 
party control. Republican control of the U.S. Senate results in positively signed and 
significant coefficients in both the short and long terms. The partisan control of the U.S. 
House has a weaker effect on social spending changes and only in the short-term.  The only 
period of time in this study in which the Republican Party controlled the Senate but not the 
House of Representatives was during President Reagan’s administration. From 1981 to 1987, 
direct social spending was cut and substituted with tax breaks that drove up the social welfare 
expenditure ratio from .249 to .338. President Reagan relied on the Republican controlled 
Senate along with fiscal conservatives in the House, during the height of conservative public 
mood, to pass sweeping tax breaks and cut direct public social expenditures. The economic 
controls, although signed in the right direction, are not statistically significant.23  
To summarize, the results presented here confirm both arguments: first, that there is 
no convincing relationship between Democratic Party control of government and changes to 
total social spending and second, that under Republican leadership, exercised mainly by the 
                                                 
23
 I ran a third base partisan model, with the same dummied presidential variables and an ordinal 
variable for control of Congress with two being full Republican control and one being a split Congress. The 
results from this model mirror model one. The most robust predictor is Republican control of the Congress in 
the long-term with a slight additive effect of Republican presidential control in the short-term. Long-run 
unemployment is positively signed and significant in the long-run. The total amount of variance explained by 
this model is similar to model one at .368.  
78 
 
Congress, indirect spending is utilized more than direct spending. I conclude from the results 
here that party control of Congress is more important than that of the executive given that 
Republican influence in the legislature was consistently important in directing the social 
expenditure ratio. First, tax expenditures are controlled by only two committees so once a 
political party controls Congress there are fewer veto points in changing indirect spending. 
Second over the course of this study, party leadership in Congress has exercised more control 
over the rank and file members often resulting in party line votes on important measures such 
as appropriations votes. As the political parties have polarized, legislators who occupy 
supermajoritarian positions in the Senate have become more ideologically extreme (and less 
moderate) and therefore, are more likely to favor highly partisan policy outcomes. Next, the 
president often works through his own party members in Congress to pass salient legislation, 
arguably the most important of which concerns annual spending and revenue bills. I interpret 
these results to mean that the Republicans substitute one type of policy, direct public funding, 
for another, indirect spending. This achieves multiple short and long term goals. In the short-
run, Republicans are able to hold constant or decrease public spending on social programs 
that benefit mainly Democratic constituents and increase tax spending that allocates 
government funds to Republican-friendly businesses and private social insurance providers. 
In the long-run, the substitution of indirect for direct funding accomplishes two goals, one 
policy and one electoral. On the policy side, an increase in tax expenditures today reduces 
government revenue into the future and therefore restricts the capacity of future legislators to 
increase direct spending without running larger deficits. Electorally, the subsidization of 
private social companies increases their ability to service and attract customers. The more 
79 
 
invested citizens are in the health of the economy or private business for their personal 
economic security, the more likely they are to support conservative policies.  
Alternative Explanations for Changes to Social Expenditures 
     In order to fully investigate the influence of political parties on social spending, I 
extend the analysis from measures of political party control to include divided government 
and political party polarization. Some studies theorize that these two recent trends, 
independent of and, in some cases in addition to, party control, are driving both the increased 
use of indirect social spending by the federal government and decreases or stagnation in 
traditional social programs (Howard 1997; Hacker 2002, 2004; Pierson 1996). If one or both 
of these trends are causing yearly increases in the ratio of indirect to direct social spending, 
then the previously reported relationship between more Republican influence and higher 
levels of the social expenditure ratio must be called into question. In the case of divided 
government, if the President’s party does not control Congress, it makes passing sizeable 
changes to domestic spending or deep tax cuts more difficult. Direct measures follow a more 
difficult policy path than indirect measures. Social expenditures for public programs go 
through the entire appropriations process and are subject to review. Conversely, tax spending 
only passes through two committees and, once passed, operates as a form of entitlement 
spending. Therefore, periods of divided government might have less influence on the fate of 
indirect versus direct spending. The effects of party polarization on the ratio of indirect to 
direct spending are similar to those of divided government. It could be argued that indirect 
spending is a logical alternative to both political parties dominant policy strategies, increased 
government spending for the Democrats and cuts in the marginal income and corporate tax 
rate for the Republicans. In essence, splitting the ideological difference between the two 
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parties’ major policy goals, tax expenditures for social welfare could act as both a tax cut for 
individuals and a form of public financing for social policy.  
     The following sections present the literature on divided government and party 
polarization with respect to public policy, government spending, and social policy. Since no 
existing theories examine these two concepts and tax expenditures, I then theorize how 
divided government and party polarization may shift the direction of indirect to direct social 
spending. In order to test these claims, I present additional hypotheses and models: one set 
which includes divided government and a second which tests for the effects of both divided 
government and party polarization. The test results indicate that the inclusion of divided 
government adds to the explanatory strength of the overall model, although partisanship 
continues to be the most powerful and significant indicator of changes to the social 
expenditure ratio. Party polarization is signed in the wrong direction and not statistically 
significant in any of the models.  
Divided Government  
    One of the most popular debates in the annals of political science literature 
concerns the influence of divided government on legislative productivity. Divided 
government has become increasingly frequent in the period since World War II. The 
elections between 1952 and 2009 generated unified governments at the national level just 30 
percent of the time. This era stands in stark contrast to the period between 1900 and 1950, 
when unified governments were elected 84 percent of the time. The traditional divided 
government hypothesis argues that legislation is less likely to become policy when the 
President’s party does not hold a majority of seats in both chambers of Congress. An 
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additional institutional obstacle to passing legislation is the super majoritarian rule of the 
U.S. Senate that requires control of sixty seats by the majority party in order to thwart the 
threat of a filibuster from the minority party. Advocates of the traditional thesis argue that 
agreement among these three bodies is likely to be difficult during periods of divided 
government due to divergent member ideologies. While this argument is intuitive, the 
empirical support has been decidedly mixed.  
      There is noteworthy scholarship that challenges the traditional explanation of 
divided government. Mayhew (1991) argues, in perhaps the most influential piece, that 
divided government does not shape the legislative process in ways that prohibit passing 
major legislation. Mayhew examines 267 pieces of “important” legislation as defined by 
journalistic accounts for the period 1947-1990 and concludes that divided government does 
not change the frequency of passing major legislation. Additionally, Keith Krehbiel (1996) 
theorizes that unified government has no effect on breaking gridlock in the legislative 
process. Legislative gridlock is an often-used phrase to denote congressional periods of 
inefficiency or stalemate in which few bills are passed into law. He goes on to argue that the 
salient factor in stopping gridlock is the policy position of the status quo relative to 
legislators’ preferences for new policy. In addition, gridlock only can be overcome when the 
status quo position is extreme relative to the preferences of the legislators. Finally, partisan 
preferences and supermajority procedures, such as the presidential veto and the filibuster, 
make it extremely unlikely that a strong majority party, even under unified government, will 
be sufficient to alter normal gridlock. Fyrmer (1994), in studying the period from 1977-1992, 
argues that the conservative block in the Democratic party assisted Republican presidents in 
passing legislation, even in periods of divided government. The majority of the 
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aforementioned studies measure the effect of divided government on “significant” legislation 
and not government spending. Given that I represent policy shifts as changes to public 
spending levels, it is essential to examine more specific studies on divided government and 
expenditures.  
     In the matter of government spending, Jones, Baumgartner and True (1998) find 
no statistical difference between unified Democratic control and divided government in 
changes to the budget authority. Although in a previous piece, Jones, Baumgartner and True 
(1996) concluded that divided government corresponds with more budget volatility.  Kiewiet 
and McCubbins (1991) found that Democratic control of Congress and the Presidency results 
in faster domestic spending increases than under Republican control. The above authors also 
report that when there is a split Congress, social spending grows slower than under 
Democratic control but faster than when there is unified Republican control from 1948-1985.  
     In contrast to the above-mentioned literature, some scholars find that divided 
government produces less legislative output than under periods of unified government 
control. Cameron, Howell, Adler, and Riemann (1997) discover that divided government 
reduces enactment of “landmark” legislation, yet increases enactment of less significant 
legislation. Binder (1999) argues that divided government produces a mild increase in the 
proportion of salient legislation that fails, but has no greater effect than other mechanisms 
such as public mood. Kelly (1993) reworks Mayhew’s list of significant laws, using only the 
laws that were significant at the time of adoption, to show that unified government does 
increase the number of important laws passed during a legislative session.  Finally, Quirk and 
Nesmith (1994), in their examination of the George H.W. Bush presidency, claim that 
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divided government only causes gridlock when the issue being debated is highly ideological 
or if there has been a change in the public mood.  
   Over the last thirty years, the increase of divided government has corresponded 
closely with the era of social welfare retrenchment. Paul Pierson (1996, p.17) defines social 
welfare retrenchment as “policy changes that either cut social expenditures, restructure 
welfare state programs to conform more closely to the residual welfare state model, or alter 
the political environment in ways that enhance the probability of such outcomes in the 
future.”  Pierson’s evaluation of retrenchment in the U.S. and U.K. demonstrates that partisan 
barriers both inhibit social program expansion and create obstacles for legislators who want 
to completely dismantle the existing social welfare state. As Pierson writes in his assessment 
of social policy in America, “Economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an 
image of welfare states under siege. Yet if one turns from abstract discussions of social 
transformation to an examination of actual policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the 
proposition that these strains have generated fundamental shifts” (173). Pierson’s conclusions 
would align with those scholars who argue that divided government restrains majority 
political parties from enacting policy that matches their members’ preferences. The 
stagnation of social policy hurts the interests of both the Democratic and Republican Parties. 
Democratic members who want to expand or index public benefits and services to inflation 
are forced to accept “policy drift.”  Policy drift occurs when social and economic changes 
alter the effects of policies without significant changes to the actual policy. Hacker (2004) 
argues that social risks have changed drastically for most workers without much change to 
the federal law that governs public and private insurance. Although retrenchment has reduced 
the scope of some welfare programs, the popularity of Social Security and Medicare inhibits 
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the Republican Party from making deep and lasting cuts. Other scholars examining federal 
and state interactions argue that institutional fragmentation, along with conservative ideology 
during this same period, has resulted in welfare devolution (Goetz 1995). Devolution is the 
shifting of public responsibilities, such as financing, management, and/or regulation, from 
the national government to the subnational level. 
      Different policies can influence the type of politics practiced at the federal level 
(Lowi 1963). I argue that divided government increases the ratio of indirect to direct social 
expenditures due to the different policy characteristics that separate the two types of 
spending. There are numerous policy advantages for tax expenditures as compared to direct 
spending: once passed tax expenditures become part of the permanent tax code, they have no 
sunset provisions, and no standards of performance. Tax incentives for social welfare are 
created and expanded in revenue or tax reform bills and not through the appropriations and 
budget processes. Additionally, tax expenditures face fewer veto points in Congress because 
the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees serve as both the authorizing and 
``appropriating'' committees. On the contrary, when Congress directs federal money to a 
public social program there are specific goals and objectives that are evaluated annually. 
Howard (1997) finds that most tax expenditures originate as minor provisions in large tax 
bills. Moreover, he argues that popular tax credits were usually passed with little to no debate 
and grew exponentially over time. I expect indirect spending to increase at a faster rate than 
direct spending regardless of party division due to the historical ease of passing and 
expanding tax expenditures, the fact that tax expenditures face fewer veto points in the 
legislature, and since tax breaks are not subject to the annual review process. The preceding 
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logic results in the following hypothesis, that divided control of government increases the 
indirect to direct social welfare expenditure ratio – all else equal.  
Party Polarization  
     In addition to increased occurrences of divided government, the two political 
parties have become increasingly polarized on both the elite and mass levels. Since 1990, 
more than half of congressional votes have featured a majority of one party opposing a 
majority of the other. This high level of party polarization has increased steadily since the 
1970s. As the political parties pull apart ideologically, they also became more uniform 
internally as measured by the decreased variance of each party’s voting coalition. There has 
been a dramatic rise in ideological polarization between the two congressional parties since 
the 1970s, whether it is measured through interest group scores (Groseclose, Levitt, and 
Snyder 1999) or roll call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
1997).24  These changes to polarization can be caused by demographic changes to the district 
or by design. Either way, district constituencies are more politically homogeneous and, 
therefore, elect more ideologically extreme members. Rhode (1991) and Jacobson (2001), 
among others, argue that party polarization has been marginally increased after every round 
of redistricting over the last thirty years.  
      The lucidity of partisan differences, especially on social issues, has resulted in 
increased party strength and polarization among the electorate. Changes in national political 
party polarization have caused responses from the mass electorate that mirror the elite level 
(Zaller 1991; Carmines and Stimson 1989). There are three major categories of theory in 
                                                 
24
 The DW-Nominate scale is calculated from all non-unanimous roll call votes cast across all 
Congresses with each vote recorded on a liberal-conservative dimension ranging from –1.0 (most liberal) to 1.0 
(most conservative), allowing measurements across time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997). 
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arguing for what drives polarization in the mass electorate: the electorates’ response to the 
elite realignment (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2000; Putz and Shepherd 2001), shifting 
partisanship on a single-issue (Riker 1982; Carmines and Stimson 1989) or voters’ extending 
conflict from divisions about social welfare to other issue areas (Carsey and Layman 2002). 
Hetherington (2001) demonstrates that party polarization in the U.S. Congress created clearer 
perceptions among voters about the major issue differences between Democrats and 
Republicans, especially for social welfare.  
     Party polarization has been blamed for a number of new policy developments 
including an increase in strategic gamesmanship (Aldrich and Rohde 2000) and decreases in 
social spending for public programs (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  Jones (2001) 
argues that it is not divided government but party polarization that leads to legislative 
gridlock. He concludes that by including party polarization and party seat division in a model 
along with divided government, the divided government effects on legislative gridlock go 
away, while polarization and seat division are highly correlated with gridlock. Besides 
making compromise across the legislative aisle more difficult, party polarization also signals 
a decrease in the amount of moderate legislators. Moderate legislators have a privileged 
position in deciding policy outcomes (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998). The long-
standing congressional rules like the Senate’s filibuster and the constitutional requirements 
for overriding presidential vetoes force super-majoritarian outcomes. If moderate members 
become less frequent, more ideological members will fill these pivotal congressional roles in 
the legislative process. Howard (1997) argues that important new tax expenditures in 
Congress were sponsored by more moderate members, and, therefore, the decrease of 
moderate members could result in less support for tax expenditures. McCarty, Poole, and 
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Rosenthal (2006), in their study of party polarization and income inequality, reveal that party 
polarization in Congress is associated with diminished social spending and decreases in 
marginal income tax rates. If McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal are correct on the social policy 
effects of polarization, then I expect polarization to correspond with a higher social welfare 
expenditure ratio.  
      As the two major political parties diverge on issue areas, they also move away on 
their preferred strategies of social policy redistribution. Polarization should affect the two 
major political parties’ preferences for indirect versus direct spending in ways that increase 
the social welfare ratio. It could be that indirect spending represents a preferred compromise 
position for both parties on social policy, as compared to the status quo. Democrats can claim 
that federal money was allocated to social welfare goals, while Republicans can claim new 
tax cuts and a reduction of government bureaucracy. The second possibility is that increased 
party polarization, along with divided government, creates obstacles to direct legislation and 
therefore privileges the less scrutinized route of indirect spending.  In the past, periods of 
drastic social spending increases occurred in periods of large Democratic majorities. 
Conversely, major tax cuts to the income and corporate structure were enacted only in times 
of significant Republican majorities. Tax expenditures for social welfare represent a natural 
policy compromise to both higher social spending and marginal tax cuts and, therefore, 
should rise in periods of increased party polarization.   
Measuring and Testing the Alternative Models of Partisan Influences  
In the new models, divided government and party polarization represent two distinct 
hypotheses concerning social policy that are tested alongside the partisan theory of social 
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policy. The first set of models adds the individual variables of divided government and party 
polarization to the baseline model. I represent divided government as a binary variable with 
unified party control being labeled as zero and years of divided party control being labeled as 
one. Party polarization is measured using the common space scores with higher values 
signaling more polarization (Poole 1998). This measure is created from scaling the DW-
NOMINATE scores that allow the House and Senate to be compared across time and space. 
In Table 4.5, the partisan variables are carried over from the original analysis with 
Republican control being coded one and Democratic control as zero. There are again 
economic controls representing yearly percentage changes to both inflation and 
unemployment. To reiterate, the expected hypotheses are that divided government, 
independent of partisan control, results in a higher social expenditure ratio and that party 
polarization also increases the social expenditure ratio.   
As is clear in table 4.5., the addition of divided government does not assist the overall 
explanatory power of the model, nor is the variable signed correctly and statistically 
significant. Both the short and long-run coefficients are small and not statistically significant. 
In fact, the long-run coefficient for divided government is signed in the wrong direction and 
not statistically significant. A higher percentage of Republican members in the legislature 
again are a robust indicator of greater indirect to direct social welfare expenditures. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of the divided government measure negates the significance of the 
short-run effects for Republican control of the executive and legislative branches. The results 
here indicate the effects of partisanship on social spending changes are distributed across the 
years after t + 1. This is unsurprising given that most of the social spending components 
included in the indirect to direct ratio measure are types of entitlement spending that, once 
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passed, increase with time. The coefficients for inflation are signed in the right direction, but 
they are not significant. As in the base model, the long-run coefficient for unemployment is 
positively signed and significant. Across almost all the models, long-term unemployment has 
been positively associated with moderate changes to the social welfare expenditure ratio. 
This is true for two reasons: one, direct spending that addresses unemployment is largely 
handled at the state level and, therefore, federal spending on public programs would not be 
triggered by increasing unemployment; second, indirect initiatives to address unemployment 
are time-lagged investments, such as worker training or incentives for extended formal 
education.   
     The results from model 4 in table 4.5. demonstrate that party polarization is signed 
in the expected direction, but not statistically significant. Republican Party influence, over 
the long-run, in Congress again is the most efficacious predictor of social spending changes. 
The combined null results of both the divided government and party polarization measures 
raise doubts on the proposed use of tax alternatives as a compromise strategy for the two 
political parties. Also, the positive signs for the party polarization variables diminish the 
possibility that an increase in moderate members of Congress corresponds to greater levels of 
indirect to direct social expenditures, as is argued by Christopher Howard in The Hidden 
Welfare State. All of the remaining political variables were in the right direction yet not 
significant. The only economic control to rise to the level of significance was long-term 
unemployment.   
     The analysis above provides considerable support for the partisan theory of social 
policy. A larger presence of Republican members in the U.S. Congress corresponds to greater 
indirect to direct social welfare expenditures. This relationship stands up against economic 
90 
 
controls and alternative political explanations such as party polarization. The partisanship of 
the legislature is a more robust and consistent predictor of changes to the social expenditure 
ratio than that of the executive branch. In fact, a higher level of Republican control was 
significant and robust across all four models. In one set of models, the presence of divided 
government does not perform as hypothesized and negatively corresponds with the social 
spending ratio, resulting in more direct versus indirect expenditures. The divided government 
results negate the theorized importance of the different policy paths of indirect and direct 
spending. It does reinforce previous findings that divided government is not in and of itself 
an obstacle to increased government spending. Party polarization is not statistically 
significant in any of three alternative models.  
     The next step for this analysis, and one I plan for the future, would be to use the 
DW-NOMINATE scores to test the potential influence of gridlock intervals on changes to 
the social expenditure ratio. I would be interested in determining if certain pivotal positions 
that are sufficiently liberal or conservative as compared to the status quo move the social 
welfare expenditure ratio in the expected direction. Additionally, it would be interesting to 
examine the DW-NOMINATE scores of the relevant committee heads in comparison to the 
ideological scores of the chamber median and the executive branch. Furthermore, I would 
like to create a cross-sectional model using four dependent variables representing each social 
welfare category. The social welfare expenditure data can be broken down into four policy 
categories: health care, income security, welfare, and education. The previous models assume 
that all four social categories respond to changes in partisanship in the same way. A cross-
sectional model might reveal different political influences than the earlier examination of 
social welfare as an aggregated measure. For example, there might be no difference between 
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the Republican and Democratic Parties in the category of welfare since both parties have 
supported increases to the EITC during this period and slashed public welfare spending.  
The Policy Effects of Political Changes to the Social Expenditure Ratio 
The results presented here have several important implications for political parties, 
public policy, and economic conditions. First, the traditional narrative of Democratic Party 
control of the federal government leading to more spending and larger government needs to 
be reconsidered. The traditional story of the liberal or Democratic social state is now 
complicated by the fact that Republicans too support a social welfare state, albeit one that 
utilizes the tax code in place of the appropriations process to direct financial resources to the 
providers, not the beneficiaries, of social benefits. The shift of social policy from direct to 
indirect spending moves resources and jurisdiction over social policy from the state to the 
market. 
In 2007, the U.S. budget deficit was 65.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product and has 
increased, on average, over $500 billion each year since 2003. The political focus on 
addressing the geometrically growing budget debt has almost solely been on controlling 
entitlement spending for social programs. Tax expenditures function as a type of entitlement 
spending, given that any taxpayer who qualifies can claim the benefit, so any new or 
expanded tax expenditure reduces the revenue of the federal government now and into the 
future. I would argue that any serious proposal to control entitlement spending as a means of 
dealing with the budget problem should also address the $1 trillion dollars of annual revenues 
lost through tax expenditures, most of which are on ``autopilot'' and not subject to annual 
review.  Not only do public entitlements drive up the annual budget deficit, but the continual 
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growth of tax expenditures for employer-provided benefits augments this growing fiscal 
problem. 
The policy process for direct spending differs drastically from indirect social 
spending. Tax expenditures are a prime example of ``off-budget'' spending since they are 
divided from direct expenditure programs in the legislature and the administrative agencies 
that prepare direct expenditure budgets. For example, the Department of Health and Human 
Services prepares the budget for means-tested assistance programs for the poor, such as 
TANF and Medicaid, but has no authority for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) subsidy 
which also is targeted at the poor. One consequence of the tax expenditure process is that 
policymakers with no interest or expertise in social policy administer incentives for health 
care, income security, welfare, and education. In addition, there are no substantive 
evaluations of who benefits from these expenditures, if they are efficient compared to direct 
spending programs, or if tax expenditures actually promote the type of private social 
provision they are intended to stimulate. The lack of annual review and smaller number of 
committees involved in the tax expenditure process reduce the scope of conflict, which in 
turn privileges special interests and could diminish the saliency of public opinion 
(Schattschneider 1960).  
Finally, policy processes have feedback loops in that citizen and interest group 
responses to government programs create incentives and costs for political participation in 
future policy debates. In traditional public programs, if citizens are unhappy with the quality 
of social services, there are many public outlets for voicing their displeasure in order to bring 
about improvements to benefits and services. Tax expenditures for social welfare subsidize 
mostly employer-provided social insurance and benefits. The government's indirect financing 
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of these social programs obscures the role of political actors and public policy in shaping the 
access and generosity of social benefits. As Suzanne Mettler (2007) argues about indirect 
spending, ``this growing sector of social policies, in obscuring the government's role, 
threatens to undermine citizens' support for more distributive forms of social provision by 
offering them the illusion that they gain economic security solely through their own 
individual efforts'' ( p. 218). 
Social policy has many economic effects, the most significant being the redistribution 
of national income. Public social welfare programs are designed to provide either cash or in-
kind benefits to the most economically vulnerable populations in society such as the elderly, 
the poor, children, unemployed workers, and the disabled. Tax expenditures for social 
purposes primarily accrue to wealthier, white-collar workers. Nathan Kelly (2005) 
demonstrates through the conditioning of economic factors Democratic control of 
government has had progressive effects on the redistribution of income over time. The 
majority of tax expenditures, all but tax credits, have regressive effects on income 
redistribution. The results here indicate that tax expenditures increase under Republican 
control, so a logical extension would be that income inequality should also rise with 
Republican gains due to increases in tax spending. It is important to consider if and how 
these tax cuts are financed with changes in direct federal spending. If an increased tax cut for 
employer-sponsored health care is paid for by a decrease in Medicaid payments, then this 
exchange is sure to cause a rise in economic inequality. Chapter five systemically tests the 
relationship among political party control, social spending, and changes to economic 
inequality. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V  
POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, AND THE PRIVATE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM 
 
This chapter presents a test of the partisan theory of social policy by examining the 
relationship among political parties, social policy, and the private social system. To date, 
there are no existing studies which empirically examine the role of political parties or public 
policy in determining adjustments to private-sector social spending. Contrary to common 
wisdom, I expect the Republican Party in government to support public funding of social 
policy. Contrary to Democratic Party preferences for public social expenditures, Republicans 
favor the subsidization of private-sector social services and benefits. The Republican Party 
distributes resources to their constituencies and promotes conservatism by using public 
policy to encourage private social spending.  
The private-sector social system is larger in the United States than in any other 
industrialized country and has rapidly grown over the last thirty years (OECD 2005). The 
vast majority of Americans receive their social benefits and services through the private 
market.25 Private-sector social spending nearly doubled from 7.7 percent of GDP in 1972 to 
13.3 percent in 1994. 26 Public spending from social programs, although larger, increased at a 
slower pace from 16.6% to 21.1% of GDP during the same time period. Total spending for 
                                                 
25
 I present data on this in chapter three from the SSA and EBRI.  
26
 I use these years because the private social spending data only run until 1994.  
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social welfare programs, both public and private, increased from 23.5 percent of GDP in 
1972 to 33.6 percent in 1994. In this chapter, I test how changes to political party control of 
government, and by extension public policy represented by the social expenditure ratio, 
determine varying levels of private-sector social spending in the United States.  
The private social system refers to health care, pensions, welfare, education, and other 
services which citizens receive through their employers or other non-government 
organizations. The majority of private social benefits are offered voluntarily by businesses.27 
This analysis focuses primarily on employment-related social benefits and services since 
these programs constitute around 96% of total private-sector social expenditures (SSA).28 
The administration and provision of employee social benefits involves the government, 
businesses, and individual employees. The two largest private-sector social programs are 
employment-based health care insurance and company pensions. Currently, the two main 
roles of public policy in the private market are regulating the provision of social benefits and 
providing incentives through favorable tax treatment and subsidies. Additionally, the 
government mandates that employers assist in paying for some public social programs such 
as Social Security, family and medical leave, workers’ compensation, and unemployment 
insurance. Employers voluntarily offer health insurance to employees that range from acute 
hospital visits to full coverage including dental and eye care. Also, employers provide 
savings and private pension plans to employees for retirement that vary from older defined 
benefit plans to newer defined contribution plans that rely on individual accounts. Employers 
often provide additional benefits and services such as education and training, child care, legal 
                                                 
27
 Given this fact, it is important to note that many of the salient factors that determine private benefits 
cannot be modeled, such as company level decisions, industry level decisions, and globalization.  
28
 Although I include spending data on non-profit and voluntary social services and benefits, I do not 
theorize about these organizations since they represent such a small percentage of total private spending and the 
literature focuses mainly on issues of organization and management.  
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assistance, traveling reimbursements, paid sick leave, vacations, and maternity leave. Finally, 
employers sometimes provide voluntarily group-life insurance and long-term disability 
insurance. The generosity of private social benefits is determined by company level 
decisions, macroeconomic factors, and public policy.  
A political party's decision to finance the public or private sector is primarily a 
function of their members' election goals and core values. Most existing theories of social 
policy operate from the assumption that the only response available to government officials 
in response to pressures for social benefits is the expansion of government programs and 
public spending.  Previously, I introduced a theoretical argument that political parties have 
preferences for the role of government in society. Republican Party members are interested in 
maximizing individual economic freedom from the perceived advancement of government 
power and, therefore, use policy to shift public funds to the private market. I have found that 
more Republican Party influence in the federal government results in higher levels of indirect 
versus direct spending, which subsidizes private-sector social programs. Therefore, I expect 
that increased Republican influence in the federal government will produce policy that both 
lowers the cost of private social provision and creates more demand by cutting public 
programs. In this chapter, I find that mixed results for the relationship between political party 
control and private spending. Republican Party control of the Senate increases private-sector 
social spending although not through changes to the social expenditure ratio. In comparison, 
if just the percentage of Republicans in Congress is used both Republican influence and the 
social expenditure ratio correlate with higher private spending. These results have 
implications for understanding the role of political institutions in the private market, public 
policy-making, and social policy.  
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A Brief History of the Private Social System 
     Private social programs have existed in the United States since the 17th century. 
The private social state’s early development is commonly attributed to the lack of national 
and state social programs (Brandes 1976). In the absence of federal social programs during 
the 19th century, civic and social organizations used welfare benefits and social insurance as 
forms of selective benefits in order to attract members and garner loyalty to their 
organizations (Lubove 1968; Skocpol 1995; Beito 2000). Some examples of earlier employer 
programs are Gallatin Glassworks profit-sharing plan in 1797, American Express Company’s 
employer pension plan in 1875, and Montgomery Ward’s group health, life, and accident 
insurance program in 1910. These programs were created to increase worker loyalty and 
dissuade union activists through offering preemptive employer benefits. Employers also 
assisted in the formation of mutual benefit societies which maintained contributory 
employee-financed funds that paid benefits to injured and ill employees. For example, health 
and accident coverage was first offered in the mining and railway industries by benevolent 
societies that later turned into industrial unions. In the 1870s railroad, mining, and other 
industrial industries offered the use of company doctors to workers. This was, for most 
businesses, the earliest form of health insurance that was later supplemented by medical or 
hospital coverage. In addition, group sickness and accident insurance guaranteed a daily 
payment for each day of work missed on account of work-related illness or injury. These 
types of corporate welfare were successful in cultivating employee loyalty and grew again in 
the 1940s and 1950s due to policies surrounding World War II.  
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     The second wave of private-sector social benefit growth occurred in response to 
war time economic policies. Quadagno (1988) argues that there were three policies that 
together influenced the rise of private social benefits in the middle of the 20th century: the 
excess-profits tax, the wage freeze, and the tax-exempt status of pension and health insurance 
payments. She argues that the excess-profit tax spurred firms to increase their before-tax 
spending on employee fringe benefits. Next, increased labor competition and the federally-
mandated wage freeze encouraged firms to increase employee compensation packages 
through better fringe benefits, as opposed to salaries and wages. At this time, there were a 
number of federal court cases that ruled employer payments into company pension and health 
care plans were not wages and were, therefore, tax deductible (Munts 1967). In addition, 
court cases surrounding the Wagner Act of 1935 gave increased rights and incentives to 
unions to negotiate and bargain over employer-based benefits. Many union leaders, 
especially the American Federation of Labor (AFL), believed that union-provided benefits 
grew their membership rolls. Finally, many union leaders turned towards employer-benefits 
as they became increasingly frustrated with the Democratic Party’s lack of progress on 
national health care and other benefits.  
     After World War II, private insurance companies began to realize the economic 
benefit of selling group policies to businesses. The number of union workers covered by 
employer-provided health insurance went from 600,000 in 1946 to 12 million workers and 17 
million dependents by 1954. First, employed people were relatively healthier and younger 
than the general population, so social insurance could be sold at a lower cost per unit. 
Second, insurance companies could avoid the problem of adverse selection since people do 
not primarily select employment due to the health and pension benefits. In conclusion, 
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businesses worked with private social providers to offer employment benefits as a means to 
generate worker loyalty, respond to the dictates of collective bargaining, and diminish the 
incentive for employees to form unions.  
The Modern Private Social System 
      American private-sector social spending grew dramatically as a portion of total 
social expenditures during the past half century. From 1972-2002, private social welfare 
expenditures, driven mainly by employer health care and pensions, more than doubled from 
seven to 15 percent of GDP (SSA 2004). Over the last decade, more than 70% of workers 
were enrolled in some type of employment-provided insurance program. The participation of 
workers in employer-based social programs is correlated with macroeconomic conditions 
such as the unemployment rate. For example, the economic boom of the 1990s produced 
higher levels of participation in private plans while the economic slowdown in the 2000s 
resulted in lower levels of worker participation. As employer-based plans have matured over 
the years, businesses, unions, and the federal government became more comfortable with the 
prominent role of private benefits in the overall social system. The following sections explore 
the major components of the modern private social system: employer social benefits and 
services.  
Employer Health Care  
     Employer-based health insurance provided coverage for 161 million citizens under 
the age of 65 in 2008. During the same year, 51 million or 19.4 % of the nonelderly 
population were covered under public programs, an additional 16.7 million, or 6.3 %, were 
covered by individual policies. In 2008, 98% of Americans with employer-based health plans 
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were enrolled in managed health care. The majority of these managed care plans are 
represented by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs). Almost all employment-based health care plans are subject to 
payment limitations and require the employee to share in the costs of coverage. These costs 
include premiums, deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, and maximum caps on benefits. 
Employment-based health benefits use a variety of administrators: commercial insurance 
programs, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, self-insured plans administered by third-party 
administrators (TPAs), or multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWAs). As Table 5.1. 
shows, employer health insurance declined from 68.4 %t in 2000 to only 61.1 % in 2008. The 
uninsured population grew over this same time-period and was estimated at 45.7 million in 
2008. The public health programs of Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) increased from 10.5% of the population in 1999 to 14.9% of the 
population in 2008. Individually purchased health care insurance has remained at a constant 
range of 16-17 %from 1996 to 2008.  
As with private pensions demographics discussed in chapter three, workers enrolled 
in employment-based health insurance programs are more likely to be white, wealthy, and 
working full-time as a professional in a large firm as compared to the average citizen. Among 
the U.S. adult population, more than 61 % of nonelderly citizens have employer-based health 
insurance. Large employers providing access to group health coverage often are able to 
provide health benefits at lower costs than smaller employers, since they are subject to less 
adverse selection and their administrative costs are lower. In 2008, 64.2% of workers in firms 
with 1,000 or more employees had social insurance compared with only 26.4% of workers in 
firms with fewer than 10 employees. In the same year, more than 66% of workers in 
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managerial and professional occupations had personal health care insurance compared with 
only 33.9% of workers in the service sector. Additionally, more than 66% of full-time or full-
year employees were enrolled in employer health insurance programs compared to 13.1% of 
part-time, part-year employees. In the United States, private health insurance enrollment 
varies by race and ethnicity. In 2008, a little less than 70% of white workers received health 
insurance through their employer. Conversely, 49.1% of blacks had coverage and only 40.7% 
of Hispanics had private coverage. Even when controlling for income levels, whites were still 
far more likely to have health coverage than racial and ethnic minorities. For example, for 
families with income levels at least 300 % above the poverty level, 84.5% of whites had 
coverage compared with 76.9% of blacks and only 72.2 % among Hispanics (EBRI 2009).  
Employer Pension Plans 
     There are two main types of employer-based retirement plans: defined 
contribution plans (DC) typified by 401(k) and 403(b) pension plans and defined benefit 
plans (DB) typified by traditional pension plans. Under a DC plan, employer contributions 
are based on a predetermined formula, and contributions made by both employers and 
employees are placed in individual accounts on behalf of each participant. Conversely, DB 
plans typically are funded by the company and do not require participants to contribute. In 
addition, payments are held in one trust on behalf of all participants, and these contributions 
are subject to federal funding rules and regulations required to maintain the plan’s tax-
favored status. The overwhelming majority of individual employees receiving DC plan 
benefits assume all of the investment risk in their own accounts. On the other hand, DB 
pension plan participants receive a specific benefit amount calculated from a specific 
formula, usually based on average salary and years of service, regardless of the investment 
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performance of the plan assets. Next, DC and DB plans differ in the manner in which they 
pay out benefits to participants. DC plans commonly pay out benefits in a lump sum and 
employees are responsible for managing this money for the rest of their lifetime. In contrast, 
DB plans are required to offer life annuities, a certain amount paid out regularly, for as long 
as the beneficiary lives. In general, a contribution to a qualified plan is immediately 
deductible in computing the employer’s taxes, but only becomes taxable to the employee on 
subsequent distributions from the plan. The final retirement benefit is a function of the total 
of employer contributions, any employee contributions, investment gains or losses, and 
withdrawals and unpaid loans. 
      The most important trend in the area of private pensions has been the massive 
shift from DB plans to DC pensions. Research from the I.R.S. demonstrates that the number 
of private-sector workers participating in a DB pension decreased from 30.1 million in 1980 
to 19.9 million in 2006, while private-sector workers enrolled in a DC plan increased from 
18.9 million in 1980 to 65.8 million in 2006, an increase of approximately 250%. There has 
been an overall downward trend in the percentage of workers participating in an 
employment-based retirement plan. In 2000, the percentage of workers enrolled in employer-
based retirement plans reached 44.4% and declined to 40.4% in 2008. The passage of the 
Pension Protection Act (PPA) in 2006 automatically enrolls employees in defined 
contribution pension plans, which should result in an increase in employer-provided pension 
enrollment.  
Other Employer Social Services 
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In addition to pensions and health insurance, there are numerous other social benefits 
offered by U.S. employers. Employers have long offered group life insurance and more 
recently have added educational and training assistance, group legal plans, and dependent 
care. Employers voluntarily provide short-term and long-term disability insurance. The 
disability compensation becomes mandatory if the employee suffers an injury or illness as a 
direct result of their job. Many employers provide death benefits for survivors of deceased 
employees. One type of fringe plan is group life insurance that makes lump-sum payments to 
a designated beneficiary, and another is a survivor income plan that makes regular payments 
to survivors. As more women have entered the workforce, employers have increased their 
child care assistance that includes services such as company-sponsored day care and financial 
assistance to flexibility in work scheduling. Also, employers provide assistance to employees 
who want or need more schooling but cannot qualify for federal assistance as a part-time or 
full-time student due to their work schedule. For these employees, there are tax-favored 
educational reimbursement programs, educational assistance programs, and qualified 
scholarship programs.  
The Role of Government in Private Social Welfare 
    Private social benefits are actively encouraged and shaped through government 
regulation and subsidies. The first real venture of the federal government into employer-
based benefits was the Revenue Act of 1926. This legislation exempted from taxation 
employer contributions to pension plans and postponed taxes on these retirement benefits 
until they were cashed in by the employees. In 1934, the federal government took over the 
largest group of employer benefits at the time, the pension plans of railroad companies. The 
establishment of the Social Security Act of 1935 established a number of public social 
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programs, which diminished the need for private social benefits and services. The majority of 
employers integrated their pension plans with Social Security, reducing their benefits by the 
amount of the Social Security stipend.  
     The start of World War II brought about new federal laws that increased private-
sector social benefits. First, the Revenue Act of 1942 required that private pension plans 
cover at least 70 percent of employees in order for businesses to continue to receive tax 
exemption for corporate pensions. Second, the provision required that pension formulas for 
both eligibility and benefits not discriminate based on employee salary. Finally, it introduced 
a tax on excess profits, thereby encouraging employers to lower their pretax earnings by 
putting profits back into employee pension and health care plans. In 1943 the National War 
Labor Board (NWLB) relieved wage pressure, due to the labor shortage caused by the war, 
by ruling that employer contributions to pension and insurance plans were not counted as 
wages. Although the main goal of the NWLB was to assist in controlling inflation, this action 
helped grow the private-sector social system. The election of more Republican members to 
Congress in the late 1940s resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which banned union 
control over social benefits and services financed by businesses. The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) leveled the playing field in the arena of private social benefits by 
ruling against Inland Steel, thus interpreting Taft-Hartley as requiring businesses to negotiate 
benefits with employees over benefits and services. The growth of business-sponsored social 
programs during this period gave the federal government another option in addressing the 
demands of citizens concerned with income security.  
      In the modern era, the federal government became more active in regulating and 
financing private-sector benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 
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1974 is the most comprehensive federal law governing private pensions and health insurance. 
ERISA was designed to make private pensions more secure, more portable, and more 
equitable among income levels. ERISA reinforced the political norm that it was the 
government’s responsibility to support the pension and health coverage of workers through 
assisting employer-based plans. The heavier regulation of traditional employer pensions and 
health care, along with new tax expenditure programs, resulted in a shift to more 
individually-based pension and health care plans. In addition, the court rulings that followed 
ERISA codified employer health care under a preemption clause that was later interpreted as 
self-insured plans not being subject to state laws. Corporations large and small responded to 
the court rulings and new tax expenditures by changing health insurance plans to be self-
insured. In addition, President Nixon pushed through legislation that incentivized health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), which were prepaid group plans that paid panels of 
doctors either a salary or fixed fee per patient. Also, the Nixon administration lobbied for the 
creation of tax-advantaged Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and expansions of the 
Keogh plans, which are retirement vehicles for the self-employed. In conclusion, public 
policy has become more deeply involved in shaping the contours of business incentives for 
the provision of employment-related health care and pensions, which has resulted in less 
traditional and more individually-based plans.  
The Role of Indirect Spending in Private Social Welfare 
     The tax treatment accorded employer benefits and services by the I.R.S. provides 
incentives for employers to establish social welfare plans and for employees to participate in 
them. Employer contributions to health care insurance are tax exempt to employees and tax 
deductible to employers. For the vast majority of private retirement programs, taxes are 
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deferred until the employee receives the actual payment. Additional employee benefits, such 
as life insurance, dependent care, and educational assistance, are tax exempt up to specific 
dollar limits. The tax treatment of employee benefit programs has remained relatively 
constant over the years. The tax code has provided tax incentives for employment-based 
pension plans since 1926, for compensation related to sickness or injuries since 1939, and for 
health insurance plans since 1942. In addition to the previously discussed ERISA tax 
expenditure programs, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was created in 1975. This 
refundable tax credit is the federal government’s largest and most expensive poverty 
assistance program aimed at the working poor. In 1993, a number of indirect spending 
initiates aimed at student loans were included in the Family and Medical Leave Act. The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 provided businesses 
incentives to provide long-term supplemental health plans, such as dental and vision. Finally, 
the Child Tax Credit was passed in 1997 and is currently the largest federally-sponsored 
direct or indirect child care program. The government has played a larger role in the private 
social system as the number and generosity of tax expenditure programs for social purposes 
has risen over time.  
Testing the Partisan Theory of Social Policy and Private-Sector Spending 
     Political parties in government have preferences for the role of government in 
society that reflects their election goals and core values. As applied to political party 
influences over social policy, the difference between direct and indirect spending tilts the 
balance of power between the public and private sectors. Republican control of government 
results in higher levels of indirect versus direct social spending that promote capitalist 
markets and regressively redistribute national income. This policy strategy adheres to 
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conservative governing principles and allocates public resources to Republican-leaning 
constituencies. I expect to find that political party control will predict changes in private 
social spending through changes to the social expenditure ratio better than fluctuations in 
economic conditions or political party control. Figure 5.1. presents the full model of 
partisanship, social policy and private-sector spending. Specifically, I expect to find that 
Republican Party control correlates with higher levels of the social expenditure ratio, which 
in turn stimulates increased private-sector social spending, all else equal. An increase in the 
social expenditure ratio will correlate with a higher level of private spending through two 
mechanisms. First, more indirect spending lowers the cost both to employers providing social 
benefits and employees consuming them. Next, decreases in public social spending and 
programs should spur more demand for private social services and benefits.  
Data and Methodology 
     In order to test the partisan theory of social policy and the private market, I 
incorporate a new data set on private social expenditures from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) from 1950-1994. The scope of this study is limited to 27 years due to 
the overlap of the indirect social spending data, which does not begin until 1967, and private-
sector spending data that ends in 1994. The SSA estimated private sector welfare benefits 
across four categories from 1950-1994: health care, income maintenance (mainly private 
pensions and worker compensation), education, and welfare services.29 These categories 
were chosen by the SSA since they correspond with comparative studies of social welfare 
programs conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In addition, these categories reflect the 
                                                 
29
 In table 5A.1. there is a detailed description of the private-sector social spending measure.  
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broad subcategories for social policy used in both the appropriations process and the tax 
code.  It is imperative to note that these data do not include tax expenditures. These data are 
purely private-sector social expenditures, which do not include public subsidies or taxes in 
order to avoid double-counting. I aggregate all of the categories to construct the dependent 
variable, a measure of annual changes to private-sector social expenditures.  
     The political variables of interest are carried over from the previous chapters with 
Republican control of the executive coded as one and Republican influence in the legislature 
represented by the percentage of Republican members between zero and one. I report 
Republican control of the House of Representatives and Senate with a dummy variable for 
both houses. In addition, I measure the ideological direction of the presidency using DW-
NOMINATE scores as a substitute for party control of the executive. The DW-NOMINATE 
procedure applies a spatial model of voting representing a liberal to conservative ideological 
spectrum. The DW-NOMINATE ranges from -1 to 1 with 1 being a perfect conservative 
score. I expect that more conservative Republican president’s will correlate with higher 
levels of the social expenditure ratio and private-sector social spending. Republican Party 
control is used in place of the traditional measurement of Democratic Party control given that 
the partisan theory of social policy predicts higher levels of private subsidization and 
spending under Republican leadership.  
I import the social expenditure ratio as representative of social policy from chapter 
three. This variable is the ratio of indirect to direct social spending represented by the annual 
change in tax expenditures for social programs in constant 1994 dollars over the annual 
change in direct appropriations for social programs in constant 1994 dollars. In addition, I 
employ existing ideas about how changes to the macro-economy affect private-sector 
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spending. An increase in the level of unemployment will result in less people being able to 
claim employer benefits, such as employer-based health care and pensions, and, therefore, 
should drive down private-sector spending. When unemployment is high, businesses 
typically cut back on discretionary spending by decreasing fringe benefits and restricting 
employee eligibility (as much as can be done legally). In addition, newer businesses, due to 
economic uncertainty, may not voluntarily offer social benefits and services to their 
employees. Next, a rise in real GDP denotes more production and economic growth, which 
should relate to increased capacity for businesses to offer more fringe benefits (although 
there are many outlets for increased profits). The dependent variable is denoted by the annual 
percentage change in total private-sector social spending in real 1994 dollars.  
      My theoretical argument implies that political party influence on private-sector 
expenditures occurs indirectly through changes to public policy. Therefore, in the full 
recursive model represented in figure 5.1, the influence of party control on the private sector 
is filtered through changes to social policy. I test for the effects of direct party control on 
private social spending in order to determine that it is changes in social policy and not other 
policy directives that are drive increases in private social expenditures. Finally, I address 
existing political economy theories by including measurements of unemployment and 
inflation. The full model can be represented as follows30 
Y = a + β1X₁+ β2X2 + β3X₃ + β4X4 + e 
                                                 
30
 There are two main reasons why a structural equation is not used to test the direct and indirect 
relationships of political party control and social spending. One is that there are no latent variables in the model, 
and second, the intervening variable, the social expenditure ratio, is directly influenced by political party control 
and therefore not endogenous to the model.  
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I employ four separate regressions to examine the relationship among political party 
control of government, social policy, and changes to private-sector social spending. 31 In this 
model, Y is the annual change in private-sector social expenditures in real 1994 dollars. 
Political party control of the executive is represented by β1, and political party control of the 
House and Senate are represented by β2. The social expenditure ratio, representing changes 
to social policy, is characterized by β3. Finally, the standard economic controls for private 
sector outcomes are represented by β4.32 As with the previously-reported ECM, Republican 
control of the government should show a direct relationship with higher levels of the social 
expenditure ratio. Therefore, I expect, in the OLS regression, that Republican Party control 
of government will correlate with higher levels of private-sector social spending through 
changes to social policy as represented by the social expenditure ratio so that when the ratio 
rises, it stimulates private spending on social programs. Additionally, higher levels of the 
social expenditure ratio will be directly associated with more private-sector social spending, 
even when controlling for party control and economic factors. I do not expect Republican 
control of government, in and of itself, to influence changes to the level of private-sector 
social expenditures.  
 
 
                                                 
31
 Also, I ran this model as a seemingly unrelated regression with similar results but choose not to use 
this due to the correlated error terms.  
32
 I also ran an alternative lagged dependent variable model. This model accounts for the time delay 
involved in the private market learning and incorporating information about policy change into their social 
expenditure strategies. The results from this model were similar to the above model and considering that the 
dependent variable is the annual percentage change in private spending, it seemed as if a lagged dependent 
variable model would be lagging private-sector spending twice, which seemed unnecessary.   
 
 
111 
 
Partisan Influence, Social Policy, and Private Social Expenditures 
     In Table 5.2, this model comes closest to indicating a causal flow among political 
party control to changes in social policy correlating with increased private-sector spending. It 
falls short in that although Republican control is positively correlated and significant with 
higher levels of the social expenditure ratio and this is in turn related to higher levels of 
private-sector spending, there is no statistically significant relationship between increased 
Republican influence and higher private social spending. As with the time-series analysis, 
there is a strong relationship between Republican Party control of Congress and increases in 
the social expenditure ratio. Republican control of the executive is signed in the wrong 
direction and not significant. The second model in Table 5.2. tests the direct effect of 
political party control on changes to private-sector social spending. As with the social 
expenditure ratio, a Republican legislature is positively signed with increases to private 
social expenditures while executive control is correlated in the opposite direction, yet neither 
is statistically significant from zero. In 5.2., the third model tests both the political party and 
social policy influences on annual changes in private-sector social spending. The previously 
found strong effects of Republican Party legislative influence are not significant in this 
model, and in turn, the partisan effects might be filtered through increases to the social 
expenditure ratio that is both positive and statistically significant. As in the first two models, 
political party control of the executive is negatively signed and not statistically significant. In 
the full model, the social expenditure ratio is signed in the right direction and significantly 
correlated with higher levels of private-sector social spending, even when controlling for 
theories from political economy. The economic controls are positive, although not 
statistically significant. These results do not present evidence of a true path dependent effect 
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given that political party control is not correlated with changes to private-sector social 
expenditures. It can be said that increased government subsidies are more important in 
driving private social spending than macroeconomic changes such as changes to the 
unemployment level. Although given the low amount of total variability picked up by the 
models, the policy effects should be interpreted with caution. In addition, the model fit is 
diminished by adding the economic controls. There are business elements that at this time are 
missing from the model which probably determine social spending changes, such as 
company-level decisions and industry structures.33  
In table 5.3., Republican control of government across the federal units is tested in 
relation to increases in private-sector social spending.34 Republican control of government 
does not demonstrate the expected relationship with greater private-sector social spending, 
except for the first model in which Senate control is signed correctly and significant. In 
addition, the correlation between the social expenditure ratio and increases to private 
spending although positive do not rise to the level of statistical significance across all three 
models. Not surprisingly, these models do not fit the data well compared to the models 
measuring Republican influence in Congress. In table 5.4., the substitution of presidential 
ideological for party control does not help improve the overall results. An increase in 
executive conservative is inversely related to higher private spending, although none of the 
coefficients are significant from zero. Republican control of the Senate is signed correctly yet 
not statistically significant. Finally, like the previous table the social expenditure table is 
robust, positive and barely misses the bar for significant levels. The lack of results in this 
                                                 
33
 I ran a model with the dependent variable being change in real dollars and not the percentage change 
of private-sector social spending. In these models that mirror the independent variables in tables 5.3. and 5.4. 
only Republican control of the Senate was correctly signed and significant across the different tests.  
34
 The Republican Party did not control the House of Representatives during this period.  
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section could be due to a number of factors. First, is that the time period only covers 27 years 
and therefore does not include most of the Clinton years or any of the spending changes 
during the Presidency of George W. Bush. Next, business decisions to increase or decrease 
private social spending is driven by numerous factors not modeled here such as globalization, 
unionization, and social insurance costs. Nonetheless, there is still some evidence that 
Republican control of the Senate and mainly, changes to the social expenditure ratio could be 
driving private-sector social spending increases in the U.S.  
 Discussion and Conclusion 
      The support of the Republican Party for increases to private-sector social 
spending through public policy changes has implications for the beneficiaries of employer-
based social insurance. The private and public social systems are dynamic and interactive, so 
when the private-sector system changes, it affects the prospects for future growth of public 
social programs. The Republican Party’s support of indirect spending for private social 
programs pays multiple dividends to party members’ electoral and policy interests. There is 
no better example of the adage that policy affects politics than the electoral success for the 
Democratic Party following passage of the New Deal package. The Republican Party has 
realized, through a number of legislative defeats in its attempts to scale back Social Security 
and Medicare, that in order to diminish the scale of these popular public programs, they 
would have to build an extensive private social system.  The use of public resources to 
subsidize the private social system allows politicians to argue for the benefits of 
employment-based insurance and not just argue against the widely popular Social Security 
and Medicare programs. In addition, subsidizing the private social system using tax 
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expenditure programs decreases it now, and future appropriations to sustain and grow public 
programs are less available, thereby “starving the beast.”  
Citizens have little power over changes to the private-sector social system. While 
public opinion and interest groups determine policy outcomes for public programs, most 
citizens relying on employment-based benefits have no institutional leverage in bargaining or 
negotiating for better benefits. In fact, workers not involved in unions have no formal 
organization and therefore little influence in changing employer-based social benefits short 
of switching jobs. Employers develop worker loyalty or dependence from basic provisions 
such as health care insurance, child care, and pensions. I expect that citizens receiving more 
social benefits from their employer versus the government would be less supportive of a tax 
and spending increase for public social benefits, and these attitudes would be visible across 
time in surveys. Finally, economic studies have demonstrated that workers pay for increased 
employer benefits in the form of reduced salaries. 
           The increase of private-sector social spending has the potential to decrease 
public demand for government-run social programs, thereby “crowding out” public social 
spending. Economists have developed a theory arguing that welfare spending in one sector 
reduces "dollar for dollar" welfare spending in another sector (Roberts 1984, 1987; 
Bergstrom et al. 1986; Andreoni 1987; Steinberg 1987). The logic of the “crowding out” 
theories is that consumer demand is relatively constant and social products are supplied by 
the two competing sectors just as in dual-oligopolistic markets. Therefore, an increase in 
subsidies to private social benefits satisfies consumers so that they demand less from the 
government. This relationship goes the other way in that increases to government welfare 
spending can crowd out private social spending. A recent study found a conditional 
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relationship between government redistribution and private charity. Brooks (2000) showed 
that at lower levels of private charity, government subsidies stimulated, or "crowded in," 
donations for a charitable cause, while at higher levels, government spending crowded out 
private donations. Additionally, Karch (2010) demonstrated that states with large Head Start 
communities were less likely to support increased funding of public preschool programs.  
     The increased use of tax subsidies can cause distortions in the private social 
market. If there is no change in current tax policy, an increasing proportion of the relatively 
wealthy and healthy population will over-buy discounted group health insurance. Tax 
expenditure programs for employer-based health care provided $160 billion worth of 
subsidies to the private-market in 2008. These subsidies hide the true cost of employer health 
insurance and inflate the consumer market for privately-administered health care, which in 
turn drives up the cost for health products and services for all health care consumers. This 
artificial inflation caused by public policy disproportionately hurts people with individually 
purchased health insurance or those with no insurance.  
The importance of the private, employment-based social system in the United States 
political landscape allows the business community to play a large role in federal debates 
about social policy. This skews the political debate surrounding health care since 
corporations have access to the healthier, younger population, while the government takes on 
the poorer and older segment of the population. Additionally, public social programs seem 
less effective since they serve marginal groups with bigger health and financial problems. In 
addition, the existence of employer-based insurance has divided the loyalties of union 
members, traditionally an important part of leftist political party support. Historically, union 
leaders have oscillated between pushing for generous public social programs and lobbying 
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for more subsidies for employer-based benefits. Finally, both tax expenditures and employer-
based social insurance accrue more benefits to wealthier and non-minority workers. So again, 
increases in indirect spending at the expense of direct spending assist the wealthiest people 
twice over while taking away public resources from society’s poorest and most vulnerable 
populations.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL SPENDING, AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Economic inequality has steadily increased over the last thirty years in the United 
States. The growth of income inequality is a concern for political science given the 
importance of money in elections, the overrepresentation of the wealthy in interest groups, 
and the political response bias that favors wealthier citizens (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; 
Bartels 2008). Political party control of government and public policy alter the level of 
national income inequality, even when controlling for economic trends (Kelly 2009). The 
Republican and Democratic Parties advocate different social and fiscal policies, which result 
in contrasting income effects. Studies have found that Republican administrations produce 
economic conditions and income growth patterns that increase income inequality, while 
Democratic presidents produce policy and economic outcomes that narrow disparities of 
income (Bartels 2008; Kelly 2009). In this chapter, I apply the partisan theory of social 
policy in examining how partisan change in the federal government affects social policy, 
which in turn influences changes to income inequality. This chapter presents evidence that 
Republican influence contributes to greater levels of income inequality through changes to 
the social expenditure ratio, in addition to executive control. The social expenditures ratio is 
composed of indirect spending that regressively accrues public monies up to wealthier 
income groups over direct social spending, which tends to progressively redistribute money 
down the income ladder. Therefore, I expect that increased Republican influence will result 
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in greater income inequality through changes to the social expenditure ratio. These results 
have implications for understanding the relationship between political trends and increased 
economic inequality in America.  
Economic Inequality in Modern America  
Currently, the wealthiest families in America hold half the nation’s wealth, and over 
the last forty years their incomes have grown at a faster pace than the rest of the country. In 
2008, the top five percent of the income distribution received 20.5% of the nation’s total 
income, while the top quartile received a hefty 47.8% of total income. In the same year, the 
bottom quartile received only 4% of total income, and the middle class, the second and third 
quartile, received a modest 38.6%. The families in the top quartile of income have not 
controlled this much of America’s wealth since 1928 (U.S. Census 2008). Political influences 
on income inequality were chronicled in a 2002 taskforce report from the American Political 
Science Association (APSA) and included long term trends such as stagnant social insurance 
policies that lag economic changes, decreases in the marginal tax rates for the very wealthy, 
and the increased influence of money in political campaigns that result in policies favoring 
the wealthy.  And although there are a myriad of economic developments that have led to 
increased income inequality including labor market trends, technological changes, and 
globalization, this study focuses on how political parties and social policy determine changes 
to economic inequality. 
America’s income inequality trends fall into two distinct periods: pre- and post- 1974. 
Economic inequality generally decreased from 1947 through 1973 and has since grown larger 
every year. The U.S. Census Bureau has published annual summary data of family income 
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distributions as far back as 1947. The U.S. Census Bureau provides data for annual family 
income for groups at the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, and 95th percentiles of the income distribution. 
Traditional studies using these data have qualified poor families at the 20th percentile and 
below, middle-class families at the 40th and 60th percentiles, wealthy families at the 80th 
percentile and extraordinarily wealthy families at the 95th percentile. If the U.S. were to 
achieve perfect income inequality, it would mean that each fifth of the population would 
receive 20 % of the country’s income. From the late 1940s through 1973, American income 
growth was relatively equal across income quartiles. More precisely, the period from 1946-
1976 saw the bottom 90 % experience income growth higher, on average, than the top one 
percent. After 1974, income growth for the top quartile of the income distribution expanded 
much faster than the rest of the population, especially compared to the lowest quartile, which 
actually went down. The cumulative income growth from1974-2006 for families at the 20th 
percentile was 10.3 %, while it was a healthy 42.9 % for families at the 80th percentile and an 
outstanding 62.9 % at 95th percentile. The top quartile has received more than 40 % of the 
nation’s income since 1947. In the period from 1974-2006, real income growth at the 95th 
percentile was 1.6% a year, while the real income of families at the 20th percentile grew at a 
paltry 0.4% annual rate. More recent increases in economic inequality have been driven by 
the wealthiest families in America.  
Most of the increase in income inequality has occurred between the median level of 
income and those families at the very top of the income scale. For example, if we examine 
the national income share of just the 95th percentile, this group received about 15% of total 
income at the beginning of this study in 1967. This same elite cohort witnessed their income 
share increase to 22% by the year 2000. Conversely, the lowest income quartile began the 
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period of this study with a little more than 4.2% of the total income share, and by the 
century’s end, this decreased to 3.6%. According to a report from the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO),35  between 1979 and 2005 the bottom half of the top 1 % experienced an 
income increase of 105%. The next four-tenths of the top 1 % witnessed their real income 
rise 161%. Next, the top 0.1 % had their after inflation adjusted income rise an amazing 
294%. Finally, the top 0.01%, approximately 11,000 families, had a real income increase of 
384% during this period. These trends measured in net worth (including stocks, mutual 
funds, retirement savings, and property ownership), as opposed to income, reveal that the top 
1% currently controls 38.1% of the nation’s overall wealth. Conversely, the bottom 90% 
receives only 29 % of the country’s total wealth. From 1951-2006, families at the 20th 
percentile experienced declining incomes in 20 of the years including 7 years of 3% or more, 
while those families at the 95th percentile experienced only one year of 3% or more drop in 
income. A study from Piketty and Saez (2008) demonstrates that the presidency of George 
W. Bush was especially kind to the wealthiest Americans, as evidenced by exacerbated 
income inequality from 2001-2008. At the end of 2008, the top 1% of the nation’s families 
accrued a larger share of national income than any other time since 1928. According to the 
study, real income for the top 1 % of families grew at 62% during these seven years, 
compared to only 4 % for the bottom 90% of households.  
In comparative perspective, the United States has the fastest growing and highest 
level of income inequality relative to any other industrialized country (Brandolini and 
Smeeding 2006; Pontusson and Kenworthy 2005). The Luxemborg Income Study (LIS) 
began in 1983 and is a cross-national study that reports on a number of demographic 
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 2007, Historical Effective Tax Rates 1979 to 2005 
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characteristics including family and personal income. In this study, the United States reports 
greater levels of income inequality than Western European countries in both the pre- and 
post-tax estimates. The LIS demonstrates that, although the median income level in the 
United States is higher than that of most other countries, far more American citizens are poor 
relative to the median income. The experience of other Western, industrialized countries 
shows that globalization and technological changes result in greater income inequality, yet 
public policy has an important equalizing effect.  In a study from Kenworthy and Pontusson 
(2005), ten of eleven industrialized countries experienced increased income inequality during 
the 1980s and 1990s, yet nine of these countries responded with more assertive distributive 
policies at the end of the period. The United States was not one of these nations.  
Increased income inequality has the potential to disrupt the political gains made by 
minorities and women during the Civil Rights Movement. Since the 1970s, the income 
disparities between whites and blacks have widened. Throughout the 1980s, unemployment 
of blacks more than doubled that of white workers, and the income gap between the races 
grew to levels of those in the 1950s. The economic growth of the 1990s ameliorated the 
racial income gap somewhat, but with the recent economic recession, blacks are much more 
likely to be unemployed and living below the poverty level than whites (BEA 2008). It is not 
a coincidence that class political divides are aggravated by the fact that poorer citizens are 
disproportionately black and Latino. Gilens (2005) demonstrated that racial discrimination is 
a salient factor in Americans’ general lack of support for social welfare policies. In addition, 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) found in a cross-national study that racially and ethnically 
diverse societies have less generous social spending policies than more racially uniform 
countries. Similarly, women earn substantially less than men in each occupational sector 
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(Mishel, Bernstein, and Bushey 2003). This gap is accentuated by the differences between 
married and single women. The number of single female-headed households has grown since 
the 1970s. While single female-headed households have experienced incremental income 
growth, they are still twice as likely as married women to be below the poverty line (Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Bushey 2003).  
The Politics of Income Inequality 
The two major political parties promote different social and economic policies, which 
result in divergent effects on income inequality. Bartels (2008) argues that “significant 
partisan differences in tax and transfer policies have continued to produce significant partisan 
disparities in patterns of post-tax growth, with the middle class and especially the working 
poor experiencing more income growth under Democratic presidents than under Republican 
presidents” (p.30). In the period from 1948-1978, income inequality decreased by 25% 
during the 14 years of Democratic control and remained unchanged under 17 years of 
Republican control (Hibbs 1987). Alesina (1988) demonstrates that the largest difference 
between Republican and Democratic administrations occurred in the early years of the 
president’s new term. In the first two years under Democratic leadership, middle and low 
income earners gained more in terms of real GDP than did families at higher income levels. 
The partisan differences established in these studies are a result of contrasting philosophies 
represented in fiscal and tax policy.  
In America, the class compositions of the parties’ respective electoral coalitions have 
encouraged them to adopt distinctive macroeconomic priorities. The New Deal alignment of 
the 1930s organized class interests into politics. As party coalitions and partisan competition 
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have evolved, class differences in party coalitions remain. The two parties differ in their 
electoral bases and in terms of average family income. Republican identifiers and voters are 
more affluent than their Democratic counterparts. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) 
demonstrated that a high income has become an increasingly reliable predictor of Republican 
Party identification and Republican presidential voting since 1950. As the political parties 
have polarized on economic issues, the public has followed with wealthier citizens aligning 
more with the Republican Party and the working class leaning more towards the Democratic 
Party. This has led to contrasting fiscal policies in which the Democrats focus on lowering 
unemployment as a means to redistribute income to working class constituencies, and 
Republicans promote lower inflation that assists investments and capital.  
     Partisan differences in changing income inequality are largely attributable to 
differences in income growth, unemployment, and inflation. For most of the past century, 
Democrats in office have pursued higher taxes, high employment, and economic 
redistribution from the rich to the working class. Republican administrations have sought 
lower inflation, lower taxes, and redistribution to wealthier constituents. Working and 
middle-class families experienced large, statistically significant growth in their income under 
Democratic versus Republican presidents during the last half century. Under Republican 
presidents, wealthy cohorts experienced considerable income gains compared to poorer 
citizens resulting in increased income inequality. Bartels (2003) argues that applying 
consistent Democratic income growth patterns every year from 1948-2005 would have 
almost negated the real rise in economic inequality. He further argues that the same 
application of Republican income growth patterns would have increased income inequality 
by 80% more than it actually grew during this same period. From 1948-2001, the average 
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unemployment rate was 30% lower under Democratic presidents than Republican presidents. 
Hibbs (1977) demonstrated that “after adjustment lags the unemployment rate tends to be 
about 2 percentage points lower under the Democrats than under the Republicans and that 
real output tends to be about six percent higher per year”(p.226). Additionally, the six out of 
seven recessions that occurred from 1951-1987 were during Republican presidential 
administrations (Hibbs 1987). Similarly, growth in real GDP was 40%  higher under 
Democratic rather than Republican administrations, and these combined economic effects 
account for much of the changes to lower and middle class income changes. Over this same 
period, the average rate of inflation was relatively equal under the two political parties. 
Recent studies show that growth in GDP and decreases in unemployment accounted for most 
of the income growth of the lower and middle classes but have little effect on income for the 
wealthy (Bartels 2008; Kelly 2009). In contrast, lower inflation rates are much more 
beneficial to income gains at the top of the distribution versus the bottom.  
The changes to tax policy, mainly under Republican administrations, in the last thirty 
years have reduced the progressive structure of income and corporate rates. Although both 
political parties have promoted tax cuts in the modern era, they have done so in vastly 
different ways. The Democratic Party has focused on what is termed “middle class” tax cuts 
aimed at stimulating job growth and lowering unemployment. The Republican Party has 
advanced the theory of supply-side tax cuts, which focuses on reducing the tax burden for the 
wealthiest citizens since they are most likely to own businesses and capital. Democratic 
administrations have cut taxes, targeting the middle and working classes, as a means to 
stimulate production, employment, and income. The decreases in marginal income and 
corporate tax rates during George W. Bush’s administration were tilted toward the very 
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wealthy. According to recent study, the 2001 tax cut allocated 36 % of the total benefits to 
the wealthiest 1% of taxpayers, and 63% of the overall benefits to the top income quartile 
(Citizens for Tax Justice 2002).  Bartels (2008) examines the trends in post-tax income 
growth as compared to pre-tax income growth. From 1980-2003, under Democratic 
administrations, every income strata grew between 1.4% and 1.6%, while during Republican 
presidencies, there were small income increases for the top quartile with no income growth 
for the bottom three income levels. The partisan differences were greater for pre-tax income 
changes implying different party strategies for Social Security, unemployment, and indirect 
spending.  
Income inequality can distort the political process. Studies have found that political 
representatives are more attentive to economic elites’ opinions than mass opinion (Wright 
1989; Bartels 2008). Bartels (2005) examines the responsiveness of U.S. senators by class 
constituencies, and his analysis suggests that wealthier policy preferences were more 
influential than simple averages of mass opinion, especially for Republican senators. In 
addition, state constituents in the bottom third of income distribution had no measurable 
impact on Senators’ voting records. Additionally, Gilens (2005) found that a 10 percentage 
point shift in the public opinion of the wealthiest respondents was associated with a 7.6 
percentage point difference in the likelihood of policy change, while the exact same 
percentage change among the poorest was correlated with only a 0.5 percentage point change 
in likelihood of policy shifting.  
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Social Policy and Income Redistribution  
Direct social spending disproportionately benefits working class populations and 
redistributes public funds down the income ladder. Kelly (2009) demonstrates that 53% of 
total Social Security benefits go to those citizens in the lowest income quartile and only 23% 
goes to the top three income categories combined. Medicare’s redistributive effects are 
similar, with 66% of the total benefits going to the bottom 40% of the income distribution 
and the top two quintiles receiving only 19% of the benefits. In addition, he finds that 
aggregated public social spending from 1947-2006 reduced the Gini coefficient by over 12% 
(Kelly 2009, p.35-36).36 The benefits from Social Security are based on a formula that 
provides higher benefits to lower-income workers relative to the taxes they paid into the 
system. According to a report from the Social Security Administration (SSA), without the 
cash payments from Social Security, more than half of the elderly population would have 
been below the poverty line in 2007. Although Medicare’s benefits are more equally 
distributed across income levels, it is financed largely from a progressive tax, thereby 
producing a modest progressive effect on income distribution. Medicare part A is financed by 
a tax on all wages as compared to Social Security which is financed by the first $76,000 of 
annual income. Part B is financed by general tax revenues coming from the progressive tax 
structure. Social Security and Medicare offer more help to lower wage workers, in large part 
due to the restricted availability of employer benefits that are more likely to be offered to 
high income professionals. Andrea Campbell (2003) demonstrates that the elderly are one of 
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 The Gini coefficient is a common measure of income inequality that measures the statistical spread  
of family incomes in a country. The coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve and can range from 0 perfect 
income equality to 1 perfect income inequality.  
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the only groups in America whose political participation is not distorted towards the wealthy, 
and she attributes this to the universality of Social Security and Medicare benefits.  
The use of the tax system as a substitute for direct spending is not new. Long-
standing provisions of the U.S. income tax provide tax benefits for home ownership, the 
provision of group health insurance by employers, retirement saving, activities of state and 
local governments and charitable organizations. The relationship between income class and 
indirect spending is clear. Indirect expenditures for social benefits increase with each 
increase in income class category. Table 6.1. presents the average tax returns for nine 
different class categories for both the medical deduction program, one of the primary tax 
expenditures for health care, and the charitable contribution program in the fiscal year 2007. 
The wealthy receive dual benefits from an increase in indirect spending in the form of both 
lower tax rates and more employer-based social services. An increase in the social 
expenditure ratio that increases indirect spending at the expense of direct spending should 
increase income inequality in America. In recent years, tax expenditures have been growing, 
especially those directed at social policy goals such as health, education, retirement security, 
and support for low-income families. For example, the earned income tax credit (EITC) has 
increased more than four-fold since 1990 and now provides as much assistance as food 
stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).37 During the period of this study, 
Republican Congresses enacted new tax credits for expenses of post-secondary education, a 
new child credit, tax incentives for saving for higher education, and expanded eligibility for 
tax-favored individual retirement accounts (IRAs).  
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 This could offset the rise in income inequality, yet EITC does not constitute a large enough 
percentage of total tax expenditures to change the regressive trend.  
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A Partisan Theory of Social Policy and Economic Inequality 
The Democratic and Republican Parties pursue different social policies that result in 
contrasting effects on income inequality. Direct and indirect government spending 
represented close to 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2006. The Democratic and 
Republican Parties direct this substantial portion of the overall economy to different 
populations in society that reflect their distinctive electoral goals and core values. In figure 
6.1., I present the full model of political parties, social policy, and income inequality. The 
Democratic Party constructs social policy so as to enhance the role of government as a check 
to private power. This policy choice leads to more direct social spending that progressively 
redistributes national income, thereby lowering economic inequality. In contrast, the 
Republican Party uses public policy to aid the private economy through increases to indirect 
expenditures, which subsidizes business activities and regressively redistributes government 
resources producing increases in income inequality. Therefore, I expect that increased 
Republican influence in the federal government will correlate with higher levels of the social 
expenditure ratio that, in turn, will increase income inequality. Indirect versus direct social 
spending accrues social benefits to different income classes and redistributes national income 
in opposing directions.  
Measuring and Testing the Partisan Theory and Income Inequality 
     In order to test the partisan theory of social policy and economic inequality, I 
incorporate a unique dependent variable that is an annual measurement of post-government 
income inequality borrowed from Nathan Kelly (2009).38 The measurement is a ratio of the 
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 This label means it measures income inequality after government taxes and transfers. 
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aggregate income of the top 20 % of the households to the bottom 20 % (T20/B20). The 
definition of income in this measurement includes pretax, pre-transfer income plus 
government cash and noncash benefits (unemployment compensation, state workers’ 
compensation, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, public assistance, veterans’ 
benefits, public survivor benefits, government pensions, public disability benefits, 
government educational assistance, Medicare, Medicaid, and food stamps), minus federal 
taxes. The dependent variable ranges from 1967-2000 due to tax expenditures starting in 
1967 and the income inequality set ending in 2000.39  
     In this chapter, I model and test the relationship among political party control of 
government, social policy, and income inequality. In the first table 6.2., I import all the 
previous political and economic variables of interest, sand inflation given that there is no 
expectation of a relationship with income inequality. In table 6.3., I use dummy variables 
signifying Republican Party control of the presidency, House, and Senate. For all the models, 
the social expenditure ratio is imported from the original analysis in chapter three and 
deflated to real 2000 dollars. This variable is the ratio of indirect to direct social spending 
represented by the annual change in tax expenditures for social programs in constant 2000 
dollars over the annual change in direct appropriations for social programs in constant 2000 
dollars. In table 6.4. all the previous variables are carried over expect the variable for the 
presidency. I substitute a measure of the president’s ideology, using DW-NOMINATE 
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 I experimented with a number of measurements for income inequality such as the T20/B40 measure, 
the Gini coefficient, and the income share of the top 5% of the nation’s distribution. The results from these 
measure was mixed. Although any measurement of postgovernment inequality reported similar results to tables 
6.2-6.4. I also tested a variable that only measured the income of the top 5% of the income distribution, 
although theoretically I expect changes at the top and bottom of the income ladder, so this variable was 
dismissed. Also, I tried the Gini coefficient and a variable named the T5/B40, which produced similar, yet not 
significant, results to the reported models.  
 
130 
 
scores, for the dummied variable of political party control. The DW-NOMINATE procedure 
applies a spatial model of voting representing a liberal to conservative ideological spectrum. 
The DW-NOMINATE ranges from -1 to 1 with 1 being a perfect conservative score. Since I 
argue that values and by extension ideology place a role in a political party’s behavior, the 
DW-NOMINATE better captures the degree of conservatism for Republican executives. In 
model and table 6.5. I substitute the DW-NOMINATE scores for dummies representing each 
President’s term of office from President Nixon to President Clinton.40 This model is 
designed to determine the influence of specific administration’s policies. I expect that 
Republican control will result in higher levels of the social expenditure ratio that in turn 
correlates with higher levels of income inequality. In order to control for economic effects, I 
include changes to annual unemployment in the model. In economic downturns, workers at 
the lower end of the pay scale tend to fare worse both in wage cuts and downsizing. 
Therefore, increased unemployment should result in higher levels of income inequality.  
      I expect political party control to influence income inequality indirectly through 
changes to public policy. Yet, I also test for the direct effects of party control on income 
inequality in order to differentiate between the influences of social policy as compared to 
other partisan effects that might drive changes in economic inequality. I expect that 
Republican Party control of government will correlate with higher levels of income 
inequality through changes to social policy as represented by the social expenditure ratio so 
that when the ratio rises, it redistributes more income to the wealthy and decreases income to 
the poor. Therefore, Republican control of the government should show a direct relationship 
with higher levels of the social expenditure ratio. Next, higher levels of the social 
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 President Clinton’s two terms serve as the control of the grouping.  
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expenditure ratio will be directly associated with more income inequality, even when 
controlling for party control and economic factors. I do not expect Republican control of 
government, in and of itself, to influence changes to the level of economic inequality. 
Partisanship, Policy, and Income Inequality 
     In table 6.2, Republican control of the executive correlates with higher levels of 
income inequality with an additive effect from changes to the social expenditure ratio. 
Republican influence in Congress performs unexpectedly given that it is negatively signed 
and not statistically significant. In the full model, Republican control of the presidency still 
holds as positive and significant with a slight effect from the ratio and changes to 
unemployment being signed in the wrong direction and significant. In table 6.3., which tests 
for Republican Party control across units the early results still hold with Republican control 
of the executive and the social expenditure ratio being robust, positive and significant. These 
expected effects are conditioned by the Republican control of the U.S. Senate being signed in 
the opposite direction and significant. This somewhat surprisingly result is probably driven 
by Republican control of the Senate from 1996-2000, a period of healthy economic growth. 
Increases to the social expenditure ratio direct higher levels of income inequality, even when 
controlling for party control and changes to unemployment. Not only is unemployment 
statistically insignificant, it lowers the fit of the overall model. As with past research, 
Republican control of the executive results in higher levels of income inequality. In model 
6.4., the dummy variable for the executive is replaced with the president’s DW-NOMINATE 
scores. Since I argue that values and, by extension, ideology place a role in a political party’s 
behavior, the DW-NOMINATE better captures the degree of conservatism for Republican 
executives. The results are largely the same, except that the ideological direction of the 
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executive results in slightly higher coefficients for control of the executive and by extension 
a better fit for all three models. In table 6.5., the individual president’s are dummied from 
Nixon to Clinton. I would expect that the Republican presidents are positively correlated with 
higher income inequality while Democratic executive produce less income inequality. The 
coefficients for Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter are in the expected direction with Nixon 
and Ford being statistically significant. Presidents Reagan and H.W. Bush are signed in the 
opposite direction but only the Bush presidency is significant. Republican control of the 
House and Senate is signed in the opposite direction and not significant from zero. Social 
policy still matters in this model and is both positive and significant, again reporting the 
largest coefficient of the model. The economic control of unemployment is signed in the 
wrong direction. In conclusion, the social expenditure ratio correlates with increases to 
income inequality, even when controlling for political and economic effects. It is difficult to 
posit a causal relationship among party control, social policy, and income inequality given 
that the coefficient for Republican executive control increases with the inclusion of the ratio 
measure and the Senate is signed in the opposite direction. Yet, the strength of the social 
expenditure ratio’c correlation with income inequality adds to our understanding of how 
politics and policy affects economic inequality.  
Conclusion  
We know that changes to partisan power in government relate to changes in economic 
inequality. Previous studies have related these changes mainly to the economic policies of 
political parties (Bartels 2008; Kelly2009). This chapter presents strong evidence that social 
policy change, intended to subsidize the private market, increases income inequality in 
America. The wealthy benefit twice over in financial and social benefits with higher levels of 
133 
 
indirect spending that in turn reduces future government revenue for programs aimed at the 
poor. There is a tradeoff that occurs with social policy that turns the provision of economic 
security into a zero sum game for the divergent income classes in the U.S. How supportive 
would the majority of Americans be for social tax expenditure programs if the line of 
financial and social benefits to the very wealthy were made clear and visible in policy 
debates? In addition, given the resource effect of political participation in American politics, 
the growing income inequality caused by changes to social spending might result in political 
pressure from the rich that produces future social expenditures ratios that tradeoff more 
indirect for direct spending.  
Can democracy operate in a society with large and increasing disparities between 
income classes? Economic inequality has insidious and detrimental effects on policy and 
representation in American government. Economic inequality influences the degree of 
political equality in the United States. Participation in American politics has bifurcated with 
the growing breach in economic inequality. The wealthy participate at higher levels in 
politics, are well organized to communicate their concerns to government, and are more 
likely to have politicians respond to their demands. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
have developed a theory that citizenship requires the accumulation of individual resources 
such as income, money, and time, and richer citizens have these resources disproportionately 
compared to poorer ones. The authors found occupational and income differences in voting, 
joining an interest group, reaching out to an elected official, working on a campaign, and 
taking part in a social movement. Also, wealthy issue activists have replaced traditional 
activists in both political parties. In order for candidates to succeed in primaries and run 
expensive campaigns, they need to recruit and attract these elite activists and volunteers to 
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work in and fund campaigns. Debates over how best to provide and administer social 
programs are worth having, but programs that disproportionally provide resources for 
economic security to the small population least threatened by income insecurity are a threat 
to political and economic stability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL POLICY, AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
Implications 
American politics is a turf war between the two major political parties. Democrats 
and Republicans fight to determine where the line is drawn in establishing the proper balance 
of power between the public and private sectors in society. A political party in power that is 
able to move the jurisdictional boundary towards their sector of society also alters the 
balance of power between the core values of equality and liberty and sets the appropriate mix 
of democracy and capitalism in America. As demonstrated in this project, Republicans prefer 
indirect versus direct social spending, which subsidizes the private-sector and redistributes 
income towards the wealthier groups. Conversely, the Democratic Party is more likely to use 
direct versus indirect spending that targets public support to vulnerable populations and 
distributes benefits to more middle and working class populations. Therefore, battles over 
social policy not only shift the equilibrium between public and private power, but redistribute 
resources between the rich and the poor and alter the role of government as either an aid or 
check to capitalist power. This dissertation makes a number of important contributions to the 
studies of American politics and public policy. 
American Government and Institutions 
Most importantly, this dissertation presents evidence that Republican Party control of 
government increases income equality through changes to social policy. This is ironic given 
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that social policy, by definition, is an attempt by government to protect citizens from 
economic insecurity and calamity. The Republican Party pursues a political strategy that 
provides government assistance to citizens who enjoy large salaries, generous social benefits, 
and economic security from their position in the private economy. This social policy strategy 
hurts populations who are disadvantaged in the private economy, and who do not gain 
income security through increased indirect social spending. Recent scholarship demonstrates 
that Republican control of government exacerbates economic inequality through fiscal policy 
or changing market conditions (Bartels 2008; Kelly 2009). This project adds to the previous 
literature by showing clearly that certain types of social policy contribute to the general rise 
of income inequality in the United States, all else equal. Also, I hope that this dissertation 
adds to the discussion over how best to finance economic security for the majority of 
Americans. Do we believe that social benefits are a right of citizenship or a commodity 
within jurisdiction of the private market? Next, which spending type, direct versus indirect, is 
most efficient in actually producing more and better quality social services? These debates 
would better serve the future of American democracy than ideological mud fights over the 
size of government.  
The empirical results in this dissertation call into question the usefulness of 
representing political conflict as a dispute over the size of government.  The size of 
government in modern American politics is not a useful concept. First, I find no clear 
evidence of differences between the two major parties in changes to total social spending. 
This raises doubt that only Democratic Party control correlates with increased public social 
expenditures. Next, as argued throughout this project, political parties spend money in a 
multitude of ways that contribute to the overall financial footprint of the federal government 
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on society. In fact, if direct spending, tax expenditure, grants, loans, and the cost of 
regulation were all accounted for in measuring government spending, the political parties 
might become even more indistinguishable than they are in this project. Also, I doubt that the 
average citizen really comprehends what the true size of government is at any moment and 
how it is different than six months ago. Over the course of this project, I wondered if we, as 
political scientists, frame political conflict as a battle over the size of government due to the 
path trajectory of survey questions and past research, or if we really believe that it is the 
fundamental fault line in politics as understood by both the electorate and elites? Citizens 
expect the political party in power to use public policy and public funds to address societal 
problems, albeit in different sectors, and both political parties do not disappoint the 
electorate. It is fantasy to believe that only one political party distributes government 
resources to their supporters for the purpose of reelection. I hope that this dissertation, along 
with other works, helps the political rhetoric catch up to the reality of modern politics. The 
major divide between the two parties is over the role of government in society, not over the 
size of government.  
Class politics matters in American politics. In the history of American politics, class 
interests have been deemphasized as compared to studies of European politics. This study 
demonstrates that the political parties, with divergent class coalitions, select specific policy 
tools to target government benefits and patterns of income redistribution to different income 
classes. The class bias of social spending is augmented by the fact that different populations 
are served by the public versus private social system. As citizens of different income classes 
have polarized politically, it has become more important and easier for political parties to 
direct public assistance to their preferred constituency by substituting one type of social 
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spending for another.  Although social policy debates are not always framed in terms of class 
politics, the policy results of social spending changes have important and divergent effects 
for different income classes. Social policy in the U.S. is close to a zero sum game for the 
different income class cohorts. As I explained here, direct public spending and benefits 
disproportionately aid middle and working class populations. Conversely, indirect social 
expenditures accrue both tax and social benefits more to wealthier populations. So while 
most European welfare states design programs to accrue more benefits to those most in need 
of economic security, the United States directs benefits to income-classes based upon 
political party electoral coalitions.  
The Republican Party is the party of smaller government in rhetoric and not reality. 
There is no modern political party that represents citizens interested in smaller government. 
This project provides evidence, contrary to common wisdom, that the Republican Party 
finances social programs and increases federal spending in ways that subsidize the private 
sector and distributes money to the wealthy. Republican Party leadership understands full 
well the relationship between distributive public programs and electoral fortunes. A 
significant motivating factor behind the Republican strategy on social policy is to build a 
private sector social system, through increased government subsidies, which would both 
construct a viable alternative to popular public programs (that provide an electoral advantage 
to the Democratic Party) and generate greater citizen investment and loyalty to the private 
market. Additionally, increasing indirect spending at the expense of direct expenditures 
represents the “starve the beast” strategy designed to increase the number of tax breaks as a 
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means to choke off revenues for future public social spending.41 America’s history of belief 
in the principle of limited government provides a net benefit for the Republican Party as long 
as the false perception over the parties’ preferences for government spending persists.  
Finally, political parties use public policy to exploit their respective comparative 
advantages in public opinion.  Survey results typically find that the public trusts the 
Republican Party more on taxes, providing assistance to businesses, and controlling 
government spending, while clear majorities prefer the Democratic Party to protect public 
social programs such as Social Security, Medicare, public education, and assistance to the 
poor. Political elites from both parties recognize that in order to win an election, debates need 
to be framed using the issues areas in which their political party has a distinct public opinion 
advantage. Smith (2007) defines the idea of public opinion comparative advantage as the 
general feeling of the public towards a party versus the public’s feeling towards that party in 
certain issue areas. For example, he argues that “if a party has 55% support on handling the 
economy and 65% support overall, it would be better directing people’s attention away from 
economic questions and towards other issues for which its backing is higher. Likewise, the 
other party would gain votes by steering the national political conversation towards the 
economy, for its disadvantage there is smaller than in other domains” (pg.181). Therefore, 
political parties benefit by selecting certain policy tools that move the policy debate to areas 
of public opinion for which they retain a comparative advantage over the other party.  
 
 
                                                 
41
 The “starve the beast “ strategy assumes that the political party in power will want to control federal 
spending and the national debt, both of which have not been true of modern parties at the federal level.  
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Public Policy  
Novel to empirical political science research, this project conceptualizes social policy 
as a choice between different roles for the government in society. Public policy in the United 
States has never just operated through direct spending on public programs. From the very 
beginning of American history, private interests have sought out government assistance and 
subsidies. The steady rise of tax expenditures, and other policy tools that assist the private 
market, demand that public policy scholars account for as many of these methods as possible 
when trying to conceptualize public policy. Public policy is better represented as a menu of 
tools, each tool representing a different degree of government involvement in the private 
sector, and distributing public resources to different populations in the electorate. Because 
they allocate resources to different sectors, different populations, and use varying degrees of 
government bureaucracy, these tools could be placed on an ideological scale. I hope future 
research makes use of all or most of these policy tools in conceptualizing government 
activity.  
This project introduces a new data set of indirect social spending which allows for a 
better measurement of social policy and social expenditures. These data represent over a 
trillion dollars of government spending, follow a unique policy path, and mainly subsidize 
the private sector. This policy tool allows us to aggregate tax spending with appropriations 
for a new measurement of total spending and treats the two policy types as a political choice 
with varying consequences. These data on tax expenditures will allow for future studies of 
federal housing policy, business policy, and energy policy. In addition, there are tax 
expenditure data sets for 41 of the 50 states and most of the OECD countries. In the future, I 
plan to collect these data along with the publicly available data for grants, loans, and 
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regulations. More and more data is becoming available for various policy tools such as 
government loans, loan guarantees, grants, tax expenditures, and even the cost of regulations. 
These instruments are measured in real dollars and provide us the opportunity to evaluate and 
test the policy portfolios deployed by political parties in pursuing political objectives.  
Social policy has negative effects on the United State’s budget deficit through the 
prevalence of two types of entitlement spending: direct and indirect. Only direct social 
expenditures for public programs such as Social Security and Medicare receives significant 
media attention in discussions of the growing federal debt. Yet, all indirect social spending 
programs are entitlement programs, which have no annual review process and no sunset 
provisions and accounted for over $1 trillion in spending in 2009. The goal behind creating 
the tax expenditure concept was to empower policymakers to compare spending in the 
appropriations process versus the tax code. Unfortunately, past attempts to eliminate or 
decrease the generosity of tax expenditure programs have been dishonestly portrayed by their 
supports as a tax hike. Therefore, it is politically more advantageous to cut direct spending 
than indirect expenditures. Any serious attempt to curtail the growth of the U.S. debt must 
take into account both of these policy instruments. The newly formed bipartisan debt 
commission would be well served to put both of these spending types on the table for 
negotiations.  
Limitations 
This project is limited in scope and exclusively focuses on political party influences 
to social policy and income distribution. There are numerous issues that this project does not 
address or areas that are underdeveloped. First, there is a breach between my theoretical 
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argument and the research design of the project. I argue that political party behavior is 
motivated by core values and electoral strategies, yet the design and analysis can neither 
confirm nor deny why political parties produce different spending ratios, just that they do. In 
addition, the time period of the study limits theorizing and testing important changes to social 
policy, such as the New Deal and Great Society periods. It would be interesting to observe 
tax expenditures before and after these periods of substantial public program growth. Also, 
political parties are treated as static, even though the time period of this study witnessed 
tremendous growth in party polarization. Next, the social expenditure ratio does not represent 
a perfect measurement of the tradeoff between indirect and direct spending. The 
measurement, as it stands, does not allow me to posit definitively that a spending tradeoff is 
occurring in each year.42 Although, there is difference is party preference for indirect versus 
direct, the real policy picture is not that stark. There are conditions under which Republicans 
will support direct spending and Democrats indirect spending.  
Next, I ran separate analyses on the four sub-categories of social policy (health care, 
income security, welfare, and education) and found no statistical evidence of political party 
influence. There are additional tests I can run to determine if one or more of these specific 
areas reacts to the theorized changes in partisanship and policy. Finally, there are numerous 
other factors that are not addressed in this dissertation that determine both changes to social 
policy and societal outcomes. In not directly testing public opinion and interest group 
influences alongside political party control of government, it is difficult to claim the 
motivational and impact factors of party elites. Public opinion, interest groups, and court 
                                                 
42
 I did run ECM’s with direct and indirect spending as stand alone dependent variables. The spending 
types moved in the theorized direction but did not rise to the level of statistical significance in the intermediate 
terms.  
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rulings surely affect the fluctuations of the social expenditure ratio and by extension 
economic inequality.  
Future Work 
I have already begun working with Christopher Ellis on an extension of my 
dissertation project which examines the dynamic relationship between public opinion and 
social policy. First, we have developed a more general theory of public opinion and social 
policy in the United States, encompassing mass responsiveness to both direct and indirect 
social spending. We find that increases in tax expenditures for social programs move public 
mood in a more liberal direction while increases in direct appropriations result in more 
conservative public opinion. Our results are consistent with a public that is attuned not only 
to the role of government in the social policy arena, but also the redistributive effects of 
different types of social policy.  
If public opinion and public policy operate in a truly dynamic relationship, then 
changes to the direction of public mood will result in predictable changes to the type of social 
spending implemented by government officials. Our early results show that increases in 
public mood liberalism correlate with lower amounts of tax expenditures for social welfare 
and higher levels of direct appropriations for public social benefits. We have also tested this 
relationship using the social expenditure ratio with similar results, indicating that a unit 
increase in public mood liberalism leads to more direct appropriations spending relative to 
tax expenditures. In conclusion, both the electorate and political elites are responsive to 
changes in social policy and the role of government in society.  
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As an extension of my dissertation project, I intend to examine the role of interest 
groups in directing changes to the social welfare expenditure ratio. I theorize that both 
partisan and institutional factors will influence the efficacy of interest group lobbying. For 
example, I expect that Republican control of the federal government will invite more activity 
by interest groups interested in providing private-sector social welfare. Conversely, I expect 
that during Democratic administrations, interest groups representing beneficiaries of 
government social benefits will lobby for more generous direct public spending. On the 
institutional side, the lack of annual review and smaller number of committees involved in 
the tax expenditure process reduce the scope of conflict that in turn privileges special 
interests. This study could be paired with data on public opinion and provide an interesting 
test of the “subgovernment” and “iron triangle” theories, which claim that less visible and 
traceable policy processes favor special interests over public opinion.  
In this project I only examine the American case, even though many industrialized 
countries have divided social systems financed by the government. There are data available 
from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for both direct 
and indirect spending from 1980-2007 for most of the OECD countries. An obvious 
extension of this project would be to evaluate if right-leaning parties in industrialized 
countries produced more indirect versus direct social spending. Other studies have found that 
public social program retrenchment was not unique to the United States, and many European 
countries not only cut public social welfare spending but replaced these cuts with tax 
incentives for private, market-based social programs (Pierson 1996). Consequently, we might 
expect similar trends in the rise of indirect spending as a policy tool for social programs 
among industrialized countries.  
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Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 1998) demonstrate across issue areas that although 
there are periods of spending stability, government expenditures display greater change than 
has been typically presented in the policy literature. The measurement of indirect government 
spending could be evaluated using the ideas of incrementalism and punctuation. I expect that 
indirect spending might operate in similar ways to direct spending in that there are periods of 
stability peppered by large expenditure changes in certain years. In addition, I expect that 
there is a relationship between indirect and direct spending. The observed changes in direct 
spending could be conditioned or bounded by changes to indirect spending. Dependent upon 
political party control of government or public opinion, these two policy instruments can be 
used as either substitute or complementary methods. An exploration of the exact relationship 
between the two policy tools would provide us a more accurate picture of public policy 
changes in America.  
Finally, I plan to conduct a historical study of the role that political parties and private 
groups played in the development of early social welfare programs commonly referred to as 
the “little New Deals” in the American states. Prior to the Social Security Act of 1935, the 
primary responsibility for social welfare provision fell mainly to private organizations such 
as churches, unions, fraternal and societal organizations, and benevolent societies. During 
this golden age of civic participation, private group leaders faced a dilemma in deciding 
whether or not to lobby for public social welfare programs for their constituencies at the state 
level. I theorize that private group leaders would lobby against generous state benefits and 
the perceived interests of their principals, the members, in order to protect private social 
benefits from public programs. I expect that states with higher levels of certain social capital 
will produce less generous state-level social benefits.  
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Table 2.1. An International Comparison of Direct and Indirect Spending as a 
Percentage of GDP, 2003 
Country Direct Rank Indirect Rank Total Rank 
United 
States 
16.7 (13) 10 (1) 26.7 (9) 
Australia 20.1 (9) 4.5 (5) 24.6 (10) 
Belgium 28.2 (4) 3.9 (6) 32.1 (4) 
Canada 19.1 (10) 5.4 (4) 24.5 (11) 
Denmark 27.4 (5) 2.5 (12) 29.9 (6) 
France 31.5 (2) 2.7 (10) 34.2 (2) 
Germany 29.2 (3) 3 (9) 32.2 (3) 
Ireland 17.6 (12) 0.5 (13) 18.1 (13) 
Japan 18.9 (11) 3.3 (7) 22.2 (12) 
Netherlands 21.4 (8) 7.7 (2) 29.1 (7) 
Norway 25.8 (6) 2.6 (11) 28.4 (8) 
Sweden 32 (1) 3 (8) 35 (1) 
England 23.4 (7) 6.8 (3) 30.2 (5) 
Source: OECD 2005  
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Table 2.2. Distribution of Income Class of Selected Individual Tax 
Expenditures, 2006 Rates and Income Levels (Amounts in millions of dollars, 
returns in thousands) 
Income 
Class 
Earned 
Income  
Credit 
 
 Child 
Care 
Credit 
 
 Student 
Loan 
Interest 
Deduction 
 
 
Returns Amount Returns Amount Returns Amount 
Below 
$10,000 
5,747 6,650 1 0 35 2 
$10,000 - 
$20,000 
6,407 16,349 112 26 259 16 
$20,000-
$30,000 
4,808 11,353 455 228 464 37 
$30,000-
$40,000 
4,607 6,446 553 302 707 69 
$40,000-
$50,000 
1,815 1,987 603 370 767 95 
$50,000-
$75,000 
534 475 1,193 636 1,602 191 
$75,000-
$100,000 
9 5 1,011 534 1,036 120 
$100,000-
$200,000 
3 5 1,866 984 1,516 249 
$200,000 
and over 
0 0 362 188 NA NA 
Source: The JCT 2007 
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Table 3.1. Tax Expenditures for Social Welfare in Fiscal Year 1967 
Health, Labor, and Welfare Millions 
 
Disability insurance benefits 
 
100 
 
Provisions relating to aged blind and 
disabled: 
 
Combined cost for additional exemption- 
retirement income credit-and exclusion of 
OASDHI for aged 
2,300 
 Additional exemption for the blind 10 
 Sick pay exclusion 85 
 Exclusion of unemployment insurance 
benefits 
300 
 Exclusion of workmen’s compensation 
benefits 
150 
 Exclusion of public assistance benefits 50 
 
Net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings:  
 
 Plans for employees 3,000 
 Plans for self-insured persons 60 
 
Exclusion of other employee benefits: 
 
Premiums on group term life insurance 400 
Deductibility of accident and death benefits 25 
Medical insurance premiums and medical 
care 
1,100 
Privately financed supplementary 
unemployment benefits 
25 
Meals and lodging 100 
Exclusion of life insurance savings 900 
Deductibility of charitable contributions 
(other than education) 
2,200 
Deductibility of medical expenses 1,500 
Deductibility of child and dependent care 
expenses 
25 
Deductibility of casualty losses 70 
Excess of standard deduction over minimum 3,200 
Credit for employing public assistance 
recipients under WIN program 
(1) 
5-year amortization of child care facilities (1) 
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EDUCATION  
Additional personal exemption for students                                                             500 
Deductibility of contributions to educational 
institutions             170 
Exclusion of scholarships and fellowships              50 
 
 
VETERANS BENEFITS AND 
SERVICES 
 
Exclusion of certain veterans’ benefits             550 
Source: The JCT 1971 
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Table 3.2. Tax Expenditures for Social Welfare in Fiscal Year 2007 
Category  Billions  
  
Education Training Employment and 
Social Services 
 
Tax credits for tuition for post-secondary 
education 
4.9 
Deduction for interest on student loans 0.8 
Exclusion of tax and earnings of Coverdell 
education savings accounts 
0.1 
Exclusion of interest on educational savings 
account 
(1) 
Exclusion of tax on earnings of qualified 
tuition programs 
0.7 
Exclusion of scholarship and fellowship 
income, 
1.5 
Exclusion of income attributable to the 
discharge of certain student loan debt and 
NHSC Education Loan repayments 
(1) 
Exclusion of employer-provided tuition 
assistance benefits 
0.8 
Exclusion of employer-provided tuition 
reduction benefits 
0.2 
Parental personal exemption for students 
age 19 to 23 
0.5 
Exclusion of interest on State and local 
governments qualified private activity 
bonds for student loans 
0.3 
Exclusion of interest on State and local 
governments qualified private nonprofit and 
qualified public educational facilities 
1.1 
Deduction for charitable contributions to 
educational institutions 
5.3 
Employment:  
Exclusion of employee meals and lodging 
(other than military) 
0.9 
Exclusion of benefits provided under 
cafeteria plans 
27.9 
Exclusion of housing allowances for 
ministers 
0.5 
Exclusion of miscellaneous fringe benefits 6.6 
Exclusion of employee awards 0.2 
Exclusion of income earned by voluntary 3.3 
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employees’ beneficiary associations 
Special tax provisions for employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs) 
0.3 
Work opportunity tax credit (1) 
Welfare to work tax credit (1) 
Deferral of taxation and capital gains 
treatment on spread on acquisition of stock 
under incentive stock option plans and 
employee stock purchase plans 
 
0.3 
Social Services:  
Tax credit for children under 17 46.0 
Tax credit for child and dependent care and 
exclusion of employer-provided child care 
3.1 
Tax credit for employer-provided dependent 
care 
(1) 
Exclusion of certain foster care payments 0.6 
Adoption credit and employee adoption 
benefits exclusion 
0.4 
Deduction for charitable contributions other 
than health and education 
29.1 
Tax credit for disabled access expenditures 0.1 
  
Health  
  
Exclusion of employer contributions for 
health care, health insurance premiums, and 
long-term care insurance premiums 
90.6 
Exclusion of medical care and TRICARE 
medical insurance for military dependents 
retirees and retiree dependents 
1.9 
Deduction for health insurance premiums 
and long-term care insurance premiums by 
the self-employed 
3.8 
Exclusion of workers’ compensation 
benefits (medical benefits) 
6.5 
Health savings accounts 0.1 
Exclusion of interest on State and local 
governments qualified private activity 
bonds for private nonprofit hospital 
facilities 
1.7 
Deduction for charitable contributions to 
health organizations 
3.7 
Tax credit for orphan drug research 0.3 
Tax credit for purchase of health insurance 
by certain displaced persons 
0.2 
152 
 
Exclusion of Medicare benefits:  
Hospital insurance (Part A) 18.5 
Supplementary medical insurance (Part B) 12.5 
Prescription drug insurance (Part D) 3.4 
Exclusion of certain subsidies to employers 
who maintain prescription drug plans for 
Medicare enrollees 
1.6 
  
Income Security  
  
Exclusion of workers’ compensation 
benefits (disability and survivors payments) 
 
2.5 
Exclusion of damages on account of 
personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness 
1.4 
Exclusion of special benefits for disabled 
coal miners 
0.1 
Exclusion of cash public assistance benefits 3.4 
 
Net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings: 
 
Employer plans 104.1 
Individual retirement plans 11.2 
Plans covering partners and sole proprietors 
(“Keogh plans”) 
9.4 
Tax credit for new retirement plan expenses 
of small businesses 
 
(1) 
Exclusion of other employee benefits:  
Premiums on group life insurance 2.5 
Premiums on accident and disability 
insurance 
2.6 
Additional standard deduction for the blind 
and the elderly 
1.6 
Tax credit for the elderly and disabled (1) 
Deduction for causality and theft losses 0.7 
Earned Income Credit (EITC) 42.1 
Exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness 
income of Hurricane Katrina victims 
 
0.2 
 
 
Social Security and Railroad Retirement  
Exclusion of untaxed social security and 
railroad retirement benefits 
 
 
23.1 
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Veterans’ Benefits and Services  
Exclusion of untaxed social security and 
railroad retirement benefits 
 
 
23.1 
 
 
Veterans’ Benefits and Services  
Exclusion of veterans’ disability 
compensation 
3.6 
Exclusion of veterans’ pensions 0.1 
Exclusion of veterans’ readjustment benefits 0.2 
Exclusion of interest on State and local 
government qualified private activity bonds 
for veterans’ housing 
(1) 
Source: The JCT 2008 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Various Types of Social Spending, 1967-
2007 
Variable  N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Social 
Expenditure 
Ratio 
40 2.044 3.811 -3.452 16.357 
Total Social 
Spending 
40 964.172 676.143 153.458 2423.527 
Direct Social 
Spending 
40 711.883 551.266 153.458 2423.527 
Indirect 
Social 
Spending 
40 252.289 127.606 94.094 536.400 
Direct 
Health  
40 205.370 194.100 9.372 672.778 
Indirect 
Health  
40 73.817 53.392 15.206 205.300 
Direct 
Income 
Security 
40 447.017 316.923 38.435 1091.400 
Indirect 
Income 
Security 
40 128.697 49.507 46.697 193.180 
Direct 
Welfare 
40 32.728 22.126 .996 77.328 
Indirect 
Welfare 
40 41.636 33.815 10.905 130.375 
Direct 
Education 
40 26.766 21.906 4.685 99.955 
Indirect 
Education 
40 8.137 5.751 3.796 25.420 
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Table 4.2. The Organization of Indirect and Direct Social Spending by 
Categories 
 
Sub-Categories Indirect Social Spending Direct Social Spending 
Health Care  Exclusion of 
employer/employee 
contributions to medical 
insurance, deductibility of 
medical expenses, exclusion 
of workers medical 
compensation, 15 other 
programs listed under 
Health, please see table 3.2. 
Health Care 
Services(Medicaid), Health 
Research and Training, 
Consumer and Occupational 
Health and Safety, Medicare  
Income Security Net exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings 
including: employer plans, 
individual retirement plans, 
Keogh plans, Veterans 
Benefits and Services, 20 
other programs listed under 
Income Security in table 3.2. 
Social Security, Veterans 
Benefits and Services, 
Training and Employment, 
Other Labor Services, 
Income Security 
Welfare  Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), 10 other programs 
listed under the category 
Welfare in table 3.2. 
Social Services, Food and 
nutrition assistance 
Education Tax credit for tuition and 
post-secondary education, 
deduction for higher 
education expenses, 13 other 
programs listed under 
Education in table 3.2. 
Elementary, Secondary, and 
Vocational Education, 
Higher Education, Research 
and General Education Aids 
Sources: The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), Policy Agendas Project 
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Table 4.3. The Percentage Change in Total Social Spending Between the 
Republican and Democratic Parties, 1967-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institution Democratic Republican T-Score P-Value 
Presidency .045 
(.008) 
.051 
(.011) 
−0.371 .712 
House .051 
(.011) 
.044 
(.003) 
0.364 .717 
Senate .051 
(.014) 
.046 
(.005) 
0.293 .770 
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Table 4.4. Annual Change in the Social Expenditure Ratio, 1967-2006 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 
 
∆ Social Welfare Spending Ratio t-1 −.285** (.111) 
−.350** 
(.130) 
 
∆ Republican President t .020* (.010) 
.010 
(.012) 
 
Republican President t-1 −.007 (.012) 
.003 
(.009) 
 
∆ Republican Congress t .145* (.128)  
 
Republican Congress t-1 .199** (.085)  
 
∆ Republican House t  .023** (.012) 
 
Republican House t-1  .017 (.021) 
 
∆ Republican Senate t  .053** (.015) 
 
Republican Senate t-1  .038** (.016) 
 
∆ Unemployment t .004 (.007) 
.002 
(.006) 
 
Unemployment t-1 .014*** (.004) 
.003 
(.006) 
 
∆ Inflation t .002 (.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
 
Inflation t-1 .004 (.003) 
.005 
(.003) 
 
Constant −.103* (.067) 
.043 
(.062) 
 
N 38 38 
 
Adj. R² .361 .499  
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 4.5. Annual Change in the Social Expenditure Ratio with Institutional 
Variables, 1967-2006 
Individual Variable Model 3      Model 4 
∆ Social Welfare Spending 
Ratio t-1 
−.278* 
(.116) 
−.263* 
(.119) 
∆ Republican President t .016 (.015) 
.017 
(.015) 
Republican President t-1 −.006 (.012) 
−.009 
(.013) 
∆ Republican Congress t .144 (.141) 
.113 
(.162) 
Republican Congress t-1 .210** (.089) 
.203** 
(.098) 
∆ Divided Government t .003 (.012)  
Divided Government t-1 −.006 (.009)  
∆ Party Polarization t  .079 (.109) 
Party Polarization t-1  .007 (.069) 
∆ Unemployment t .005 (.008) 
.006 
(.009) 
Unemployment t-1 .014** (.004) 
.014** 
(.004) 
∆ Inflation t .002 (.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
Inflation t-1 .004 (.003) 
.004 
(.004) 
Constant −.106* (.069) 
−.110* 
(.074) 
N 38 38 
Adj. R² .332 .325 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 5.1. Sources of Health Insurance Coverage for the Nonelderly Population, 
1996-2008 
 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Employer-based 64.8 68.4 63.1 61.1 
Own name 33.3 34.6 32.0 31.4 
Dependent 31.5 33.8 31.1 29.7 
Individual 16.8 16.0 17.5 16.7 
Public 16.2 14.6 17.7 19.4 
Medicare 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.9 
Medicaid 12.2 10.7 13.6 14.9 
Tricare/CHAMPVA 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 
No Health 
Insurance 
16.4 15.6 16.9 17.4 
Source: Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI) 2008 
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Table 5A.1. Private Social Welfare Expenditure Data 
Social  Category Private Data Sources 
Health Care Private health 
insurance, services, 
supplies, 
noncommercial 
medical research, and 
medical facilities 
construction 
HCFA, SSA 
Income Maintenance Employee benefit 
plans in the private 
sector, including 
group life insurance, 
sickness and disability 
insurance, long-term 
disability insurance, 
and private pension 
plans 
U.S. Census, IRS, 
HIAA, ACLI, NIPA, 
Department of Labor 
Welfare Welfare services 
designated by SIC: 
individual and family 
services, adoption 
services, child day 
care services, senior 
citizen services, 
counseling and 
referral services to 
family and 
individuals, 
residential care, 
halfway homes, group 
foster homes, 
recreation and group 
work, civic and 
social/fraternal 
groups, job training, 
vocational rehab 
centers and skill 
training centers 
BEA, BLS, NIPA, 
SIC, Department of 
Health and Human 
Services 
Education Private higher 
education, K-12, 
vocational schools 
Department of 
Education, NCES 
Source: Social Security Administration 
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Table 5.2. Political Parties, the Social Expenditure Ratio and Private-Sector 
Social Spending 
Independent 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Social 
Expenditure 
Ratio 
Private 
Spending 
Private 
Spending 
Private 
Spending 
Republican 
President 
-.013 
(.026) 
-.066 
(.050) 
-.058 
(.049) 
-.055 
(.050) 
Republican 
Congress 
.724** 
(.302) 
.579 
(.519) 
.150 
(.663) 
.268 
(.679) 
Social 
Expenditure 
Ratio 
  
.591* 
(.338) 
.573* 
(.400) 
∆ 
Unemployment    
.005 
(.013) 
∆ GDP 
   
.018 
(.019) 
Constant 
-.037 
(.120) 
-.136 
          (.233) 
-.114 
(.227) 
-.198 
(.258) 
N 27 27 27 27 
Adj. R² 
.136 .009 .045 .021 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 5.3. Political Party Control, the Social Expenditure Ratio and Private-
Sector Social Spending 
Independent 
Variable 
Private Spending Private Spending Private Spending 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
Republican 
President 
-.017 
 (.041) 
-.031 
(.045) 
-.030 
(.047) 
Republican  
House 
NA NA NA 
Republican 
Senate 
.033* 
(.023) 
.026 
(.040) 
-.002 
(.061) 
Social Expenditure 
Ratio 
 .307 
(.303) 
.565 
(.504) 
∆ Unemployment   .013 
(.019) 
∆ GDP   .004 
(.006) 
Constant .046** 
(.033) 
.017 
(.085) 
.155 
(.218) 
Adjusted R2 .031 .060 .098 
N 27 27 27 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 5.4. Political Parties, DW-NOMINATE, the Social Expenditure Ratio, 
and Private-Sector Social Spending 
Independent 
Variable 
Private Spending Private Spending Private Spending 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DWNOMINATE 
President 
-.021 
(.048) 
-.041 
(.053) 
-.048 
(.055) 
Republican  
House 
NA NA NA 
Republican 
Senate 
.035 
(.030) 
.029 
(.031) 
.001 
(.016) 
Social Expenditure 
Ratio 
 .327 
(.307) 
.588 
(.507) 
∆ Unemployment   .013 
(.019) 
∆ GDP   .004 
(.006) 
Constant .038** 
(.020) 
.037 
(.089) 
.179 
(.222) 
Adjusted R2 .032 .064 .103 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 6.1. The Average Income Redistribution of Selected Tax Expenditures 
for Social Welfare by Income Class, 2007 
Income Class Medical Deduction Charitable 
Contribution 
Deduction 
$10,000 & < NA NA 
$10,000-20,000 $180.9 $91.2 
$20,000-30,000 $289.7 $150.3 
$30,000-40,000 $361.4 $198.2 
$40,000-50,000 $479.1 $244.9 
$50,000-75,000 $716.1 $363.9 
$75,000-100,000 $920.4 $469 
$100,000-200,000 $1,809.6 $837.5 
$200,000 & > $6,463.3 $4,240.2 
Source: The JCT/JCS – 3-07 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
Table 6.2. Political Parties, Social Spending, and Income Inequality 
Independent 
Variable 
Social 
Expenditure 
Ratio 
Income 
Inequality 
Income 
Inequality 
Income 
Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Republican 
President 
-.013 
(.026) 
.133* 
(.094) 
.112 
(.097) 
.238** 
(.090) 
Republican 
Congress 
.741** 
(.362) 
-.256 
(.915) 
-.431 
(.941) 
-.990 
(.864) 
Social 
Expenditure 
Ratio 
  
.900* 
(.741) 
.124* 
(.093) 
∆ 
Unemployment    
-.096*** 
(.029) 
Constant 
.332** 
(.112) 
4.762*** 
          (.396) 
4.623*** 
(.427) 
5.575 
(.456) 
N 33 33 33 33 
Adj. R² 
.183 .067 .090 .231 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 6.3. Political Party Control, Social Spending, and Income Inequality 
Independent 
Variable 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Republican 
President 
.147* 
(.109) 
.161* 
(.104) 
.185* 
(.105) 
Republican  
House 
.008 
(.164) 
.090 
(.161) 
.101 
(.162) 
Republican 
Senate 
-.211** 
(.106) 
-.346** 
(.120) 
-.373** 
(.125) 
Social Expenditure 
Ratio 
 2.368** 
(1.151) 
2.379** 
(1.158) 
Unemployment   -.225 
(.273) 
Constant 4.71*** 
(.087) 
4.20*** 
(.263) 
4.129*** 
(.265) 
Adjusted R2 .125 .213 .203 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 6.4. Political Parties, DW-NOMINATE, Social Spending, and Income 
Inequality 
Independent 
Variable 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DWNOMINATE 
President 
.206* 
(.132) 
.199* 
(.129) 
.226* 
(.130) 
Republican  
House 
.047 
(.170) 
.105 
(.166) 
.116 
(.167) 
Republican 
Senate 
-.230** 
(.108) 
-.349** 
(.120) 
-.374** 
(.125) 
Social Expenditure 
Ratio 
 2.197** 
(1.147) 
2.183** 
(1.152) 
Unemployment   -.218 
(.272) 
Constant 4.78*** 
(.055) 
4.313*** 
(.250) 
4.322*** 
(.252) 
Adjusted R2 .143 .215 .205 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 
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Table 6.5. Political Parties, Presidential Administration, Social Spending, and 
Income Inequality 
Independent 
Variable 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
Income  
Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
President  
Nixon 
.274** 
(.131) 
.343** 
(.128) 
.421** 
(.132) 
President 
Ford  
.004 
(.149) 
.207 
(.175) 
.302 
(.179) 
President 
Carter 
-.274** 
(.138) 
-.108** 
(.154) 
-.048** 
(.153) 
President 
Reagan 
-.105 
(.178) 
-.096 
(.168) 
-.077 
(.163) 
President 
Bush 
-.257* 
(.138) 
-.174* 
(.136) 
-.109* 
(.138) 
Republican  
House 
-.213 
(.178) 
-.106 
(.175) 
-.084 
(.171) 
Republican 
Senate 
-.105 
(.151) 
-.169 
(.146) 
-.184 
(.141) 
Social Expenditure 
Ratio 
 2.474* 
(1.214) 
2.836* 
(1.194) 
Unemployment   -.357* 
(.217) 
Constant 4.852*** 
(.098) 
4.321*** 
(.318) 
4.115*** 
(.315) 
Adjusted R2 .449 .511 .543 
Note: Entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed Significance  
Levels: * p ≤. 10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01
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  Figure 2.1. The Partisan Theory of Social Policy 
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Figure 3. 1. The Growth of Tax Expenditures versus Direct 
Spending, 1972-2007 
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Figure 3.2. Social Welfare Tax Expenditures, 1967 - 2007 
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Figure 3.3.  The Composition of Health Care Spending, 1975-2005 
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Figure 3.4. The Composition of Income Security Spending  
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Figure 3.5. The Composition of Welfare Spending, 1975-2005 
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Figure 3.6. The Composition of Education Spending, 1975-2005 
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Figure 4.1. The Social Expenditure Ratio, 1972-2007 
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Figure 5.1. The Partisan Theory of Social Policy and Private-Sector Social Spending 
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Figure 6.1. The Partisan Theory of Social Welfare and Income Inequality 
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APPENDIX 
Private-Sector Spending by Sub Category 
Health Care 
    The health care expenditure data are collected by the SSA come from the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA). They include private spending on health services and 
supplies, noncommercial medical research, private insurance, and medical facilities 
construction. HCFA's estimates are based on the National Health Accounts that provide a 
framework for understanding the nature of health care spending in America. The HCFA uses 
a two-dimensional classification matrix with categories of providers or services along one 
dimension, and sources of funds across the other. From 1972-1994, health care has 
represented the largest share of private social spending, in 1994 health care represented 57% 
of total private spending, but surprisingly health care's percentage of total private social-
welfare spending has not changed since 1972. In 1992, total health care spending for both 
public and private sectors totaled to $820.3 billion or 13.6 percent of GDP.  
Welfare 
Welfare spending estimates are manufactured from an indicator series developed by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and a personal consumption expenditure measure from 
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), an agency within the Department of 
Commerce. These data represent the private efforts of employers and nonprofits to assuage 
poverty, assist in child care, and construct a minimal amount of income security for citizens. 
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Welfare services are classified by the Bureau of the Census according to definitions provided 
by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). These services include: individual and family 
services, adoption services, child day care services, senior citizen services, counseling and 
referral services to family and individuals, residential care, halfway homes, group foster 
homes, recreation and group work, civic and social/fraternal groups, job training, vocational 
rehab centers and skill training centers. Public funds and financing are excluded from the 
private social welfare estimates. Total welfare spending grew to $86.2 billion dollars in 1994 
from 7.5 billion in 1972. The Census survey used by the BEA includes 106,000 social service 
agencies and establishments surveyed in five-year intervals in conjunction with the 
Economic Census. Welfare costs between census years are estimated by extrapolating wage 
data collected by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS). The percentage of welfare 
services expenditures in this category increased, in relation to total private spending, from 7.9 
percent in 1972 to 9.3 percent in 1994. The percentage distribution of spending in 1992 were: 
social services at 23.9%, individual and family services at 19.6%, residential care at 18.2%, 
civic and social/fraternal organizations at 18.1%, child day care at 10.9%, and job training 
and vocational rehab services at 9.4%.   
Pensions 
    Income maintenance expenditures represent outlays for employee benefit plans in the 
private sector, including group life insurance, sickness and disability insurance, long-term 
disability insurance, and private pension plans. Income maintenance has experienced the 
most growth over the past twenty years increasing from 17.1 billion dollars in 1972 to 204.7 
billion in 1994. The vast majority of income maintenance spending went towards pension 
plan benefits at around 85% and private pension plans denote 19.1% of total social spending 
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by the private sector.  These estimates are based on an indicator series developed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the national income and product accounts on 
personal consumption expenditures. The primary data are collected by the Census Bureau 
from its Census of Service Industries. In addition, these data are also collected from: the 
Health Insurance Association of America, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of 
Labor, and the American Council of Life Insurance. Public funds are excluded from the 
estimates for private social services. In 1992, $10.2 billion was spent for group life insurance 
benefits that were based directly on an employment relationship. The estimate is adjusted to 
exclude group policies not based directly on employer-employee relationships, such as 
insurance for credit card holders, mortgage insurance, fraternal societies, savings or 
investment groups, professional societies, and employee associations. The data on 
supplemental unemployment benefits are derived from the NIPA series "Other Labor Income 
by Industry and by Type". In 1992, sickness and disability welfare benefits were 14.6 billion 
dollars, most spending in this sector was paid sick leave to workers amounting to $12.7 
billion and the remaining $1.9 billion was paid under group and self-insurance programs.          
Education    
    The Social Security Administration constructs private sector education spending data using 
information from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and the Department 
of Education (DOE). The BEA also has a measure of public and private education spending 
that over the years has converged with the SSA series. In 1994, private spending for 
education was 100.8 billion dollars - 50% of that was for higher education, 28% was K-12 
education, 17% was for commercial and vocational schools, and 5% included private funds 
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for school construction. These private expenditures amounted to 11.0 percent of all private 
social welfare expenditures, down from 15.6 percent in 1972. 
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